

COMMAND INVESTIGATION REPORT

CHATTANOOGA ARMED FORCES

RECRUITING STATION AND NAVY

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER

SHOOTINGS OF JULY 16, 2015

October 2, 2015

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Executive Summary

At approximately 1050 on the morning of July 16, 2015, (b)(6) (b)(6) a 24-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kuwait and raised in Tennessee, drove a Ford Mustang convertible in front of the Armed Forces Recruiting Station (AFRS) located in a Chattanooga strip mall. Using a semi-automatic rifle (AK-74, 5.45 caliber) (b)(6) fired from the car into the AFRS, directing the majority of his fire into the Marine portion of the office, causing damage and wounding one Marine. (b)(6) then drove to the Chattanooga Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), arriving at approximately 1057. After ramming his car through the NOSC's front gate, (b)(6) entered the NOSC on foot and proceeded through the building and outside into the motor pool, continuously firing his weapon. Chattanooga Police Department (CPD) was following (b)(6) due to his erratic driving and arrived at the NOSC at the same time. Within minutes, CPD killed (b)(6) while he was in the motor pool. Law Enforcement (LE) then searched the NOSC for additional suspects and explosive devices. Before he was stopped, (b)(6) wounded a CPD police officer, killed four Marines, and mortally wounded one Sailor. Post-incident response efforts began immediately to support the wounded, the families of the deceased, and affected Sailors and Marines. The LE and emergency medical service (EMS) response was both heroic and effective. Overall post-incident response, casualty assistance and post traumatic incident care was timely and responsive to the needs of those affected by the incidents.

Law Enforcement (LE) Disclaimer: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM) directed this investigation be conducted in a manner not to interfere with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation. The

investigation team coordinated all LE information through the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

The FBI's criminal investigation into the Chattanooga shootings is ongoing. The details of the shootings contained in this report were the only details released by the FBI. In accordance with FBI guidance, this investigation did not take sworn statements, did not record statements, and did not question witnesses about actions or observations during the shootings in order to preserve the integrity of the ongoing FBI investigation. Any further inquiries into the shootings should be cleared through the FBI via NCIS.

(U/FOUO) Known threat at the time of the July 16 shootings. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terrorist threat level for the United States was "SIGNIFICANT," which is defined by the following conditions: Anti-U.S. terrorists are operationally active and attack personnel as the preferred method of operation; or, terrorist groups seek to carry out large casualty producing attacks but are operationally limited. Per NCIS, there were no indications of an imminent terrorist attack on Department of the Navy (DON) personnel on July 16. On May 5, 2015, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) issued a FP advisory message to ensure increased vigilance and safeguarding of all DoD personnel, installations and facilities in the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). The advisory came in response to an increased general threat of homegrown violent extremist (HVE) attacks from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) supporters, and was based on assessments of recent violent activity against military and law enforcement personnel. USNORTHCOM stated there was a lack of specificity about timing and targeting; no imminent credible threat against U.S. military personnel was identified.

Inquiry into the shootings. On August 10, 2015, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) directed the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant

of the Marine Corps (CMC) to coordinate action in support of appropriate fact finding regarding the incidents at the Chattanooga NOSC and the AFRS on July 16, 2015.

On August 10, 2015, CNO forwarded SECNAV's memorandum of August 10 to COMUSFLTFORCOM, directing him to ensure, following a full and comprehensive investigation in accordance with the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN), that the findings, opinions, recommendations, and actions be appropriately coordinated given the joint interests of the Navy and Marine Corps.

On August 11, 2015, COMUSFLTFORCOM appointed (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED], to inquire into the Chattanooga shooting incidents for the purpose of identifying any deficiencies in or non-compliance with applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to Force Protection (FP) for off-installation activities of the Navy and Marine Corps.

COMUSFLTFORCOM directed that (b)(6) [REDACTED] report findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in writing to COMUSFLTFORCOM, with a copy to Marine Forces North.

The investigative effort was tasked to examine the following:

- Applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to Force Protection (FP) for off-installation activities in place at the time of the shootings to determine whether they were being properly executed.
- Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF) related to FP for off-installation activities to determine any possible deficiencies.
- Whether the two subparagraphs above contributed to the tragic loss from the shootings.

- Applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to emergency response management for off-installation activities to determine proper execution and compliance.
- Appropriateness of DON post-incident response, including medical response, support to victims, survivors, and their families.
- Applicable law, regulations, programs, policies, and procedures related to FP for off-installation activities to determine whether they were adequate in light of the threat which was known at the time of the shootings.

Methodology

The investigation team employed a multi-disciplinary, fact-finding approach and reviewed documents, interviewed witnesses, interviewed headquarters SMEs, and conducted field observations. The investigation team was augmented by a Headquarters Marine Corps Mission Assurance Team (MAT) of SMEs. The MAT tailored the Mission Assurance Assessment (MAA) methodology for an off-installation assessment using recognized Navy and Marine Corps benchmark criteria. The MAT prepared a MAA and All Hazards Threat Assessment (AHTA) to provide context and detail to this report. These reports are provided in Appendices C and D.

Findings

The findings of this investigation fall primarily into two categories: **Compliance** with applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to FP, EM, and post-incident response for off-installation activities in place at the time of the shootings; and **deficiencies** with DOTMLPF related to the adequacy of FP for off-installation activities.

Primary Compliance Findings:

- Commanders did not fully implement FP-related programs to include Antiterrorism (AT), Mission Assurance (MA), and Emergency Management (EM) due to gaps in policy; lack of synchronization of AT requirements between TACON for FP and OPCON/ADCON chains of command; and non-compliance with existing policy.
- Risk Management (RM), a fundamental component of AT, was not uniformly used to inform commanders' AT planning, threat and vulnerability assessments, risk mitigation strategies, training, and resourcing processes.
- There was a lack of AT planning and exercises, site-specific incident response plans, and coordination with local emergency response agencies.
- Hamilton County and Chattanooga City emergency response agencies provided effective and heroic emergency response.
- Navy-Marine Corps post-incident services to Sailors, Marines, and families were appropriate.

Primary Deficiency Findings:

- The process for Recruiting Commanders to implement risk-based physical security decisions into existing lease agreements does not enable rapid response to evolving threats.
- DON has not implemented a universal unclassified capability to provide rapid threat dissemination and near real-time threat sharing to off-installation activities.
- AT Level II Training does not address the unique FP concerns of off-installation activities. AT Level III Commander Training should be

evaluated for applicability to off-installation activities. Although active shooter training is contained in AT Level I Training, it is not specifically required to be exercised uniformly across the Navy and Marine Corps.

Opinions

There are five opinions that inform this report's recommendations. The first three are the primary report themes. First, DON culture must universally shift to treat FP as an operational mission vice administrative program. Second, commanders must emphasize FP readiness through deliberate planning, training and exercises. Finally, FP strategies must add time throughout the active shooter detect-to-engage sequence in order to enhance personnel survivability until LE arrives.

Opinion 1: The DON requires a cultural shift in its approach to FP at off-installation activities. From day one of command, commanders must treat FP as an operational requirement vice an administrative program. Commanders at all levels must own the FP risks within their operational environment. The means by which commanders exercise FP for their Sailors, Marines, and civilians, regardless of what or where they command, must be oriented and adapted to unique mission requirements, emerging threats, and local FP vulnerabilities.

The cultural shift must extend to every member of a command. As in combat, every individual must maintain the situational awareness, training, and mental toughness to act decisively toward a range of threats.

Opinion 2: This investigation found instances of non-compliance with policy related to FP for off-installation activities and deficiencies with DOTMLPF related to FP for off-installation activities. Deliberate compliance with existing FP requirements would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses. However, the deficiencies and non-

compliance, individually or collectively, did not contribute to the tragic loss from the shootings.

Opinion 3: ISIL, al-Qa'ida, and HVEs, using the active shooter tactic, have placed a priority on attacking off-installation targets, thereby increasing the threat to those personnel and facilities. It is impractical to resource all recruiting and reserve centers to the same level as installations. However, since the threat has increased, DON needs to either assume greater risk at these facilities, or increase the resources allocated to them, in order to maintain or reduce their risk.

Risk can be determined using the elements of threat, vulnerability, and criticality. Any change to these variables will be reflected by a corresponding change in risk. The Navy's Required Operational Capability (ROC) tiering strategy bins installations and facilities into categories according to their respective mission criticality (ROC Levels 1-5). ROC Level 1 (strategic weapons facilities and command and control) is the highest criticality, and Level 5 (all off-installation facilities) is the lowest criticality.

Assuming the threat remains relatively constant, AT resources (which directly affect the vulnerability) are allocated to maintain acceptable levels of risk to Navy installations and facilities according to their respective mission criticality. Any increase in the threat requires either a decrease in criticality (lower priority placed upon the mission accomplished by an installation or facility), or a decrease in vulnerability (through the allocation of additional resources used to reduce an installation or facility's vulnerability), in order to maintain the same level of risk.

During an active shooter event, priority should be survivability of personnel. Off-installation FP strategies must rapidly warn personnel, as well as deter and delay the active shooter until the arrival of LE. It is critical to prioritize capabilities that will **add time** throughout the active shooter detect-to-engage sequence.

Therefore, resourcing strategies should target points within an active shooter detect-to-engage sequence where improvements will add time to enhance survivability. Examples include next generation, near real time, hand held communication capabilities; adding additional impediments to a shooter's movement; and tight coordination with local agencies. All of these examples could provide precious minutes for personnel to execute IRPs (run, hide, fight) and enable LE to respond to the threat.

Opinion 4: There is a deficiency in DON EM Program policy for off-installation activities. Current policy does not cover all off-installation activities and does not clearly define EM requirements down to the AFRS and reserve center level, which leads to a lack of readiness. Notwithstanding this deficiency and instances of DON non-compliance, the EM response on the day of the shootings was exceptional. Hamilton County and City of Chattanooga EM agencies responded swiftly, effectively, and heroically.

Opinion 5: Post-incident care for victims, survivors, and their families was appropriate, timely, and responsive. There are some points of improvement that should be addressed through a routine after-action review, including Casualty Assistance Calls Officer (CACO) training curricula, continuity of counselling support, and management of crisis response resources. These minor issues did not significantly affect post-incident care.

Recommendations

The investigation team acknowledges it is impractical to protect off-installation activities to the same level as installations. The unique missions of AFRS and reserve centers require our service members to be in and among communities across the nation, in urban and rural areas. A "one size fits all" approach to FP is not viable across recruiting and reserve commands. Each command has unique

local risks which must be addressed through risk-based decision-making with limited fiscal resources and small staffs.

In response to the Chattanooga shootings, SECDEF on July 29, 2015, directed the Services and combatant commanders to develop action plans to improve the security and FP of DoD personnel. This task is being completed through the DoD Mission Assurance Control Board (MACB) co-chaired by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy and the Joint Staff (JS). Navy and Marine Corps should synchronize the opinions and recommendations of this investigation with the MCAB.

To directly address the findings and opinions most relevant to strengthening the DON's FP posture against active shooter threats, Navy and Marine Corps must take the **immediate** actions below:

- Comply with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) memorandum of July 29, 2015, on arming personnel, FP enhancements for off-installation leased facilities, and mass warning/notification systems.
- Reinforce commander ownership of FP and the risk management process through deliberate assessment.
- Direct unit level development and rehearsal of emergency action plans, to include active shooter scenarios, for the most likely local threats and coordinate those plans with local LE & EM response agencies.
- Mandate stand-alone active shooter training for individuals and units. Require active shooter response scenarios to be exercised uniformly across the Navy and Marine Corps.
- Require NRD, NOSC, and RS commanders to attend AT Level III training prior to assuming command. Ensure Level III curricula includes information relevant for off-installation commanders and provides requisite tools and knowledge for management of their AT programs.

Additionally, Navy and Marine Corps should:

- Evaluate the effectiveness of FP and EM policy and procedures for risk management at off-installation activities. These policies, procedures, and processes should be reviewed from the tactical to strategic level; from off-installation activity OICs up through the chain of command. Policy processes, and procedures should be crafted to take into account small recruiting and reserve staffs.
- Conduct a FP program review to close off-installation FP-related policy gaps (e.g., AT, EM, MA); synchronize FP requirements between TACON for FP and OPCON/ADCON chains of command; and review allocation of resources for the protection of personnel and off-installation facilities in the current threat environment, focusing resources on those materiel solutions that will give our personnel time to execute run, hide, and fight measures in order to survive an active shooter attack.
- Implement a universal unclassified capability to provide rapid threat dissemination and near real-time threat sharing to off-installation activities. Leverage existing unclassified threat dissemination systems (e.g., AtHOC, C4I and Trapwire), local civilian mass warning systems, and mobile applications for hand-held devices.
- Revise, through the DoD/JS MA Coordination Board (MACB), the process for applying additive physical security features to existing leases. The process should be streamlined and the decision-making authority should reside at the lowest level commander within the TACON for FP chain of command.
- Direct commanders to review, exercise, and sign AT plans upon assuming command. Commanders should be required to identify unacceptable risk

in writing to the first flag officer/general officer in the TACON for FP chain of command.

- Require RTC commanders to attend AT Level II training. Review DON AT Level II ATO training and incorporate curricula for off-installation activity protection.
- CNIC, MARFORRES, MCRC, and Manpower and Reserve Affairs capture lessons learned and recommendations from this investigation to improve unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care in future mass casualty post-incident responses.

Chapter 1- Introduction

At approximately 1050 on the morning of July 16, 2015, (b)(6) a 24-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kuwait and raised in Tennessee, drove a Ford Mustang convertible in front of the Armed Forces Recruiting Station (AFRS) located in a Chattanooga strip mall. Using an AK-74 5.45 caliber semi-automatic assault rifle, (b)(6) fired multiple rounds from the car into the AFRS, directing the majority of his fire into the Marine office, causing damage and wounding one Marine. (b)(6) then drove to the Chattanooga Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), arriving at approximately 1057. After ramming his car through the NOSC's front gate, he entered the main building by shooting the locked glass front door with his rifle. He proceeded from the Navy side to the Marine Corps side and finally outside into the motor pool, continuously firing his weapon.

Chattanooga Police Department (CPD) was following (b)(6) due to his erratic driving and arrived at the NOSC at the same time. Within minutes, the police officers engaged (b)(6) while he was in the motor pool and killed him. Before being killed by law enforcement, (b)(6) wounded a police officer, killed four Marines, and shot one Sailor at the NOSC who subsequently died from his injuries.

Law Enforcement (LE) Disclaimer: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM) directed this investigation be conducted in a manner not to interfere with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation. The investigation team coordinated all LE information through the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

The FBI's criminal investigation into the Chattanooga shootings is ongoing. The details of the shootings contained in this report were the only details released by

the FBI. In accordance with FBI guidance, this investigation did not take sworn statements, did not record statements, and did not question witnesses about actions or observations during the shootings in order to preserve the integrity of the ongoing FBI investigation. Any further inquiries into the shootings should be cleared through the FBI via NCIS.

Scope of Investigation

In a memorandum dated August 10, 2015, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) directed the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to coordinate action in support of appropriate fact finding regarding the incidents at the Chattanooga NOSC and the AFRS on July 16, 2015.

In a memorandum dated August 10, 2015, CNO forwarded SECNAV's memorandum of August 10 to COMUSFLTFORCOM as a matter under his cognizance, recognizing that COMUSFLTFORCOM intended to convene an investigation into the Chattanooga shootings. CNO directed COMUSFLTFORCOM to ensure, following a full and comprehensive naval investigation in accordance with the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN), that the findings, opinions, recommendations, and actions be appropriately coordinated given the joint interests of the Navy and Marine Corps.

In a memorandum dated August 11, 2015, COMUSFLTFORCOM, per CNO's memo of August 10 and in accordance with the JAGMAN, appointed (b)(6) (b)(6), as the Investigating Officer to inquire into the shooting incidents for the purpose of identifying any deficiencies in, or non-compliance with, applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures, related to Force Protection (FP) for off-installation activities, of the Department of the Navy (DON). COMUSFLTFORCOM directed (b)(6) report findings

of fact, opinions, and recommendations in writing to COMUSFLTFORCOM, copy to Commander, Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH), by September 25, 2015.

Per COMUSFLTFORCOM's direction, this investigation addresses the following:

- Whether applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to FP for off-installation activities in place at the time of the shootings were being properly executed;
- Whether there were possible deficiencies in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities related (DOTMLPF) to FP for off-installation activities at the time of the shootings;
- Whether the two subparagraphs above contributed to the tragic loss from the shootings;
- Whether applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to emergency response management for off-installation activities were properly executed and complied with;
- Whether there was appropriate DON post-incident response, including medical response, support to victims, survivors, and their families;
- Whether applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to FP for off-installation activities were adequate in light of the threat which was known at the time of the July 16 shootings;
- Specific opinions as to the adequacy of applicable programs, policies, and procedures as they pertain to this incident, and recommendations to address any concerns, lessons learned, or other issues which may be identified during the course of the investigation.

Methodology

The investigation team, led by (b)(6), consisted of 14 investigators and five support personnel. The team consisted of military, DON civilian, and contractor subject matter experts (SMEs) with experience in FP, law enforcement (LE), emergency management (EM), mission assurance (MA), public affairs (PA), investigations, and law. Additionally, the team consulted with SMEs in casualty assistance, chaplain services, and fleet & family services. The FP SMEs were provided from USFLTFORCOM, MARFORNORTH, and Headquarters Marine Corps. Members of the investigation team have extensive experience administering Navy and Marine Corps FP programs and conducting inquiries and assessments. Appendix A is a complete team roster.

The investigation team employed a multi-disciplinary fact-finding approach and reviewed documents, interviewed witnesses, interviewed headquarters SMEs, and conducted field observations. Additionally, (b)(6), or a senior representative, discussed the purpose and scope of the investigation with: COMUSFLTFORCOM; Commander, MARFORNORTH/Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES); Commander, Navy Region Southeast (CNRSE); Commander, Reserve Component Command Southeast (RCC SE) Jacksonville; Commanding Officer, 14th Marine Regiment; Commanding Officer, 6th Marine Corps District; and Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNFRC). This dialogue continued throughout the investigation.

The team used the Headquarters Marine Corps Mission Assurance Assessment (MAA) methodology to provide an MA assessment and an All Hazards Threat Assessment (AHTA).¹ Forty-five program benchmarks were derived from DoD Joint Mission Assurance (MA) Benchmarks and DON policy. These benchmarks were used to determine risk and risk management strategies. See Appendix C. This process is consistent with Joint MA methodologies to assess all protections-

related programs (e.g., FP, critical infrastructure, emergency management, law enforcement, and physical security). The MA team also conducted an AHTA which was used to build a comprehensive list of threats and hazards; and identified the likelihood or probability of occurrence of each threat/hazard. Though completed post-incident, the AHTA is illustrative of the threats and hazards at the time of the incident. See Appendix D.

Report Organization

The report is organized into chapters that provide findings, opinions, and recommendations on the major elements of the appointing order. Chapter 2 provides a sequence of events from the start of the incident and continuing through the post-incident response. Chapter 3 analyzes FP for Navy and Marine Corps recruiting activities. Chapter 4 analyzes FP for Navy and Marine Corps off-installation reserve activities. Chapter 5 analyzes EM for off-installation activities. Chapter 6 analyzes DON post-incident response including medical response, support to victims, survivors, and their families. Chapter 7 analyzes the adequacy of FP for off-installation activities in light of the threat known at the time of the shootings. Chapter 8 offers primary opinions and recommendations. The appendices contain supporting documentation.

The findings of this investigation fall into two categories: **Compliance** with applicable law, regulation, programs, policies, and procedures related to FP for off-installation activities in place at the time of the shootings; and **deficiencies** with DOTMLPF related to FP for off-installation activities. The report highlights findings that are recommended for immediate action.

BACKGROUND

The Armed Forces Recruiting Station

The AFRS is located in a commercial strip mall at 6211 Lee Highway, Suite 3C in Chattanooga, Tennessee. As depicted in Figure 2-3, the AFRS includes Navy, Air Force, Army, National Guard, and Marine Corps recruiting stations. Five Navy personnel and four Marines are assigned to the AFRS.² The AFRS is a leased facility procured through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.³

The Navy Operational Support Center

The NOSC is located within the Tennessee River Park at 4051 Amnicola Highway in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The NOSC's Navy full-time staff includes eleven military members and civilians.⁴ Approximately 145 Navy selected reservists drill at the NOSC.⁵ The NOSC is a federal government-owned building on land leased from the city of Chattanooga.⁶

As depicted in Figure 2-4, USMC M-Battery 3/14's Reserve Training Center (RTC) is also located in the NOSC building. RTC's Inspector & Instructor (I&I) full-time staff consists of eight military members.⁷ Approximately 140 Marine Corps reservists drill with the unit.⁸

Force Protection and Antiterrorism

FP refers to preventative measures designed to mitigate hostile actions against DoD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.⁹ FP has several components. Among these are combating terrorism (CbT), physical security (PS), EM, LE, information security, and continuity of operations.¹⁰ CbT is defined as actions, including antiterrorism (AT) and counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.¹¹

AT, the defensive component of CbT, refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces.¹² AT stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures common to all combatant commands and Services. AT integrates other defensive actions such as PS, Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE), operations security (OPSEC), and Counter Intelligence (CI) in a comprehensive program designed to protect against terrorist attack; however, it does not include all the aspects of FP. Therefore, FP should not be used as a synonymous term with AT.¹³

Fundamentals of DoD AT Programs

As specified in DoDI 2000.16, there are five core elements of an AT program. The core elements apply to all organizational entities in the DoD, including those off-installation.¹⁴ These are: (1) Risk Management (RM); (2) Planning; (3) Training and Exercises; (4) Resource Application; and (5) Comprehensive Program Review.¹⁵

Risk Management. RM permeates all aspects of an AT program. It involves identifying terrorist threats, developing mitigation measures against those threats, and allocating limited resources in the optimal way.¹⁶ RM decisions take into account the unique vulnerabilities and the criticality of assets at a particular command.¹⁷ The ultimate responsibility for RM rests with the commander, who must determine which assets require the most protection and how resources should be optimally applied.¹⁸

Planning. Commanders must develop specific AT guidance and execution-oriented instructions for their subordinates.¹⁹ DoD policy requires this guidance

to be captured in a command AT Plan that is specifically tailored to local conditions.²⁰ A command's AT plans must cover FPCON measures, execution of Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs), conduct of exercises, use of PS measures, and incident response measures.²¹

Training and Exercises. Training and exercises are critical components of a command's AT program. Under DoD policy, a command's AT Plan is incomplete unless it is exercised.²² Unit-level training and drills allow commanders to identify critical shortfalls and optimize response plans.²³

Resource Application. After reducing risk as far as possible through local mitigation measures, commanders employ resource application through the existing planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.²⁴

Program Review. Commanders must conduct comprehensive AT Program Reviews at least annually.²⁵ These reviews are designed to identify deficiencies and vulnerabilities that may be exploited. Reviews should offer realistic solutions to improve the program and strengthen mitigation strategies.²⁶ Additionally, Program Reviews should take into account changes in the threat environment since the last review through threat assessments.²⁷

Tactical Control (TACON) for FP

Commander, USNORTHCOM exercises TACON for FP of all DoD elements and personnel in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR), and directs the day-to-day execution of the FP mission through the designated Service Components, to include USFLTFORCOM and MARFORNORTH (Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 below).²⁸ The USNORTHCOM AOR is divided into Continental U.S. (CONUS) regional and afloat operational environments.


TACON for FP enables the geographic combatant commander (GCC) to order implementation of FP measures, and authorizes the GCC to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce FP measures for covered forces.²⁹ This relationship includes the authority to inspect and assess security requirements, direct DoD activities to identify the resources required to correct deficiencies, and to submit budget requests to parent organizations to fund identified corrections. Persons subject to the GCC's TACON or FP authority include active duty, reserve, and DOD civilians in the GCC's AOR.³⁰

CNO designated COMUSFLTFORCOM as the Executive Agent for Navy FP in the USNORTHCOM AOR.³¹ Specific responsibilities and authorities inherent in this role include exercising command and control (C2) of the operational FP mission for all U.S. Navy shore and afloat commands, activities, facilities, units, elements, and personnel in the USNORTHCOM AOR.³² For Navy forces, facilities, and personnel located in the CONUS Regional Operational Environments, COMUSFLTFORCOM exercises TACON for FP through the respective CONUS Region Commanders. CONUS Region Commanders are responsible for operational matters related to the FP mission for all Navy installations and outlying activities located in their region. CNRSE exercises TACON for FP for all Navy activities in its AOR, including activities not located on an installation. CNRSE's AOR includes the state of Tennessee.³³ These installations and activities include Navy organizations that may not be in the administrative or operational COC of the applicable Navy Region Commander, such as off-installation recruiting offices and Navy reserve operational support activities.³⁴ (Figure 1-1 and 1-2) Note: Administrative and operational chains of command do not have TACON for FP implementing responsibilities.³⁵

CMC designated Commander, MARFORNORTH as the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Service component command to USNORTHCOM and executes TACON

for FP as the single USMC point of contact (POC) under Commander, USNORTHCOM for all USMC personnel, installations, infrastructure, facilities, resources, and information within the NORTHCOM AOR (Figure 1-3).³⁶


MARFORNORTH executes DoD, USNORTHCOM, and Service FP instructions and orders through the designated Supporting Establishment Commands (SEC) defined as Marine Forces Reserve, Marine Corps Installation Command, Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), Training and Education Command, and in coordination with Commandant Plans, Policy, and Operations (DC PP&O) as the office of primary responsibility for AT program policy.³⁷



Source: USFFC AT OPORD 3300.15 & CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14

Figure 1-1. TACON for FP Navy Recruiting Station Chattanooga

TACON for FP Navy Operational Support Center Chattanooga USNORTHCOM AOR



Source: USFFC AT OPORD 3300.15 & CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14

— TACON for FP
- - - ADCON/OPCON

Figure 1-2. TACON for FP for NOSC Chattanooga




Figure 1–3. USMC Recruiting & Reserve TACON for FP Chattanooga

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Discussion

DOTMLPF are resources to resolve validated Service or departmental requirements.³⁸ By law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJSC) advises and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the operational

requirements of combatant commands.³⁹ The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) assists the CJCS in identifying, assessing, and approving joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy.⁴⁰ The JROC uses the Joint Capability Integration and Develop System (JCIDS) process to provide a baseline for validation of capability requirements across DoD as well as facilitate DOTMLPF changes.⁴¹

DON uses Joint and DON concepts to identify capability gaps with DOTMLPF solutions.⁴² The Naval Capabilities Development Process improves existing and develops new warfighting capabilities by translating strategic guidance and operational concepts into specific warfighting capabilities.⁴³

On July 29, 2015, in response to the shootings, SECDEF directed the Services and combatant commanders to develop action plans to improve the security and FP of DoD personnel.⁴⁴ Specifically, SECDEF directed implementing guidance for augmenting security and arming personnel; for improving off-installation site security; and for enhancing mass warning and notification.⁴⁵ This task is being completed through the DoD Mission Assurance Control Board (MACB) co-chaired by OSD Policy and the Joint Staff.⁴⁶

Commanders are responsible for identifying FP DOTMLPF requirements where there are capability gaps. Protecting off-installation activities presents unique FP challenges. However, the local commander, using risk-based decision making, is in the best position to make informed, intelligent decisions about how to protect the command's Marines, Sailors, and DOD civilians.

¹ MCO 3058.1 ¶3(c) Enclosure 1 ¶2(a)(2).

² Email of (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Aug 15; email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 3 Sep 15.

- ³ SI with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15, § 3.
⁴ SI with (b)(6) of 21 Jul 15 from CNRSE Preliminary Inquiry.
⁵ *Id.*
⁶ NAVFAC SE Ltr 11011/Code OPUB-LR of 19 Feb 15.
⁷ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15.
⁸ *Id.*
⁹ Joint Publication 1-02 (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) p.90.
¹⁰ DoDI 2000.12 (DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program) § 4(b).
¹¹ *Id.* at Glossary.
¹² Joint Publication 1-02 p.14.
¹³ USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-13 (United States Fleet Forces Command Antiterrorism Operations Order) § 7(b)(2)(c).
¹⁴ DoDI 2000.16 (DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards) § 2.1.
¹⁵ *Id.* at § E2.3.
¹⁶ *Id.* at § E2.3.1.
¹⁷ *Id.* at § E3.3.
¹⁸ *Id.* at § E2.3.1.
¹⁹ *Id.* at § E2.3.2.
²⁰ *Id.* at § E3.7.1.3.
²¹ *Id.*
²² *Id.*
²³ *Id.* at § E3.23.1.1.
²⁴ *Id.* at § E2.3.4.
²⁵ *Id.* at § E3.31.2.
²⁶ *Id.* at § E3.31.5.
²⁷ *Id.* at § E3.31.1.
²⁸ USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222 § 1.6 and § 4.5.4.
²⁹ USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-15, Base Order, § 1(e)(1).
³⁰ *Id.* at § 1(e)(3).
³¹ OPNAVINST 3300.53C § 7(g).
³² *Id.*
³³ CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 § 1(d).
³⁴ *Id.*
³⁵ USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-15, Base Order, § 1(d)(7).
³⁶ MARADMIN 422/07, USMC AT Program and FP Responsibilities in the U.S. Northern Command AOR of 20 Jul 07.
³⁷ *Id.*
³⁸ CJCSI 3710.011 § 4(c).
³⁹ 10 U.S.C. § 163(b)(2)(C).
⁴⁰ 10 U.S.C. § 181(b)(1)(A).
⁴¹ CJCSI 3710.011 § 4(d).
⁴² SECNAVINST 5000.2E § 1.1.
⁴³ *Id.* and at § 1.1.2.1.
⁴⁴ SECDEF Memo "Force Protection Recommendations Following the Chattanooga Shooting" of 29 Jul 15.
⁴⁵ *Id.*
⁴⁶ *Id.*

Chapter 2 – Sequence of Events

The following general overview of events provides context to the Chattanooga AFRS and NOSC shooting incidents on July 16, 2015. This summary begins with the arrival of (b)(6) outside the AFRS that morning and includes the incident response to the active shooter and the post-incident response that followed.

Law Enforcement (LE) Disclaimer: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM) directed this investigation be conducted in a manner not to interfere with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation. The investigation team coordinated all LE information through the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

The FBI's criminal investigation into the Chattanooga shootings is ongoing. The details of the shootings contained in this report were the only details released by the FBI. In accordance with FBI guidance, this investigation did not take sworn statements, did not record statements, and did not question witnesses about actions or observations during the shootings in order to preserve the integrity of the ongoing FBI investigation. Any further inquiries into the shootings should be cleared through the FBI via NCIS.

Background

(b)(6) who had a local address of Hixson, Tennessee, was born in Kuwait in September 1990. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen on December 13, 2013.

Events of July 16, 2015¹

At approximately 1050, (b)(6) drove a gray Ford Mustang convertible (with the top down) in front of the AFRS located in a strip mall in the 6200 block of Lee Highway in Chattanooga, Tennessee. See Figures 2-2 and 2-3.

Using an AK-74 semi-automatic rifle (5.45 caliber), (b)(6) fired multiple rounds from the car into the AFRS, directing the majority of his fire into the Marine office, causing damage and wounding one Marine. Within the AFRS, there were three Sailors and an applicant in the Navy office and four Marines and three civilians in the Marine office.

At the Marine RSS, two of the four Marines and two of the three civilians were seated just inside the front window approximately eight feet away from (b)(6) when he fired the first shot. There was a brief pause between the first shot and the follow-on shots. During this pause, the two Marines and two civilians in the front of the RSS proceeded to run to the door located in the back of the building as additional shots rang out. The remaining personnel (two Marines and one civilian) temporarily sheltered in place in the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge office.

Upon exiting the back of the RSS, the four personnel went down the hill to find cover. Shortly after, the remaining three personnel exited the rear door of the RSS. While maintaining cover behind a dumpster, a Marine sergeant observed the shooter pull out of the parking lot. Upon hearing police sirens one to two minutes later, the sergeant walked back to the RSS where he linked up with the other Marines. While standing in the RSS, the Marine gunnery sergeant took accountability and asked if everyone was alright. A Marine sergeant realized he was bleeding from his leg from what he presumed was a cut caused by broken glass. A CPD officer looked at the injury and it was determined to be a gunshot

wound. EMS was called and the sergeant departed for the hospital shortly thereafter. The sergeant was treated and released from Erlanger Medical Center later that same day.²

After departing the AFRS parking lot, (b)(6) drove away in the Mustang toward the NOSC, which is located at 4051 Amnicola Highway in Chattanooga. It took (b)(6) approximately seven minutes to drive the 7.1 miles from the AFRS to the NOSC. See Figure 2-1. At some point after (b)(6) departed the AFRS parking lot, a CPD officer observed him driving erratically and began to follow him.

At approximately 1057, (b)(6) bypassed the serpentine barriers and drove his vehicle through the NOSC's entry control point (ECP) by ramming through the front gate. See Figure 2-4. His car came to rest inside the NOSC compound, where (b)(6) got out of the car and headed toward the main building. He was armed and wearing hearing protection and a load bearing vest with extra ammunition.

As (b)(6) headed on foot toward the NOSC main building, the NOSC Commanding Officer engaged the shooter with small arms fire from his office window located on the far right side of the main building.

(b)(6) continued on foot to the building's main entrance, a locked front door located in the center of the building. He shot his rifle several times, shattering the glass on the front door, and stepped into the NOSC foyer through the broken glass door. (b)(6) entered the Navy side of the building, stepping into a large open cubicle area. He shot his rifle several times, hitting (b)(6), (b)(6), in the hallway just outside the far entrance to the room. It is believed that (b)(6) subsequently called 911. Other Sailors had barricaded themselves inside offices and called 911.

(b)(6) then entered the USMC side of the building. When the sounds of the gunfire moved away from the Navy side of the building, service members pulled (b)(6) inside an office and rendered first aid.

The first area (b)(6) entered on the USMC side was a large open cubicle area, similar to the first room he entered on the Navy side of the building.

(b)(6) fired his weapon many times, at a greater volume than on the Navy side.

(b)(6) worked his way through the open cubicle room, down the adjoining hallway, and out the NOSC rear door toward the motor pool. Although the exact route (b)(6) took is uncertain, at some point he shot at a police car that was responding to the scene on the street which runs along the perimeter fence.

(b)(6) shot and killed (b)(6) and (b)(6)

(b)(6) as he exited the USMC side of the main building and entered into the motor pool. One of the Marines (b)(6) killed had previously been on the phone with 911, while other Marines escaped by climbing over the motor pool's perimeter fence. After clearing the fence, those Marines ran across the street to a park and gathered civilian women and children from a playground, moving them to safety.

(b)(6) moved to the left past the two Marines he killed and entered a grassy area located between the motor pool's building and the perimeter fence. At some point he pivoted right and shot and killed (b)(6), who appeared to be attempting to escape.

(b)(6) advanced toward the far left corner of the motor pool's fence. Turning right, he walked along the backside of a row of parked military vehicles, where he shot and killed (b)(6) in the bed of a vehicle.

(b)(6) moved beyond the row of the military vehicles into an open area of the motor pool.

Local LE officers entered the NOSC facility through the ECP. The officers advanced past (b)(6) car and proceeded around the Navy side of the main building where they engaged (b)(6) through the motor pool fence. One CPD officer was struck in the lower leg.

(b)(6) moved between two large military trucks lined up perpendicular to the motor pool fence. This had a channeling effect, and as (b)(6) ran toward the back of the trucks, police officers on the other side engaged him with a high volume of fire. During this volley, the police shot and killed him as he attempted to round the back corner of the trucks next to the fence.

Based on the terrain walk and verbal orientation brief provided to the investigation team by NCIS, the entire incident – from the shootings at the AFRS until (b)(6) was fatally shot by LE – lasted approximately 20 minutes.

Afterwards, LE completed a methodical room-by-room clearance of the NOSC, uncovering several personnel who had sheltered in place throughout the incident.

Eight Navy members assigned to NOSC Chattanooga were present at the facility.³ Eighteen Marines assigned to RTC Chattanooga, three Marines assigned to a parent command, and a visiting corpsman were present.⁴

In total, (b)(6) wounded one Marine at the AFRS; at the NOSC, he wounded a police officer, killed four Marines, and shot one Sailor who died on July 18 from his injuries.

EMS Response⁵

The Chattanooga EMS 911 call center received its first call related to the shootings at approximately 1058. This call was specifically related to injuries at the NOSC. The first ambulance crew, Medic 14, was notified at 1059 and departed for the NOSC at 1100. Medic 14 arrived at the NOSC several minutes prior to 1111, followed by five additional EMS crews, all of which arrived within approximately 6-8 minutes. The prompt medical response was enabled by the NOSC's location on EMS's most-traveled road and its proximity to multiple EMS stations. There were also medics trained in full tactical insertion assigned to SWAT on scene.

Unified Incident Command was established on the shoulder of Amnicola Highway, closest to the NOSC. Medic 14 treated their first patient, a CPD officer, at 1111. At approximately 1115, (b)(6) was brought out to the EMS crew in an armored vehicle.

Although the AFRS shooting took place before the NOSC shooting, EMS received the first call for assistance at the AFRS at approximately 1117. EMS crew Medic 11 was dispatched to the AFRS at 1118.

Post-Incident Response after July 16, 2015

On July 16, nine Marines were assigned as Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACOs) to provide casualty assistance to identified next-of-kin (NOK) for each of the four Marine fatalities.⁶

By 2255 on July 16, all USMC NOK notifications were complete.⁷


At approximately 1200 on July 16, the NOSC CO notified (b)(6) that (b)(6) had been shot and was being treated at Erlanger Medical Center.⁸

At approximately 1800 on July 16, the Navy CACO was assigned.⁹

(b)(6) passed away at 0217 on July 18, 2015.¹⁰ The assigned CACO performed the official NOK notification at approximately 1000.¹¹

On July 17, the CNRSE Crisis Action Team (CAT) began arriving on scene.¹² CAT counselors remained in the Chattanooga area providing services through August 17.¹³

After the shooting, DON senior leaders began traveling to Chattanooga. The Vice President of the United States, SECDEF, SECNAV, and nine Flag Officers/General Officers (FO/GO) traveled to Chattanooga between the time of the shooting and the public memorial on August 15, including: CNO and CMC; Chief of the Navy Reserve; Commander, Marine Forces Reserve/Marine Forces North; Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command; Commanding General, 4th Marine Division; Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command; Commander, Navy Recruiting Command; and Commander, Navy Region Southeast.¹⁴



1) Approximately 1050 (b)(6) engaged AFRS (119 Lee Highway, Chattanooga, TN) and then immediately drove to the NOSC.

(b)(6) speculated route to NOSC (4051 Amnicola Highway)

- Left onto US-11N/US-64E(SW)
- Turn left onto Tennessee 153 N ramp
- Merge onto TN-153 N
- Right to exit 6 for TN-319 N/Amnicola Hwy
- Left onto TN-319 N/TN-58 S

2) Arrived at NOSC approximately 1057

*Route from AFRS to NOSC is approximately 7.1 miles

(b)(6) route has not been fully evaluated by LE. Speculated route is based on witness statements, traffic patterns and road infrastructure.

Source: Google Earth Imagery by Investigative team on 1 Sep 2015 (not to scale)

Figure 2-1. Speculated Route of (b)(6)




(b)(6) stopped car approximately 1050 and fired multiple shots into the Marine, Navy and Air Force recruiting centers. One Marine was struck in the leg during the incident. (b)(6) then departed the parking lot, turned left onto US-11N/US-64E heading towards the NOSC

(b)(6) route and specific sequence of events has not been fully evaluated by LE. Speculated route is based on witness statements, traffic patterns and road infrastructure.

Source: Google Earth Imagery by
Investigative team on 1 Sep 2015 (not to
scale)

Figure 2-2. Speculated Route of (b)(6)




Recruiting offices

- 1) Army – No shots fired
- 2) Air Force – Multiple shots fired here
- 3) Navy – Multiple shots fired here
- 4) Marines – Office where one Marine was shot
- 5) National Guard – No shots fired

*Number of shots fired has not been evaluated by LE.

Source: Google Earth Imagery by
Investigative team on 1 Sep 2015 (not to
scale)

Figure 2-3. AFRS Chattanooga, TN



- | | |
|---|---|
| 1) (b)(6) bypasses barriers, crashes through gate and comes to a stop | 6) (b)(6) kills two Marines inside motor pool |
| 2) (b)(6) departs on foot | 7) (b)(6) kills one Marine by fence |
| 3) (b)(6) enters building | 8) (b)(6) kills one Marine in back of a truck |
| 4) (b)(6) shoots on Navy side of NOSC | 9) (b)(6) killed by CPD |
| 5) (b)(6) departs NOSC heads towards Motor Pool | |

Source: Google Earth Imagery modified by Investigative team on 1 Sep 2015 (not to scale)

Figure 2-4. NOSC Chattanooga, TN

¹ All events listed in this section of the Sequence of Events were provided in an FBI Memo of 26 Aug 15, in a 27 Aug 15 PHONCON between the FBI Special Agent in charge of the investigation and the Investigation Team Deputy Investigating Officer, in an email from NCIS Special Agent (b)(6) to the Investigation Team Chief of Staff of 15 Sep 15.

² Statement of (b)(6) of 3 Aug 15 from RS Nashville Command Investigation.

³ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 15 Sep 15. This figure includes three assigned NOSC staff and five SELRES personnel.

⁴ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15.

⁵ SI with (b)(6), Director of Chattanooga EMS, of 28 Aug 15.

⁶ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 Aug 15.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15.

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ Navy Office of Information (18 Jul 15) "Navy Sailor Wounded in NOSC Shooting Dies." *Navy Newsstand*. Retrieved from www.navy.mil.

¹¹ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15.

¹² CNRSE CAT Master Manning Document supplied to Investigation Team by (b)(6); Emails from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15 at 8:23 AM and 1:39PM.

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 10; Email with attachment from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15.

Chapter 3 – Force Protection for Off-Installation Navy and Marine Corps Recruiting Activities

This chapter outlines instances of non-compliance and deficiencies at NRS and RSS Chattanooga. These must be balanced against two considerations. First, no specific threat – active shooter or otherwise – existed in Chattanooga at the time of the shooting. Second, the current United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) baseline physical security features for leased facilities are primarily designed to protect against criminal threats, not active shooter threats.

TACON for FP

Navy Recruiting Station (NRS) Chattanooga falls under the TACON for FP authority of CNRSE.¹ Marine Corps Recruiting Sub-Station (MCRSS) Chattanooga falls under the TACON for FP authority of Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC).² See Figures 1-1 and 1-3 for further detail.

Regulatory Background

DoDI 2000.12 (DoD Antiterrorism Program) and DoDI 2000.16 (DoD Antiterrorism Standards) form the basis for AT programs across the Services.³

SECNAVINST 3300.2B (Department of the Navy Antiterrorism Program) implements DoD instructions and assigns AT responsibilities within DON.⁴

The Services implement the DoD AT Program through OPNAVINST F3300.53C (Navy Antiterrorism Program) and MCO 3302.1E (USMC Antiterrorism Program).

USNORTHCOM's AT policies are stated in USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222.⁵ USFLTFORCOM and MARFORNORTH execute USNORTHCOM's AT policies

in USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-13 and MARFORNORTH MA OPORD 15-01, respectively.⁶

CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 implements USFLTFORCOM guidance and applies to Navy recruiting activities.⁷

MCRC implements AT program requirements through MCRCO 3302.1A.⁸

6th Marine Corps District (MCD) implements AT program requirements through DistO 5000.⁹

Navy Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 3.1 (Non-compliance): NRD Nashville, parent command of NRS Chattanooga, lacked an AT Plan.¹⁰

Discussion: USFFC requires all Navy units and activities to have an AT program, to include an AT plan tailored to the mission, local conditions, and terrorist threat.¹¹ Specifically, CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 requires off-installation activities to have an AT Plan that is reviewed and updated annually.¹² On July 9, 2014, CNRSE ATO distributed the CNRSE AT OPORD to all commands in the region, including NRD Nashville, via email.¹³ However, the NRD Nashville ATO was unaware of the CNRSE AT OPORD that required an AT Plan.¹⁴

Opinion 3.1: An AT Plan would have improved NRD Nashville's overall AT program and identified for correction possible FP deficiencies. An NRD Nashville AT Plan would have included NRS Chattanooga.

Recommendation 3.1: NRD commanders establish an executable AT Plan within unique recruiting mission requirements and staff capabilities.

Finding 3.2 (Non-compliance): NRD Nashville did not coordinate with NRS Chattanooga to establish site-specific Incident Response Plans (IRPs).¹⁵

Discussion: AT programs must include detailed response plans that are specific, tailored for their unique location, and exercised annually.¹⁶ IRPs must address a full range of an activity's response to potential incidents.¹⁷ While NRD COs must develop IRPs for incidents most likely to occur, there is no specific requirement for an off-installation activity to have an active shooter IRP.¹⁸ The only planning resource available to personnel at NRS Chattanooga was a CNRC AT handbook.¹⁹

Opinion 3.2: IRPs would have strengthened NRD Nashville and NRS Chattanooga's preparedness.

Recommendation 3.2.1: Recruiting activities establish IRPs to address most likely local threat scenarios.

Recommendation 3.2.2: NRDs coordinate with respective Navy Region to establish recruiting station IRPs that can be tailored for NRSs. Navy Regions coordinate with NCIS to obtain tailored most likely/most dangerous threat scenarios to facilitate recruiting station IRP development.

Recommendation 3.2.3: Require IRPs for active shooter scenarios for recruiting activities.

Recommendation 3.2.4: Brief all new or temporarily-assigned personnel on IRPs.

Finding 3.3 (Non-compliance): NRD Nashville did not coordinate with NRS Chattanooga to conduct AT exercises.²⁰

Discussion: Off-installation activities must conduct AT exercises at least annually in order to evaluate the validity of their AT plans.²¹ NRS Chattanooga had not conducted an annual exercise.²²

Opinion 3.3: Exercises are a critical part of an AT program, highlighting planning gaps and refining response plans. Exercises would have strengthened NRS Chattanooga's preparedness.

Recommendation 3.3: All NRDs ensure requisite AT training necessary to exercise their AT plan (to include active shooter scenarios) is incorporated into their annual training plan. Coordinate AT drills/exercises with local LE and EM response.

Finding 3.4 (Non-compliance): NRD Nashville's ATO was not appointed in writing and lacked required training.²³

Discussion: Each NRD must have a certified ATO who has completed AT Level II training.²⁴ NRD ATO had not completed AT Level II Training.²⁵

Opinion 3.4: The ATO is the key person responsible for managing a command's AT program. A trained ATO will improve AT program effectiveness.

Recommendation 3.4: NRD Commanders appoint ATOs in writing and ensure ATOs complete required AT Level II training.

Marine Corps Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 3.5 (Non-compliance): RS Nashville, parent command of RSS Chattanooga, lacked an AT Plan.²⁶

Discussion: RS commanders are required to publish an AT plan that aligns with the district AT program.²⁷ MARFORNORTH requires recruiting commanders to

ensure minimum FP responsibilities are implemented by all recruiting facilities.²⁸ Those minimum responsibilities include a standard operating procedure outlining FPCON level processes, emergency action lists, and preplanned responses.²⁹

Opinion 3.5: An AT Plan would have improved RS Nashville's overall AT program and identified for correction FP deficiencies.

Recommendation 3.5.1: RS commanders establish an executable AT Plan within unique recruiting mission requirements and staff capabilities.

Recommendation 3.5.2: RS commanders include active shooter scenarios to exercise AT plans; coordinate exercises with local LE and EM response.

Recommendation 3.5.3: Require Emergency Incident Response Plans for active shooter scenarios for recruiting activities.

Finding 3.6 (Non-compliance): RS Nashville did not have a certified Level II ATO.³⁰

Discussion: Each RS must have a Level II trained ATO.³¹ The RS Nashville ATO position (RS executive officer) was gapped at the time of the shootings.³² The officer previously occupying the ATO billet separated from the Marine Corps in May 2015, and the RS commander appointed the current ATO on August 1, 2015; he has not completed ATO Level II training.³³

RS commanders are required to appoint a Recruiting Station Force Protection Officer (RSFPO).³⁴ MCRC RSFPO course provides training for this billet.³⁵ RSFPO training is not in full compliance with AT Level II training.³⁶ The current executive officer has not attended MCRC RSFPO training.³⁷

Opinion 3.6.1: The ATO is the key person responsible for managing the command's AT program. Having a trained ATO would have improved AT program effectiveness and identified for correction FP deficiencies.

Opinion 3.6.2: MCRC is using the RSFPO course, which is not an AT Level II certified course, to fulfill the AT Level II requirement. This creates a disconnect between Service and MCRC policy.

Recommendation 3.6.1: RS commanders appoint ATOs in writing and ensure ATOs complete required AT Level II training.

Recommendation: 3.6.2: MCRC require RSFPO to attend AT Level II training; or, in coordination with Training and Education Command and Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, bring RSFPO Course in compliance with AT Level II requirements.

Finding 3.7 (Non-compliance): RS Nashville did not participate in a required AT Working Group (ATWG).³⁸

Discussion: A command's ATWG is the CO's primary means of executing the AT Program.³⁹ RS commanders are required to participate in the district's ATWG.⁴⁰ DistO 5000 does not provide implementing guidance for ATWGs.⁴¹

RS Nashville does not participate in the MCRC Mission Assurance Working Groups.⁴² There is also not an ATWG forum established by 6th MCD for RS Nashville to participate in as required.⁴³

Opinion 3.7: Participating in an ATWG would have improved RS Nashville's AT program effectiveness and identified for correction FP deficiencies.

Recommendation 3.7.1: 6th MCD establish an ATWG that includes RS Nashville; RS ATOs participate in district ATWGs.

Recommendation 3.7.2: RS Nashville commander establish a local/regional ATWG to implement AT program requirements and coordinate with NCIS; federal, state, and local law enforcement; and other appropriate agencies.

Navy & Marine Corps DOTMLPF Findings

Finding 3.8 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): AT Level II and Level III training does not address the unique concerns of off-installation facilities.⁴⁴

Discussion: AT Level II training is required for all assigned ATOs, and focuses primarily on installation and shipboard AT programs.⁴⁵

Per Navy policy, AT Level III training is required for O-5/O-6 COs prior to assuming command.⁴⁶ There are community-specific Commanding Officer AT (COAT) courses which satisfy the AT Level III training requirement for Aviation, Surface Warfare, Submarine, Installation and Expeditionary prospective commanding officers, and are normally included in their respective pre-command training tracks.⁴⁷ Commanders in the grades of O-5/O-6 or below receive AT training in the prospective executive officer/prospective commanding officer training pipelines.⁴⁸ Nothing precludes NRD commanders from attending pre-command AT Level III training. USFFC provides an alternative method, via Navy e-learning Antiterrorism Planning (ATP) course (CSF-ATP-010-1.0), for meeting the AT level III training requirement for those PCOs who do not have an established pre-command pipeline.⁴⁹

In August 2015, the Center for Security Forces (CENSECFOR) conducted the inaugural Reserve Force Commanding Officer AT Training Seminar at NOSC Little Creek.⁵⁰

Per Marine Corps policy, AT Level III training is required for O-5/O-6 COs prior to assuming command.⁵¹ O-4 RS commanders are not required to attend Level III training.⁵²

Opinion 3.8.1: ATOs who complete the AT Level II training are not fully prepared to manage an AT plan at an off-installation facility. While the AT Level II training provides a foundation to execute ATO responsibilities, it does not fully address unique off-installation concerns.

Opinion 3.8.2: NRD COs are responsible for protecting personnel and facilities, which includes the development, management, execution, and exercise of a command AT plan and program. They are additionally required to meet the recruiting station FPCON measures. A qualified and trained ATO to oversee and manage the AT program will facilitate the NRD CO's success. However, AT Level III program training for NRD COs would enhance AT program implementation. The Navy e-learning ATP Course is a valid delivery method for a prerequisite course, but does not address the unique concerns of off-installation activities. Online training is not a substitute for traditional in-person training provided by CENSECFOR subject matter experts.

Opinion 3.8.3: AT Level III program training for RS commanders would enhance AT program implementation.

Recommendation 3.8.1: Expand AT Level II training to include one or more modules geared to the specific concerns of off-installation activities, to include instruction on AT Plans, barrier plans, site-specific FPCON measures, and IRPs or incident response measures.

Recommendation 3.8.2: NRD and RS commanders attend AT Level III training prior to assuming command. Ensure Level III curricula includes information

relevant for off-installation commanders and provides requisite tools and knowledge for management of their AT programs.

Recommendation 3.8.3: Naval Education and Training Command/ CENSECFOR and MARFORRES, MCRC, TECOM, and PPO investigate viability of developing/implementing an AT Level II training course tailored for off-installation facilities and activities.

Finding 3.9 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): There is a DON-wide policy and capability gap in the ability to conduct mass warning and notification, specifically for personnel assigned to recruiting activities.⁵³

Discussion: DoD and Service EM policy and directives do not address mass warning and notification policy and procedures for recruiting activities.⁵⁴ DoD's Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program maintains DoD readiness by implementing a comprehensive, all-hazards IEM Program on DoD installations worldwide.⁵⁵ The Services support and implement the DoD IEM program.⁵⁶

SECDEF has directed the Services and Combatant Commanders to exercise mass warning and notification procedures to incorporate lessons learned and any procedural changes into applicable guidance.⁵⁷ SECDEF also directed the Services and Combatant Commands to leverage commercially available systems to provide warning to DoD personnel and identify gaps.⁵⁸ SECDEF noted that solutions should leverage off-the-shelf technology and commercial applications to address capability gaps.⁵⁹

MARFORRES is in the process of implementing a scalable, easy-to-use, and rapidly deployed technical solution that empowers military and federal personnel to quickly notify and coordinate with local public safety agencies in response to a variety of domestic emergencies.⁶⁰

AtHOC Communications Solutions Suite meets the SECDEF requirements for emergency mass notifications and personnel accountability in accordance with DoDI 6055.17.⁶¹ AtHOC is an existing NIPR-based system being used at DoD installations.⁶²

C4I is a communication, collaboration, and information sharing tool available to Navy and Marine Corps commanders.⁶³ C4I systems on NIPR and SIPR networks provide rapid threat dissemination and near real-time threat sharing.⁶⁴

The current standard for mass notification is ten minutes.⁶⁵ The time difference between the first and second shooting sites was approximately seven minutes.⁶⁶

Opinion 3.9: Active shooter incidents are dynamic and unfold quickly. Mass notification and warning systems need to be designed to enable rapid dissemination of information across a wide audience. Recruiting personnel must have mass warning capability in hand-held devices. This capability should be integrated into emergency action plans and rehearsed routinely. These capabilities need to be incorporated with local emergency response forces and leveraged with commercially available systems.

Recommendation 3.9.1: Close policy and capability gaps in mass warning and notification.

Recommendation 3.9.2: Recruiting activities must incorporate mass warning and notification procedures into AT planning, coordinate with local LE and emergency responders, and exercise regularly. Leverage commercially available mass warning systems.

Finding 3.10 (Non-compliance): Navy and Marine Corps AFRS offices were not compliant with The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) baseline leased facilities standards.⁶⁷

Discussion: The Secretary of the Army is the DoD Executive Agent for lease of commercial property for recruiting stations.⁶⁸ USACE defines the security standards required in recruiting office leases.⁶⁹ These minimum standards are coordinated with the Services through the Joint Recruiting Facilities Committee (JRFC).⁷⁰ The general standards USACE requires in leased properties are captured in each fiscal year's Consolidated Policies and Procedures, and USACE ensures compliance through on-site vulnerability assessments.⁷¹

USACE minimum security standards include fragmentation retention film for windows and doors, and durable blinds.⁷² When blinds cannot be installed due to window shape or size, the lessor must install a translucent window film to achieve a frosted-glass effect.⁷³

During a May 19, 2015, vulnerability assessment, USACE determined the Chattanooga AFRS was not compliant with USACE standards for emergency lighting, window blinds, crash bars or interconnected locks on rear doors, and exterior glass door film.⁷⁴

Opinion 3.10: Although the USACE standard for recruiting stations is focused on protection against theft and criminal activity, correcting these deficiencies will improve AFRS physical security.

Recommendation 3.10: USACE immediately correct these deficiencies.

Finding 3.11 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): Current USACE standards place a higher priority on vision-blocking blinds over tinted/frost glass.⁷⁵

Discussion: The current USACE standards direct the use of blinds as the default window covering.⁷⁶ Prior to leasing, translucent window tinting may be installed only where window shape or size prevents installation of blinds.⁷⁷ Ballistic-resistant material is not a USACE standard.⁷⁸

On July 16 after the shootings, CNRSE directed FPCON measures including Charlie 12 (Close blinds to reduce visibility of DoD presence and activities.).⁷⁹

On July 19, USNORTHCOM directed implementation of Charlie 12.⁸⁰ On August 21, USNORTHCOM directed recruiting stations to discontinue FPCON measure Charlie 12.⁸¹

Personnel stationed at NRS Chattanooga were able to observe (b)(6) outside the NRS because the blinds were not drawn and windows had tinting applied.⁸²

Opinion 3.11: Tinted glass should be prioritized over window blinds. Window tinting is more effective because it prevents observation from the outside while permitting occupants to see external threats.

Recommendation 3.11.1: USACE change the standard to prioritize tinted glass over window blinds.

Recommendation 3.11.2: Modify Recruiting Station FPCON measure Charlie 12, to read "Recruiting Stations not equipped with tinted exterior glass, close blinds to reduce visibility of DoD presence and activities."

Finding 3.12 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): Recruiting commanders lack the ability to quickly add nonstandard security enhancements for existing leased facilities.⁸³

Discussion: The Services coordinate minimum standards for leased recruiting facilities in conjunction with the USACE through the JRFC.⁸⁴ Special application security enhancements are standard measures that commanders may request to address site-specific vulnerabilities.⁸⁵ The Services may only request four special applications: monitored security alarm system; rolling metal shutters; video intercom entry system; and camera/DVR system.⁸⁶ Special applications, which may only be approved by USACE, may be installed as a result of an

emergency where the health, safety, and security of DoD personnel requires them.⁸⁷ USACE will negotiate for the lessor to install an emergency upgrade special application as soon as possible.⁸⁸ Recruiting commanders have no authority to modify leases based on emerging threats.⁸⁹ The monthly JRFC conference call is the proper forum for a Service to request USACE to code a nonstandard security enhancement.⁹⁰

Opinion 3.12: Special applications are one-size-fits-all security measures and are not responsive to commander's local, risk-based requirements. The current process for commanders to make physical security modifications to leased facilities degrades the ability to respond to emerging threats.

Recommendation 3.12: JRFC develop expedited process to identify commanders' nonstandard requirements and certify them to USACE for approval.

¹ CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 § 1(d).

² MARFORNORTH MA OPORD 15-01, Tab C, Appendix 11, Annex C ¶¶3 (a)(1)-(2).

³ DoDI 2000.12 § 1(a) and DoDI 2000.16 § 1.1.

⁴ SECNAVINST 3300.2B § 1 and §3(a).

⁵ USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222, p.1.

⁶ USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-15 and MARFORNORTH MA OPORD 15-01.

⁷ CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 § 1(d).

⁸ MCRCO 3302.1A, ¶1.

⁹ District Order 5000, 6th District Antiterrorism/Force Protection Plan, ¶1.

¹⁰ SI with (b)(6) of 25 Aug 15, § 10.

¹¹ USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-15, Base order, § 3.c.(1)(d).

¹² CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 Annex C, §1(c).

¹³ Email from (b)(6), CNRSE Security Officer, to (b)(6), USFLTFORCOM, of 25 Aug 15 (forwarding email from CNRSE N3AT to Regional ATOs of 9 Jul 14).

¹⁴ SI with (b)(6) of 29 Aug 15 § 10.

¹⁵ *Id* at §1; OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 20; CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 § 3(c)(1) and Appendix 8 to Annex C, § 3.

¹⁶ OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 20; CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 § 3(c)(1) and Appendix 8 to Annex C, § 3.

¹⁷ CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 Annex C § 3(b)(2).

¹⁸ *Id* at Tab B of Appendix 8 to Annex §1. and § 3.a.(1)-(17).

¹⁹ SI with (b)(6) of 29 Aug 15, § 2.

²⁰ SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 6; CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 Annex R § 3(b)(3); OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 23.

²¹ CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 Annex R § 3(b)(3); OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 23.

- 22 SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 6 and SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 4.
- 23 Fleet Training Management and Planning System print out of 30 Aug 15 re: (b)(6) training record; DoDI 2000.16, Enclosure 3, § E3.26.1; OPNAVINST 3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 9.
- 24 DoDI 2000.16, Enclosure (3), § E3.26.1; OPNAVINST 3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 9.
- 25 Fleet Training Management and Planning System print out of 30 Aug 15 re: (b)(6) training record.
- 26 SI with (b)(6) of 3 Sept 15, §4; MCO 3302.1E ¶4(c)(15)(d).
- 27 MCO 3302.1E, ¶4(c)(15)(d).
- 28 MARFORNORTH AT OPORD, Tab C to Appendix 11 of Annex C, ¶3.a.(4).
- 29 *Id.*
- 30 SI with (b)(6) of 3 Sept 15, Preliminary Statement and § 2; MCO 3302.1E ¶4(c)(15)(a).
- 31 MCO 3302.1E ¶4(c)(15)(a).
- 32 SI with (b)(6) of 3 Sept 15, Preliminary Statement and § 2.
- 33 *Id.* at § 3.
- 34 MCRCO 3302.1A ¶4(b)(1)(x)(17).
- 35 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15.
- 36 MCRCO 3302.1A ¶4(b)(1)(x)(18); DoDI 2000.16 Enclosure 3, § E3.26.
- 37 Summary of Interview with (b)(6) § 2.
- 38 *Id.* at § 5.
- 39 DoDI 2000.16 § E3.10. (DoD Standard 10); OPNAVINST 3300.53C, § 7(u)(3).
- 40 MCO 3302.1E ¶4(c)(2)(15)(b) and ¶4(c)(13)(d).
- 41 District Order 5000; compare with MCRCO 3302.1A, Enclosure (2), "Operations" ¶2(e)(2)(a) and "Mission Assurance Policy, Standards, and Training Requirements," ¶1(b)(5)(c)(4) and ¶1(b)(2).
- 42 SI with (b)(6) of 3 Sep 15, § 5.
- 43 MCO 3302.1E ¶4(c)(13)(d).
- 44 SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 7; CANTRAC catalog entry: ATO II CIN J-830-0015 and COAT CIN A-1B-0500, https://app.prod.cetars.training.navy.mil/cantrac/pages/rpt_basic_search.html?p=2&trc=41&q=Antiterrorism; and OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 27.
- 45 OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 26; MCO 3302.1E ¶4.c.(13)(a), 4.c.(14)(a), 4.c.(15)(a); SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 7; CANTRAC catalog entry: ATO II CIN J-830-0015.
- 46 OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 27; See also DODI 2000.16 Enclosure 3 § E3.27.
- 47 https://app.prod.cetars.training.navy.mil/cantrac/pages/rpt_basic_search.html?p=1&q=COAT Aviation PCOs attend the Aviation COAT course in Pensacola, FL. Surface Warfare PCOs attend the Surface Warfare COAT course in Newport, RI; Expeditionary PCOs attend the Expeditionary COAT in Virginia Beach, VA; Submarine PCOs attend the Submarine COAT as part of the Submarine Commander's Course at COMSUBLANT and COMSUBPAC headquarters; the Installation COAT Course is conducted as a part of the Senior Shore Station Leadership Course (SSSLC) at the Washington Navy Yard
- 48 OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8 at CNO Standard 27.
- 49 USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-13 (United States Fleet Forces Command Antiterrorism Operations Order), Appendix 2 to Annex C, § 3.d.(3)(c)(3).
- 50 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 Aug 15.
- 51 MCO 3302.1E ¶4.d.(7)(b); See also DODI 2000.16 Enclosure 3 § E3.27.
- 52 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Sep 15; DODI 2000.16 Enclosure 3 § E3.27, Standard 27.
- 53 DoDI 6055.17, § 2.2; OPNAVINST 3440.17A, Enclosure 2, § 7(c); and MCO 3440.9 ¶1.a. and ¶3(b)(13)(a)(13).
- 54 *Id.*
- 55 DoDI 6055.17 ¶4(a).
- 56 OPNAVINST 3440.17A § 1(a) and MCO 3440.9 ¶1.
- 57 SECDEF ltr of 29 Jul 15, p.2, TAB B to Action Memo for SECDEF.
- 58 *Id.* TAB A to Action Memo for SECDEF.
- 59 *Id.*

⁶⁰ MARFORRES White Paper MARINE CORPS RESERVE TRAINING CENTER (RTC) SECURITY SOLUTION WHITEPAPER Alerting, Collaboration, and Training System for Wide-area Interoperability - Facility Threats (ACT-SWIFT) 26 August 2015.

⁶¹ OPNAVINST 3440.17A § (7)(a); DoDI 6055.17 Enclosure (6), §§ (2)(b), (2)(d)(1); CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14, ¶3(a)(1); "Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Deploys AtHoc Emergency Notification and Communication System for Personnel Protection and Accountability," 19 Mar 13, AtHoc Newsroom Article (<http://www.athoc.com/newsroom/press-releases/2013/237-defense-information-systems-agency-disa-deploys-athoc-emergency-mass-notification-and-communication-system-for-personnel-protection-and-accountability.html>); AtHoc IWSAlerts is a network-centric, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) emergency notification system that uses existing IP networks to quickly distribute alerts to installation personnel. It includes a library of more than one hundred pre-defined scenarios. The alerts, in the form of pop-up windows on a desktop or other mobile device, accompanied by an audio alarm, describe the potential threat, categorize the threat level and includes instructions for action. Once the alerts are distributed, the AtHoc system tracks which users acknowledged receipt of the alert and provides operators with detailed, real-time reports of alert responses. Additional information can be found at: <http://federal-government-agencies.athoc.com/industries/federal-government-agencies/>.

⁶² *Id* and CNRSE AT OPOD 3300.14 Appendix 3 to Annex K, § 3(a)(1). Additional information can be found at

[http://www.ready.marines.mil/StayInformed/EmergencyActions/MarineCorpsMassNotificationSystem/EnterpriseMassNotificationSystem\(eMNS\).aspx](http://www.ready.marines.mil/StayInformed/EmergencyActions/MarineCorpsMassNotificationSystem/EnterpriseMassNotificationSystem(eMNS).aspx); also reference: <http://defense-military.athoc.com/industries/defense-military/>.

⁶³ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300.14, Appendix 3 to Annex K § 3(a)(1); MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01, Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C; ¶1.a.; C4I was established in 2007 by CNIC as a command and control tool to help operationalize and connect Regional Operations centers. C4I Suite provides the connecting network, command and control functionality, information management and associated reporting and other functional requirements in one integrated system. It provides a multi-tiered approach to developing situational awareness in support of the security, safety and the integrity of Navy installations and forces. This Navy owned system is currently in use across the Navy shore establishment and USMC.

⁶⁴ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 Appendix 1 to Annex B, § 3(a)(1); *see* MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01 Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C; ¶3(a)(2) and ¶3(d)(2)(b); MARADMIN 646-13.

⁶⁵ DoDI 6055.17 Enclosure 6, § 2(b)(2)(d)(1); OPNAVINST 3440.17A, Enclosure 2, § 7(c); and MARADMIN 563/11 ¶4.B.2.K.

⁶⁶ US DOJ, FBI Ltr of 26 Aug 15, p.1, ¶1.

⁶⁷ USACE Recruiting CTR Benchmarks for MCRSS Chattanooga of 2 Sep 15, assessed by (b)(6); USACE Recruiting CTR Benchmarks for MCRSS Chattanooga of 19 May 15, assessed by (b)(6); (b)(6) and USACE Benchmark CRT Assessment Matrix for MCRSS Chattanooga of 9 Sep 15.

DoDD 5160.58E § 1.3.

⁶⁹ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers FY15 Consolidated, Policies and Procedures, 14 Nov 14; DoDD 5160.58, § 4.2.

⁷⁰ DoDD 5160.58E § 1.2.

⁷¹ DoDD 5160.58E, § 4.2; USACE FY15 Consolidated, Policies and Procedures, p.1, § 1, "General," ¶1; and p.8, § 3, "Facility Inspections," ¶2.

⁷² Consolidated Policies and Procedures, Appendix B, p. 6, ¶3,4,6.

⁷³ Consolidated Policies and Procedures, Appendix B, p. 6, ¶3; *id.* at Marine Corps Construction Specifications p.57.

⁷⁴ USACE Recruiting CTR Benchmarks for MCRSS Chattanooga of 19 May 15, assessed by (b)(6); (b)(6) d; and email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Sep 15.

Consolidated Policies and Procedures, Appendix B, ¶(g)(3).

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ CNRSE FPCON Directive 15-08 162038Z Jul 15, § 4.

⁸⁰ USNORTHCOM FP Change Message 15-200 192151Z Jul 15, ¶2(c).

⁸¹ USNORTHCOM FP Change Message 15-232 211425Z Aug 15, ¶1(b)(1).

⁸² SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, §§ 6-7; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Jul 15 to CNRSE Preliminary Inquiry.

⁸³ SI with (b)(6) of 4 Sep 15, § 5(a) and 5(b); SI with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15, § 14.

⁸⁴ DoDD 5160.58E, § E2.1.

⁸⁵ Consolidated Policies and Procedures, "Upgrades Necessary due to Vandalism," ¶3.a.-b. "Site Evaluation/Selection," ¶5; Appendix D to Consolidated Policies and Procedures, "Special Applications – Brief / Condensed Equipment Specifications," ¶ 1-4.

⁸⁶ Appendix D to Consolidated Policies and Procedures, "Special Applications – Brief / Condensed Equipment Specifications," ¶¶ 1-4.

⁸⁷ Consolidated, Policies and Procedures, § 3, "Action Additions/Deletions/Unaccomplishable/ Unfunding," ¶1(a)(2); Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Sep 15; and Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 15 Sep 15. See Consolidated, Policies and Procedures, "Emergency Upgrades/Repairs," § 3, ¶1.

⁸⁸ Consolidated, Policies and Procedures, "Emergency Upgrades/Repairs," § 3, ¶1 and "Upgrades Necessary Due to Vandalism," p.10, § 3, ¶3.a.

⁸⁹ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Sep 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 15 Sep 15.; See Consolidated Policies and Procedures, § 3, "Upgrades by Service,"

¶5.

⁹⁰ SI with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15, § 14.

Chapter 4 – Force Protection for Off-Installation Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Activities

This chapter outlines instances of non-compliance and deficiencies at NOSC Chattanooga and RTC Chattanooga. These must be balanced against two considerations. First, no specific threat – active shooter or otherwise – existed in Chattanooga at the time of the shooting. Second, NOSC Chattanooga baseline physical security features are primarily designed to protect against criminal threats, not moving vehicle threats or active shooter threats.

TACON for FP

NOSC Chattanooga falls under the TACON for FP authority of CNRSE.¹ RTC Chattanooga falls under the TACON for FP authority of MARFORRES.² See Figures 1-2 and 1-3 for further detail.

Regulatory Background

DoDI 2000.12 (DoD Antiterrorism Program) and DoDI 2000.16 (DoD Antiterrorism Standards) form the basis for AT programs across the Services.³

SECNAVINST 3300.2B (Department of the Navy Antiterrorism Program) implements DoD instructions and assigns AT responsibilities within DON.⁴

The Services implement the DoD AT Program through OPNAVINST F3300.53C (Navy Antiterrorism Program) and MCO 3302.1E (USMC Antiterrorism Program).⁵

USNORTHCOM's AT policies are stated in USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222.⁶ USFLTFORCOM and MARFORNORTH execute USNORTHCOM's AT policies

in USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-13 and MARFORNORTH MA OPORD 15-01, respectively.⁷

CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 implements USFLTFORCOM guidance and includes Navy reserve activities.⁸

In addition to the instructions and orders described above, commanders use official message traffic to modify AT policy and posture as conditions change.

On May 7, 2015, USNORTHCOM issued Force Protection Directive 15-127, which directed a change to the CONUS FPCON level.⁹

Navy Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 4.1 (Non-compliance): NOSC Chattanooga's written AT Plan was not fully compliant with higher headquarters policy.¹⁰

Discussion: NOSC Chattanooga's AT Plan was non-compliant in three respects. First, the plan was not reviewed and updated annually.¹¹ Second, although the NOSC CO had discussed FP topics with his counterpart at the Marine tenant command, NOSC Chattanooga's AT Plan had not integrated that tenant command as required.¹² Third, NOSC Chattanooga's AT Plan lacked required site-specific measures across FPCONs.¹³ However, while site-specific FPCON measures were not incorporated in the AT Plan, NOSC Chattanooga was executing some site-specific AT RAMs, as directed by CNRSE.¹⁴

Opinion 4.1: A fully compliant and exercised AT Plan would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.

Recommendation 4.1.1: All NOSC commanders update written AT Plan to ensure compliance with all required elements/direction.

Recommendation 4.1.2: All Navy Regions and RCCs assist NOSC with reviewing and updating AT Plan.

Finding 4.2 (Non-compliance): NOSC Chattanooga did not have an ATWG.¹⁵

Discussion: The ATWG is the primary means of executing the command's AT Program.¹⁶ The ATWG must include members from each tenant command and must meet at least semi-annually.¹⁷

Opinion 4.2: An ATWG would have formalized AT planning, supported RM, and increased dialogue with the RTC and local agencies. An ATWG would have also increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.

Recommendation 4.2.1: NOSC with tenant commands establish an ATWG that includes the tenant. ATO should coordinate ATWG membership with NCIS; federal, state, and local law enforcement; and other appropriate agencies.

Recommendation 4.2.2: NOSC participate in higher headquarters ATWGs as directed.

Recommendation 4.2.3: Off-installation reserve commands include local recruiting activities in ATWGs where practical.

Finding 4.3 (Non-compliance): NOSC Chattanooga did not establish required IRPs to address AT scenarios.¹⁸

Discussion: In the weeks and months preceding the shootings, the NOSC Chattanooga CO frequently discussed FP topics in his daily staff meetings.¹⁹ Discussions covered the effective employment of RAMs, perimeter security, and generalized guidance about what to do in an active shooter event.²⁰ Regardless, NOSC Chattanooga did not have specific, written, and exercised IRPs.²¹ AT

programs must include detailed response plans that are specific, tailored for their unique location, and exercised annually.²² Those response plans must address the full range of an activity's response to potential incidents.²³ While off-installation COs must develop IRPs for incidents most likely to occur, CNRSE does not specifically require an off-installation activity to have an active shooter IRP.²⁴

Opinion 4.3: IRP planning and development would have increased readiness, resulted in site-specific guidance and training efficiencies, and mitigated FP weaknesses.

Recommendation 4.3.1: NOSC establish site-specific IRPs – and include tenant commands in those plans. Navy Regions coordinate with NCIS to obtain tailored most likely/most dangerous threat scenarios to facilitate NOSC IRP development. IRPs should be exercised routinely to account for personnel turnover and the NOSC's transient population.

Recommendation 4.3.2: Require IRPs for active shooter scenarios at all off-installation activities. Navy Regions evaluate AT readiness during scheduled assessments, to include competency in execution of active shooter IRPs.

Recommendation 4.3.3: Brief drilling reservists on IRPs and ensure they participate in exercises.

Recommendation 4.3.4: Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) reinforce Navy Region AT training requirements to facilitate IRP development and execution.

Finding 4.4 (Non-compliance): NOSC Chattanooga did not conduct an annual AT exercise to evaluate the validity of the AT Plan.²⁵

Discussion: Off-installation activities must conduct an annual AT exercise in order to evaluate the validity of their AT plans.²⁶ Tenant commands must participate.²⁷

Opinion 4.4: An annual exercise would have increased readiness, resulted in site-specific guidance and training efficiencies, and mitigated FP weaknesses. More frequent exercises are required to more fully sustain readiness and account for personnel turnover.

Recommendation 4.4.1: NOSC conduct an annual exercise to evaluate the validity of AT Plans.

Recommendation 4.4.2: CNRFC evaluate the adequacy of NOSC AT training to sustain AT readiness.

Finding 4.5 (Non-compliance): NOSC Chattanooga did not have a fully-compliant barrier plan.²⁸

Discussion: CNRSE requires Navy activities to have a barrier plan that provides specific information as to where the barriers are located, how those barriers will be moved, and contact information for all personnel responsible for executing the barrier plan.²⁹ NOSC Chattanooga's barrier plan contained no specific information about how or where barriers would be employed.³⁰ NOSC Chattanooga lacked serviceable barriers.³¹

In April 2015, RCC SE Jacksonville conducted a command assessment of NOSC Chattanooga, which included a review of the FP program; however, this assessment did not evaluate the command barrier plan.³²

Opinion 4.5: An effective barrier plan uses Design Basis Threat (DBT) to defeat moving vehicle threats and must be properly resourced.

Recommendation 4.5: NOSCs develop and exercise an effective barrier plan as part of a comprehensive AT Plan; identify resource limitations and seek engineering expertise from higher headquarters if required to develop an effective barrier plan.

Finding 4.6 (Non-compliance): The RCC SE Jacksonville ATO had not completed required AT Level II training.³³

Discussion: RCC SE Jacksonville must have a certified ATO who has completed AT Level II training.³⁴

Opinion 4.6: The ATO is the key person responsible for managing a command's AT program. A trained ATO will improve AT program effectiveness.

Recommendation 4.6: RCCs ensure designated ATOs complete required AT Level II training.

Finding 4.7 (Non-compliance): Commander, Navy Reserve Force (CNRF) had not issued required AT guidance or policy.³⁵

Discussion: CNRF, though not in the TACON for FP chain of command, had not issued AT policy for its subordinate commands as required by OPNAVINST F3300.53C.³⁶ Specifically, CNRF has not established procedures for the dissemination of terrorist threat information, nor has CNRF issued policy concerning planning, programming, and budgeting of AT projects and programs.³⁷

Opinion 4.7: CNRF AT policy should support TACON for FP efforts by disseminating terrorist threat information, and providing policy guidance concerning planning, programming, and budgeting of AT projects and programs.

Recommendation 4.7: CNRF issue required AT policy and procedures that complement and provide additional specificity to support TACON for FP authority. Ensure this policy is synchronized with the TACON for FP guidance.

Marine Corps Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 4.8 (Non-compliance): RTC Chattanooga did not have an AT Plan.³⁸

Discussion: RTC commanders are required to have an AT Plan that is signed and coordinated with the host command.³⁹ RTC Chattanooga did not have a signed and coordinated AT Plan.⁴⁰

MARFORRES did not have written AT guidance for subordinate commands to implement an AT plan.⁴¹

Opinion 4.8: A compliant AT Plan would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.

Recommendation 4.8.1: RTCs develop and promulgate a written AT Plan. RTCs that are tenants must ensure AT Plan is coordinated and integrated with host command.

Recommendation 4.8.2: MARFORRES publish AT planning guidance and provide a template to guide development of AT planning and localized response measures. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve staffs.

Finding: 4.9 (Non-compliance): RTC Chattanooga did not conduct an annual AT exercise to validate the command AT Plan.⁴²

Discussion: Off-installation Marine Corps activities must conduct an annual AT exercise to validate their AT Plan.⁴³ Though RTC Chattanooga did perform a drill

in May 2015 that simulated a person trying to get into the NOSC gate, the RTC did not conduct an exercise to validate their AT Plan – a document the RTC lacked.⁴⁴

Opinion 4.9: An annual exercise would have increased readiness, resulted in site-specific guidance and training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses. Frequent exercises are required to sustain readiness and account for personnel turnover.

Recommendation 4.9.1: RTCs conduct an annual exercise to evaluate the validity of the AT Plan. Integrate RTC exercises with host command where applicable.

Recommendation 4.9.2: Require emergency action plans (EAPs) for active shooter scenarios at all off-installation activities. EAPs should be exercised routinely to account for personnel turnover and drilling reservists.

Recommendation 4.9.3: MARFORRES evaluate AT readiness during scheduled assessments, to include competency in execution of active shooter EAPs.

Finding 4.10 (Non-compliance): RTC Chattanooga did not have an ATWG.⁴⁵

Discussion: The ATWG is the primary means of executing the command's AT Program. The RTC must conduct an ATWG, or participate in the NOSC ATWG.⁴⁶ RTC Chattanooga did not have an ATWG; however, the RTC I&I regularly conducted meetings on FP topics with staff.⁴⁷ These discussions included strategies for completing the MA process, implementing FPCON BRAVO measures, and finalizing the command AT Plan.⁴⁸ The RTC I&I also coordinated with Chattanooga PD on response plans.⁴⁹

Opinion 4.10: An ATWG would have formalized AT planning and risk management processes, and increased dialogue with the NOSC and local agencies. An ATWG would have also increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.

Recommendation 4.10.1: RTC participate in NOSC and higher headquarters ATWG forums.

Recommendation 4.10.2: RTCs include local recruiting station activities in ATWGs where practical.

Finding 4.11 (Non-compliance): RTC Chattanooga did not complete its risk management process.⁵⁰ Specifically, RTC Chattanooga did not complete either its annual risk assessment or execute risk planning.⁵¹

Discussion: (1) Risk self-assessment. RM involves the application of a standardized process to identify, assess, and manage risk and enable decision making that balances risk with cost and mission benefits. All commanders are required to conduct an annual risk assessment as part of the RM process.⁵² The risk assessment identifies the threat in the commander's AOR, the criticality of the assets under his charge, and the vulnerability of those assets to the threat.⁵³ (2) Risk planning. Based off the risk assessment, the CO must submit proposed courses of action and resource requirements to mitigate the threat.⁵⁴

RTC Chattanooga had begun the risk management process, but had not completed it.⁵⁵

Opinion 4.11: The RM process would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.

Recommendation 4.11.1: RTC Chattanooga institute the RM process, to include conducting annual risk assessments and risk planning. Coordinate risk strategies with NOSC.

Recommendation 4.11.2: MARFORRES assist RTCs in executing the RM process. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve staffs.

Navy and Marine Corps DOTMLPF Findings

Finding 4.12 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): AT Level II and Level III training does not address the unique concerns of off-installation facilities.⁵⁶

Discussion: AT Level II training is required for all assigned ATOs, and focuses primarily on installation and shipboard AT programs.⁵⁷

Per Navy policy, AT Level III training is required for O-5/O-6 COs prior to assuming command.⁵⁸ There are community-specific Commanding Officer AT (COAT) courses which satisfy the AT Level III training requirement for Aviation, Surface Warfare, Submarine, Installation and Expeditionary prospective commanding officers, and are normally included in their respective pre-command training tracks.⁵⁹ Commanders in the grades of O-5/O-6 or below receive AT training in the prospective executive officer/prospective commanding officer training pipelines.⁶⁰ Nothing precludes O-4 commanders from attending pre-command AT Level III training.

NOSC COs attend command leadership school in Newport, RI, prior to reporting to their duty stations; however, their training pipeline does not include any AT training.⁶¹

USFFC provides an alternative method, via Navy e-learning Antiterrorism Planning (ATP) course (CSF-ATP-010-1.0), for meeting the AT level III training requirement for those PCOs whom do not have an established pre-command pipeline.⁶²

In August 2015, the Center for Security Forces (CENSECFOR) conducted the inaugural Reserve Force Commanding Officer AT Training Seminar at NOSC Little Creek.⁶³

Per Marine Corps policy, AT Level III training is required for O-5/O-6 COs prior to assuming command.⁶⁴ RTC I&Is are not required to attend Level II training, unless formally assigned as the ATO.⁶⁵

Opinion 4.12.1: ATOs who complete the AT Level II training are not fully prepared to manage an AT plan at an off-installation facility. While the AT Level II training provides a foundation to execute ATO responsibilities, it does not fully address unique off-installation concerns.

Opinion 4.12.2: NOSC COs are responsible for protecting personnel and facilities, which includes the development, management, execution, and exercise of a command AT plan and program. They are additionally required to meet the baseline FPCON measures for installations, without having the manpower (Naval Security Forces) and resources of a naval installation. A qualified and trained ATO to supervise and manage the AT program will facilitate the NOSC CO's success; however, AT Level III training for NOSC COs would enhance AT program implementation. The Navy e-learning ATP Course is a valid delivery method for a prerequisite course, but does not address the unique concerns of off-installation activities. Online training is not a substitute for traditional in-person training provided by CENSECFOR subject matter experts.

Opinion 4.12.3: AT Level II program training for RTC I&Is would enhance AT program implementation.

Recommendation 4.12.1: Expand AT Level II training to include one or more modules geared to the specific concerns of off-installation activities, to include instruction on AT Plans, barrier plans, site-specific FPCON measures, and IRPs or incident response measures.

Recommendation 4.12.2: RTC I&Is should receive AT Level II training.

Recommendation 4.12.3: NOSC commanders attend AT Level III training prior to assuming command. Ensure Level III curricula includes information relevant for off-installation commanders and provides requisite tools and knowledge for management of their AT programs.

Recommendation 4.12.4: Naval Education and Training Command/CENSECFOR and MARFORRES, MCRC, TECOM, and PPO investigate viability of developing/implementing an AT Level II training course tailored for off-installation facilities and activities.

Findings 4.13 (Informational): NOSC Chattanooga was not required to have a facility-wide mass notification system.⁶⁶

Discussion: Mass notification systems help in emergencies by providing real-time information and instructions to people in a building or area using voice communications along with visible signals, text, graphics, or other communication methods.⁶⁷

UFC Minimum AT Standards for Buildings prescribe requirements for notifying building occupants of threats and how to respond to those threats.⁶⁸ This facility

construction standard did not apply to NOSC Chattanooga.⁶⁹ NOSC is in the process of installing a mass notification system.⁷⁰

Current Service policy does not specifically require off-installation commanders to incorporate a mass notification process in the absence of an installed system. Nevertheless, commanders must still conduct drills to ensure personnel are highly trained and proficient in notification and evacuation.⁷¹

Opinion 4.13: Absent an installed mass notification system, commanders cannot effectively protect their personnel without an alternate process to quickly notify them of threats and instruct them how to respond to those threats.

Recommendation 4.13.1: Services develop mass notification systems for off-installation activities. Commands should conduct drills and exercises in conjunction with these systems. These systems should leverage emergency capabilities and be coordinated with other DON/DoD agencies in the local area as applicable.

Recommendation 4.13.2: Clarify DoD and Service policy requirements for mass notification systems and processes at off-installation facilities.

Finding 4.14 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): Naval Facilities Criteria (FC) did not require NOSC Chattanooga to have physical security features to protect against moving vehicle or active shooter threats.⁷²

Discussion: FC describes construction processes and standards for NOSC.⁷³ An interdisciplinary team determines physical security requirements using DBT.⁷⁴ The current physical security requirement focuses on protection against damage or theft.⁷⁵

Opinion 4.14: While it would be impractical to protect off-installation facilities to the same degree as installations, the current physical security requirements for off-installation facilities do not emphasize protection against moving vehicle and active shooter threats. Multi-disciplinary teams using DBT should broaden their focus beyond damage and theft to identify and mitigate FP weaknesses. For example, the NOSC Chattanooga gate was designed to prevent damage and theft – not protect against a moving vehicle threat.

Recommendation 4.14.1: Evaluate FC guidance for NOSC's to consider adding provisions on threats such as moving vehicles and active shooters.

Recommendation 4.14.2: Align fiscal resources to match DBT decisions for NOSC's.

¹ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 1(d); Annex J § 1(c).

² MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01, Tab C, Appendix 11, Annex C ¶3(a)(1)-(2).

³ DoDI 2000.12 § 1(a) and DoDI 2000.16 § 1.1.

⁴ SECNAVINST 3300.2B § 1.

⁵ OPNAVINST F3300.53C § 1(a) and MCO 3302.1E ¶ 3.

⁶ USFLTFORCOM AT OPOD 3300-13 § 1.

⁷ USFLTFORCOM AT OPOD 3300-13 and MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01.

⁸ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 1(d).

⁹ USNORTHCOM FP Directive 15-127, 072315Z May 15 § 1A.

¹⁰ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14; NAVOPSPTCHATINST 5530.1A Enclosure 4.

¹¹ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 Annex C § 1(c).

¹² DoDI 2000.16 § E.3.8.3; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 2.

¹³ OPNAVINST F3300.53C § 5(i); NAVOPSPTCHATINST 5530.1A Enclosure 4.

¹⁴ SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 3; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 4. NOSC Chattanooga Bi-Weekly RAM schedule.

¹⁵ SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 6.

¹⁶ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 3(c)(2)(i).

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 3(c)(1); Annex C §§ 3(a)(1) and 3(b)(2); SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 5; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 6; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 36.

¹⁹ SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 5; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 3; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 36; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 2. Personnel assigned to the NOSC articulated during interviews that current CO had emphasized security and FP since his arrival. Specifically, personnel believed that more had been done relative to FP under (b)(6) than in the prior two years under the previous CO.

²⁰ SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, §§ 6, 36-37; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, §§ 2, 5; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 6.

²¹ SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 5; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, §§ 6, 9; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 5; NAVOPSPTCHATINST 5530.1A Enclosure 4.

- ²² OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 20; CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 3(c)(1); Annex C §§ 3(a)(1) and 3(b)(2).
- ²³ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 Annex C § 3(b)(2).
- ²⁴ *Id* at Annex C, Appendix 8, Tab B, § 3(a).
- ²⁵ *Id* at Annex R § 3(b)(3); SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 36; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 13-14; and SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 10.
- ²⁶ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 Annex R § 3(b)(3).
- ²⁷ *Id* at Annex R, Appendix 1, § 3(c)(3).
- ²⁸ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 Annex C, Appendix 3, TAB B, Enclosure 2, § 3(a); NAVOPSPCHATINST 5530.1A Enclosure 4 (Appendix E is nominally labeled a Barrier Plan, but neither Appendix E nor the AT Plan contains substantive information about barriers).
- ²⁹ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 Annex C, Appendix 3, TAB B, Enclosure 2, § 3(a).
- ³⁰ NAVOPSPCHATINST 5530.1A, Enclosure 4 and Enclosure 4, Appendix E.
- ³¹ SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, §§ 9, 30.
- ³² RCC SE Jacksonville Command Assessment for NOSC Chattanooga, N01A/300, 11 May 15.
- ³³ SI with (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15, § 1; DoDI 2000.16, Enclosure (3), § E3.26.1; OPNAVINST 3300.53C, Enclosure (8), CNO Standard 9.
- ³⁴ DoDI 2000.16, Enclosure (3), § E3.26.1; OPNAVINST 3300.53C, Enclosure (8), CNO Standard 9.
- ³⁵ CNRFC N52 (b)(6) email to (b)(6) of 31 Aug 15.
- ³⁶ *Id* and OPNAVINST F3300.53C § 7(l)(2).
- ³⁷ *Id*.
- ³⁸ MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01 ¶ 3(d)(2)(b) and Regimental (14th) Order 3300.2 ¶ 4(b)(1)(a); Interview with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15. (b)(6), supplied draft versions of AT Plans, but had no finalized, signed AT Plan.
- ³⁹ MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01 ¶ 3(d)(2)(b) and Regimental (14th) Order 3300.2 ¶ 4(b)(1)(a).
- ⁴⁰ (b)(6) supplied draft versions of AT Plans, but had no finalized, signed AT Plan; Draft of Policy Letter 01-15 Battery M Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Plan of 11 Mar 15.
- ⁴¹ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15 and SI with (b)(6) of 25 Aug 15 § 3.
- ⁴² MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01, Annex C, Appendix 3 ¶ 2(b)(2); MCO 3302.1E ¶ 4(c)(15)(d); Regimental (14th) Order 3300.2 ¶ 4(b)(1)(a).
- ⁴³ MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01 ¶ 3(d)(2)(i).
- ⁴⁴ *Id*; Regimental (14th) Order 3300.2 ¶ 4(b)(1)(a); SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 6.
- ⁴⁵ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Sep 15.
- ⁴⁶ MCO 3302.1E ¶ 4(c)(15)(b).
- ⁴⁷ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Sep 15.
- ⁴⁸ *Id*.
- ⁴⁹ *Id*.
- ⁵⁰ SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 4.
- ⁵¹ *Id*.
- ⁵² MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01 ¶ 3(d)(2)(f).
- ⁵³ *Id* at Appendix 5, Annex C, ¶ 3(b)(1).
- ⁵⁴ *Id* at ¶ 3(b)(2).
- ⁵⁵ SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 4.
- ⁵⁶ OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 26; MCO 3302.1E ¶ 4.c.(13)(a), 4.c.(14)(a), 4.c.(15)(a); SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 7; CANTRAC catalog entry: ATO II CIN J-830-0015.
- ⁵⁷ OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 26; MCO 3302.1E ¶ 4.c.(13)(a), 4.c.(14)(a), 4.c.(15)(a); SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 7; CANTRAC catalog entry: ATO II CIN J-830-0015.
- ⁵⁸ OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 27; See also DODI 2000.16 Enclosure 3 § E3.27.
- ⁵⁹ https://app.prod.cetars.training.navy.mil/cantrac/pages/rpt_basic_search.html?p=1&q=COAT Aviation PCOs attend the Aviation COAT course in Pensacola, FL. Surface Warfare PCOs attend the Surface Warfare COAT course in Newport, RI; Expeditionary PCOs attend the Expeditionary COAT in Virginia

Beach, VA; Submarine PCOs attend the Submarine COAT as part of the Submarine Commander's Course at COMSUBLANT and COMSUBPAC headquarters; the Installation COAT Course is conducted as a part of the Senior Shore Station Leadership Course (SSSLC) at the Washington Navy Yard
⁶⁰ OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8 at CNO Standard 27.

⁶¹ SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 41.

⁶² USFLTFORCOM AT OPOD 3300-13 (United States Fleet Forces Command Antiterrorism Operations Order), Appendix 2 to Annex C, § 3.d.(3)(c)(3).

⁶³ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 Aug 15.

⁶⁴ MCO 3302.1E ¶4.d.(7)(b); See also DODI 2000.16 Enclosure 3 § E3.27.

⁶⁵ *Id.*; DODI 2000.16 Enclosure 3 § E3.27.

⁶⁶ UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, 9 Feb 12, Change 1, 1 Oct 13, § 2-3.6.

⁶⁷ UFC 4-021-01, Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems, 9 Apr 08, Change 1, Jan 10, § 1-1.

⁶⁸ UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, 9 Feb 12, Change 1, 1 Oct 13, § 2-3.6.

⁶⁹ Email from (b)(6) of NAVFAC MIDLANT to (b)(6) of 10 Sep 15. NAVFAC noted that NOSC Chattanooga was an existing building at the time the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings were published. Accordingly, these standards only apply to existing buildings when a major investment project under § 1-8.2.1 occurs. Though a "primary gathering building" under UFC 4-010-01, NOSC Chattanooga has not undergone a renovation that would trigger the requirement for the Mass Notification Standard.

⁷⁰ SI with (b)(6) to CNRSE Preliminary Inquiry of 20 Jul 15, p.2.

⁷¹ OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 23.

⁷² FC 4-171-06N Navy Operational Support Center Facilities Criteria of 5 Sep 14, § 1-5.2.

⁷³ *Id.* at § 1-1.

⁷⁴ *Id.* at § 1-5.2.1.

⁷⁵ *Id.* at § 1-5.2.

Chapter 5 – Emergency Management Response

DON relies on local agencies to provide EM response to off-installation activities. For this incident, Hamilton County Emergency Management Services (HCEMS) and CPD responded swiftly and heroically to both the AFRS and NOSC. The investigation team did not assess the detailed tactical responses of these local agencies, but rather focused on deficiencies and compliance with DON EM policy and makes several recommendations to improve DON's off-installation EM capability.

For purposes of this chapter, EM response includes police, fire, and emergency medical services.

Regulatory Background

The investigation team reviewed DoD, USN, and USMC policy guidance, instructions, and operational orders regarding EM for off-installation activities in place on July 16, 2015. As detailed below, DoD and DON EM guidance is focused on Installation Emergency Management (IEM) and generally does not apply to off-installation facilities, such as the AFRS and NOSC.

DoDI 6055.17 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for developing, implementing, and sustaining IEM programs at DoD installations worldwide for all hazards.¹ This instruction provides the regulatory basis for EM programs, but does not apply to off-installation activities.²

USN Guidance:

OPNAVINST 3440.17A addresses the Navy IEM Program, providing policy and guidance to develop, implement, and maintain an IEM program on Navy

installations and, along with CNICINST 3400.17, implements DoDI 6055.17. This instruction does not apply to off-installation activities.³

CNICINST 3440.17 (Navy Installation Emergency Management Program) provides additional guidance for Installation EM programs but does not apply to off-installation activities.⁴

CNRSEINST 3440.2D (Southeast Regional Emergency Management (EM) Program) aligns with the CNICINST and OPNAVINST 3440 series instructions, but does not provide off-installation EM guidance.⁵

NAVOPSTCHATINST 5330.1A (Physical Security and Anti-Terrorism Plan) states the Medical Division will develop and maintain medical MOA/MOU with local civilian and military medical facilities to provide emergency medical support to AT and incident response operations.⁶ The same instruction states MOA/MOU shall be developed with local LE agencies to support planning.⁷

CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 applies to all personnel assigned or attached to a Navy installation within Navy Region Southeast's AOR, and other off-installation facilities to include NOSCs and NRSs.⁸ This OPORD states: "CNRSE shall establish and manage a regional security program, including the development of plans (AT, Emergency Management, etc.) for off-installation facilities."⁹ CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 addresses the requirement to establish MOAs/MOUs with local, state, and federal agencies and the requirement for IRPs for personnel assigned to off-installation activities, as well as coordination with local LE agencies.¹⁰

USMC Guidance:

MCO 3440.9A (Installation Emergency Management) provides EM guidance to RTCs through MARFORRES, but does not provide guidance to MCRC activities.¹¹

MCRC 3302.1A addresses Emergency Action Planning to the Recruiting Station (but not the Sub-Station) level.¹² 6th Marine DistO 5000 provides sample emergency action plans for scenarios including “active shooter” to its subordinate units, but does not direct actions to those units.¹³

Navy and Marine Corps Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations

Finding 5.1 (Informational): HCEMS agencies provided emergency response to both the AFRS and NOSC on July 16, 2015.¹⁴

Opinion 5.1: The HCEMS response was swift, effective, and heroic.

Recommendation 5.1: DON off-installation activities develop EM MOAs/MOUs with local agencies (such as HCEMS) in order to establish expectations, ensure clear coordination, and enable effective response from local EM agencies.

Finding 5.2 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): There is a deficiency in DON EM Program policy guidance for off-installation activities.

Discussion: As described above, DoDI 6055.17, OPNAVINST 3440.17A, CNICINST 3440.17, and CNRSEINST 3440.2D do not provide EM policy guidance for off-installation activities. MCO 3440.9A applies to RTCs, but not recruiting activities.¹⁵

Recommendation 5.2: Update DON EM policy to include off-installation activities. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve and recruiting staffs.

Finding 5.3 (Non-compliance): CNRSE's regional security program does not include the development of EM plans for off-installation facilities.¹⁶

Recommendation 5.3: Navy Region Commanders update EM policy to include off-installation activities. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve and recruiting staffs.

Finding 5.4 (Non-compliance): MARFORRES does not have a required EM policy.¹⁷

Recommendation 5.4: MARFORRES issue EM policy to include off-installation activities. Guidance should be tailored for implementation by small I&I staffs.

Finding 5.5 (Non-compliance): Neither NOSC Chattanooga, NRD Nashville, nor RS Nashville had formal MOAs/MOUs with local emergency response agencies.¹⁸

Discussion: Although NOSC CO had initiated informal contact with the Hamilton County Park Rangers, NOSC Chattanooga had no formal MOA/MOU relationships with local agencies.¹⁹

RTC is a tenant and responsibility for establishing MOU/MOA for local emergency response falls on the NOSC.²⁰

Opinion 5.5: MOAs/MOUs are valuable tools for pre-incident coordination and for increasing the effectiveness of EM when no organic assets are present. MOAs/MOUs are contingent upon agreement with agencies outside of DoD, and therefore may not be attainable for every reserve center and recruiting center.

Where formal agreements are not attainable, coordination with local agencies should be documented.

Recommendation 5.5: Develop MOAs/MOUs with local emergency response agencies. When formal MOAs/MOUs are not attainable, document coordination with local agencies.

Finding 5.6 (Non-compliance): Neither NOSC Chattanooga, NRD Nashville, nor RS Nashville established and exercised EM IRPs.²¹

Opinion 5.6: IRP planning and exercises would have increased EM readiness.

Recommendation 5.6: NRDs, subordinate units, RSs, and NOSCs develop and exercise EM IRPs with local agencies.

¹ DoDI 6055.17, Change 1, of 19 Nov 10 § 1(a).

² *Id* at § 2(b), Glossary p.47.

³ OPNAVINST 3440.17A § 1(a): "To provide policy and guidance to develop, implement, and maintain an installation emergency management (IEM) program on Navy *installations*, per [DoDI 6055.17]" (emphasis added). There are no additional references to off-installation activities.

⁴ CNICINST 3440.17 § 2(a), § 2(d).

⁵ CNRSEINST 3440.2D Part 1, § 1(b): "Applicability. This Regional EM Plan applies to the CNRSE Staff, supported *installations*, and tenant commands on those *installations*. It is applicable to all Navy personnel, including active and reserve components, Navy civilians, Navy families, Navy and non-Navy tenants on NRSE *installations*, transient military or US Government (USG) personnel, contractor personnel, visitors and guests, and third country national personnel who are assigned to or resident on NRSE *installations*" (emphasis added).

⁶ NAVOPSTCHATINST 5330.1A Encl. 4, § 3(e), § 4(b).

⁷ *Id* at Enclosure 4 § 4(b).

⁸ CRNSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 1(d); *id* at Annex C, Appendix 4, Tab B § 3(c).

⁹ *Id* at Annex C, Appendix 4, Tab B § 3(e)(2)(c).

¹⁰ *Id* at Annex C § 3(a)(1) and § 3(b)(1).

¹¹ MCO 3440.9A ¶ 3(b)(13)(a) directs MARFORRES to develop, implement, and sustain an IEM Program that is scalable, flexible, and adaptable to specific installation needs worldwide supporting preparation for, response to, and recovery from "all-hazards" incidents.

¹² MCRO 3302.1A ¶ 4(b)(1)(x)(7).

¹³ 6MCD DistO 5000 ¶¶ 1-6.

¹⁴ See the Chapter 2 Sequence of Events.

¹⁵ MCRO 3440.9a ¶ 3(b)(13)(a).

¹⁶ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 3(e)(2); CNRSEINST 3440.2D Change 1 of 27 FEB 14, § 3.

¹⁷ MCO 3440.9A ¶ 3(b)(13)(a)(2) directs MARFORRES to develop, implement, and sustain an IEM Program that is scalable, flexible, and adaptable to specific installation needs worldwide supporting preparation for, response to, and recovery from "all-hazards" incidents; Email from (b)(6) to

(b)(6) and (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15 confirms that there was no MARFORRES policy at the time of the shooting – the policy was being reviewed for signature at the time.
¹⁸ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 3(c)(2)(i); NAVOPSTCHATINST 5330.1A Enclosure 4, § 3(e); MCO 3058.1 ¶ 3(b)(4)(f)(11); SI with (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15 § 20; SI with (b)(6) 19 Aug 15 § 8; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15 § 2; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 6; SI with (b)(6) on 3 Sep 15 § 10.
¹⁹ SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 8; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15 § 8; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 6.
MARFORNORTH MA OPOD 15-01 ¶ 3(d)(4)(b); DoDI 2000.16 § E3.8.3.
²¹ CNRSE AT OPOD 3300-14 § 2(e), § 3(c)(1); MCRCO 3302.1A ¶ 4(b)(1)(x)(7); DistO 5500 Enclosure 2 provides “Generic Emergency Action Plans”; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 5; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 13; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 4; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 10; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 9; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 10; SI with (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15, § 15; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 36; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 7; SI 5.12 with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 13; SI with (b)(6) on 3 Sep 15, § 4.

Chapter 6 – Post-Incident Response

The post-incident response to the Chattanooga shootings was appropriate, timely, and effective. Counselors and CACOs performed their roles effectively, providing necessary care to victims and their families. For future incidents, recommend a senior officer act as the single post-incident response POC to ensure unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care.

Regulatory Background

DoDI 1300.18 (Department of Defense Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures) assigns responsibilities and establishes uniform personnel policies and procedures across DOD components for reporting, recording, notifying, and assisting the next-of-kin whenever DoD casualties are sustained.

OPNAVINST 1770.1A (Casualty Assistance Calls and Funeral Honors Support (CAC/FHS) Program Coordination) and Marine Corps Order 3040.4 (Casualty Assistance Program (MARCORCASASTPRO)) establish requirements for providing and coordinating casualty assistance and funeral honors for active duty and retired military members and their families.

SECNAVINST 5720.44C (Department of the Navy Public Affairs Policy and Regulations) provides requirements and guidance on DON Public Affairs matters.

Post-Incident Personnel Accountability

Accountability was conducted for AFRS personnel immediately after the shooting, and was reported to RS Nashville by 1055 on July 16.¹ Accountability for Marines at RTC Chattanooga was conducted both during and after the shooting, and reported to the 3/14 chain of command no later than 1300 on July 16.² CNRSE initiated personnel accountability for all Navy employees in the

Chattanooga region via the Navy Family Accountability and Assessment System (NFAAS) at 1330 on July 16, and reported 100% accountability by 1600 on July 17.³

Finding 6.1 (Informational): CNRSE deployed a multi-disciplinary crisis action team (CAT) to Chattanooga to provide post-incident care to Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their families.⁴

Discussion: The CAT arrived beginning July 17, 2015, and began working in the same facility where the NOSC staff had relocated.⁵ The CAT was comprised of Fleet and Family Services counselors, chaplains, public affairs officers, a judge advocate general (JAG) legal assistance provider, an active-reserve integrated Navy Security Forces (NSF) element, and representatives from the Region Inspector General (IG) and Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).⁶ CAT counselors remained in Chattanooga providing services to Navy and Marine Corps personnel and families through August 17, 2015.⁷ During this timeframe, a total of 49 CAT members came to Chattanooga, to include 10 counselors and 11 chaplains.⁸ There was no single POC identified to coordinate unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care.⁹

Service members stated support and aftercare provided by CAT were beneficial.¹⁰ However, there were some concerns: (1) the number of providers that surged into the area amounted to saturation;¹¹ (2) repeated inquiries into the well-being of service members influenced some to avoid the counselors;¹² (3) the turnover of the counseling staff did not permit continuity of care;¹³ (4) the turnover required service members to start over in counseling;¹⁴ and (5) the turnover facilitated “an unhealthy competition” between successive counselors.¹⁵

The surge of providers working in the same facility as the NOSC staff created a strain on space and resources.¹⁶ Reservists serving on the CAT required

administrative support and assistance with travel and pay issues, for which they turned to the NOSC staff. Some NOSC staff members stated these issues created an awkward atmosphere for counseling.¹⁷

Some Marines avoided the counseling services, stating they were more receptive to uniformed chaplains.¹⁸ One Marine found comfort in speaking to other Marines, specifically noting (b)(6) and (b)(6); some stated it would be more helpful, whenever possible, to have counseling services from a combat veteran.¹⁹ Many of the service members were grateful and humbled by the support shown to them by the local Chattanooga community.²⁰

Officers at the O-5/O-6 level from each of the affected DON commands have specifically developed long-term medical treatment and mental health care plans for their service members.²¹

After the shooting, DON senior leaders began traveling to Chattanooga. The Vice President of the United States, SECDEF, SECNAV, and nine Flag Officers/General Officers traveled to Chattanooga between the time of the shooting and the public memorial on August 15, including: CNO; CMC; Chief of the Navy Reserve; Commander, Marine Forces Reserve/Marine Forces North; Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command; Commanding General, 4th Marine Division; Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command; Commander, Navy Recruiting Command; and Commander, Navy Region Southeast.²²

Public Affairs support consisted of 15 uniformed and civilian DON PA personnel who traveled to Chattanooga to coordinate and staff media queries to support their parent commands.²³ PA personnel also helped survivors and families to handle the post-incident media interest.²⁴ The CAT did not coordinate PA

support.²⁵ PA efforts aligned after dedicated personnel arrived on July 24, some of whom remained on scene through the public memorial on August 15.²⁶

During the course of this investigation, CNRSE personnel interviewed had not captured lessons learned from the post-incident response.²⁷

Opinion 6.1: CAT and administrative post-incident response was appropriate, timely, and effective.

Recommendation 6.1.1: Establish a single chain of command with a senior officer acting as the CAT POC to ensure unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care for the entire post-incident response.

Recommendation 6.1.2: CATs should provide consistent staff support with minimal turnover.

Recommendation 6.1.3: To the maximum extent possible, CATs supporting small activities should arrive on scene administratively self-reliant. CATs should not co-locate with supported personnel if doing so would strain resources.

Recommendation 6.1.4: The CAT must have dedicated PA support, including a visual information specialist, to ensure consistent messaging.

Recommendation 6.1.5: CNIC, MARFORRES, MCRC, and Manpower and Reserve Affairs capture lessons learned and recommendations from this investigation to improve unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care in future mass casualty post-incident responses.

Finding 6.2 (Informational): CACO services to victims' families, including Next-of-Kin (NOK) notifications, were timely and professional.

Discussion: Ten Marines and one Sailor were ultimately assigned as CACOs to provide casualty assistance to the identified NOK for each of the five fatalities.²⁸

CACOs completed NOK notifications for the Marine fatalities by 2255 on July 16, 2015.²⁹ [REDACTED] passed away at 0217 on July 18, 2015.³⁰ The CACO completed the NOK notification at approximately 1000 the same day.³¹ These notifications were timely.³²

The Marine Corps CACOs stated their training was primarily computer-based, though some had also completed an in-residence course supported by MARFORRES.³³ None of the Marine CACOs identified specific deficiencies in the CACO training.³⁴ Some suggested areas of improvement, to include having prospective CACOs perform “ride along” duties with a qualified CACO to build familiarity with the process, including witnessing the interactions between the CACO and the family.³⁵ The Marine CACOs stated their communication with Casualty Branch was responsive and helpful.³⁶

The Navy CACO completed his training via a one-day mandatory course; he stated the training was not sufficient on its own but did provide him a foundation to perform his duties.³⁷

One CACO stated he could have been better prepared for the incident’s high visibility, which resulted in CACOs being contacted directly by the Vice President of the United States, the offices of U.S. Congressmen, SECNAV, and CMC.³⁸

Opinion 6.2: CACO support, to include NOK notifications, was appropriate and effective.

Recommendation 6.2: Maximize opportunities for live training taught by experienced CACOs. Ensure CACO training includes instruction on handling inquiries by senior leaders.

¹ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15.
² Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 9 Sep 15.
³ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 8 Sep 15.
⁴ CNRSE CAT Master Manning Document supplied to Investigation Team by (b)(6).
⁵ CNRSE CAT Master Manning Document supplied to Investigation Team by (b)(6) and SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 18.
⁶ *Id.*
⁷ *Id.*; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15, 8:23 AM; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15, 1:39 PM.
⁸ CNRSE CAT Master Manning Document supplied to Investigation Team by (b)(6) and Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 31 Aug 15.
⁹ CNRSE CAT Master Manning Document supplied to Investigation Team by (b)(6).
¹⁰ SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 11; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 8; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 15; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 9; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 18; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 11.
¹¹ SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 16: (b)(6) said the turnover among support personnel was a problem. A Sailor or Marine would find himself telling the same story multiple times to different support providers. (b)(6) said this feeling of saturation was widespread throughout the Sailors and Marines assigned to NOSC Chattanooga."
¹² SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 45: (b)(6) reported that an unhealthy competition developed among FFSC representatives about whether NOSC staff were ready to return to the facility. Some FFSC representatives appeared to take pleasure in contradicting the mental health determinations of prior FFSC representatives. White said this was frustrating for him and his staff."
¹³ SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 21: (b)(6) said turnover among support personnel was occasionally a problem. Personnel would transfer out after a week or so. (b)(6) reportedly told a counselor, "Why should I talk to you? You'll be gone next week."
¹⁴ SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 16; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 21; SI (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 19.
¹⁵ SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 45: (b)(6) reported that an unhealthy competition developed among FFSC representatives about whether NOSC staff were ready to return to the facility. Some FFSC representatives appeared to take pleasure in contradicting the mental health determinations of prior FFSC representatives. White said this was frustrating for him and his staff."
¹⁶ *Id.* at § 46.
¹⁷ SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 20.
¹⁸ SI (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 7; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 7; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 6; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 10; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 7; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 11.
¹⁹ SI (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 7; SI (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 10.
²⁰ SI (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 7; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 8; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 10; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 7; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 11.
²¹ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 21 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 21 Aug 15.
²² (b)(6) and (b)(6) (15 Aug 15) "Biden reflects on loss at service for Chattanooga victims." *USA Today*. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com; SI with (b)(6); Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15.

- 23 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15 and Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15.
- 24 SI (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 7; SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 8; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 7.
- 25 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15.
- 26 PA support consisted of temporarily assigned active-duty and reserve personnel from Headquarters Marine Corps, Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve, MARFORRES, CNRFC, CNRSE, RCC SE Jacksonville, Navy Office of Community Outreach, Navy Public Affairs Support Element East, and Navy Expeditionary Combat Camera.
- 27 CNRSE CAT Master Manning Document supplied to Investigation Team by (b)(6); Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15.
- 28 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 Aug 15.
- 29 *Id.*
- 30 Navy Office of Information (18 Jul 15) "Navy Sailor Wounded in NOSC Shooting Dies." *Navy Newsstand*. Retrieved from www.navy.mil.
- 31 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 26 Aug 15.
- 32 DoDI 1300.18 § 4(2).
- 33 SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 13; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 12; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 13; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 12; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 15; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 5, § 16; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 4, § 14.
- 34 *Id.*
- 35 SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15 § 3, § 4.
- 36 *Id.* at § 9; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 6; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 9; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 6; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 2015, § 5; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 8; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 4.
- 37 SI with (b)(6) of 18 Aug 15, § 17.
- 38 SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug, 15 § 13.

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Chapter 7 – Force Protection Relative to Known Threats on July 16, 2015

There was no specific, credible threat against DoD personnel at the time of the shootings. However, the findings inform recommendations to assist commanders in remaining alert and ensuring constant vigilance.

Background

Threat detection depends on the ability to gather, fuse, assess, and disseminate intelligence and information derived from multiple sources, including national agencies, theater commands, and LE elements at all levels of government. NCIS completes threat assessments for naval installations, activities, and special events.¹

The Multiple Threat Alert Center (MTAC) serves as NCIS' fusion center for LE, intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and other threat information. It also provides indications and warnings of terrorist, foreign intelligence, cyber, and criminal threats to the DON and to generate related analysis and products.²

Commanders and ATOs can submit a request for information for annual threat assessments to their local NCIS office.³ ATOs can also submit a request for information for a threat assessment through the NCIS SIPRnet website.⁴

Known Threat on July 16, 2015

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Finding 7.1 (Informational):** Per NCIS, there were no indications of an imminent terrorist attack on DON personnel on July 16, 2015.⁵

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Discussion:** DIA provides terrorist threat levels, which are country-level intelligence assessments of the threat facing DoD personnel and interests.

At the time of the July 16 shootings, the DIA terrorist threat level for the United States was "SIGNIFICANT," which is defined by the following conditions: Anti-U.S. terrorists are operationally active and attack personnel as the preferred method of operation; or, terrorist groups seek to carry out large casualty producing attacks but are operationally limited. The operating environment was neutral, favoring neither the terrorists nor U.S. personnel.⁶

(U/FOUO) The NCIS threat assessment database contained no threat assessments for Chattanooga as of July 16, 2015.⁷ The most recent threat assessment for any naval site in Tennessee was completed on July 9, 2015, for Millington, Tennessee.⁸

(U/FOUO) The NCIS Daily Threat Summary for July 10, 2015, reported no indications of an imminent terrorist attack on DON personnel; however, it noted that "extremists who exercise exceptional operational security may elude their attention and attack with little or no warning."⁹

(U/FOUO) The Threat Assessment for Millington, Tennessee, stated:

(U/FOUO) A Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) is an individual residing in the United States who has been motivated by a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) to advocate, engage in, or prepare to engage in terrorist activities, while acting independently of the FTO's command and control. HVEs pose the most immediate terrorist threat to DoD facilities and personnel in the Homeland. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) encourages supporters in the U.S. to kill military, law enforcement, security, and intelligence personnel at any available opportunity, without direct guidance from ISIL's core members. By their very nature, such attacks are difficult to predict and prevent. NCIS advises military

personnel to be alert at all times, especially when outside the confines of the military base.¹⁰

Opinion 7.1: The process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating threat information down to the tactical level was effective.

Recommendation 7.1: Ensure DON, NCIS, and USNORTHCOM continue coordination on the collection, assessment, and dissemination of threat information.

(U/FOUO) **Finding 7.2 (Informational):** On May 7, 2015, USNORTHCOM directed an FPCON increase to BRAVO.¹¹

(U/FOUO) **Discussion:** On January 10, 2015, ISIL released a video on social media which reemphasized its encouragement for lone offender attacks in the West. Specifically, it advocated violence against soldiers, troops, police, security, and intelligence members, and directed supporters execute attacks without seeking advice.¹²

(U/FOUO) USNORTHCOM issued an unclassified FP advisory message on March 9, 2015, highlighting a general ISIL threat. This message stressed a vigilant FP posture especially for those personnel in the off-installation environment such as recruiting centers, ROTC, reserve centers and other identifiable DoD locations.¹³ No specific credible threat against DoD or DON personnel was identified. USNORTHCOM did not direct an FPCON posture change.

(U/FOUO) On March 29, 2015, a group proclaiming affiliation to ISIL posted online a list of 100 individuals identified by DoD Service branch, name, rank, U.S. address, and photograph. The FBI was not aware of any imminent threat towards U.S. service members at that time.¹⁴

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 5, 2015, USNORTHCOM issued an FP advisory message to ensure increased vigilance and safeguarding of all DoD personnel, installations, and facilities in the USNORTHCOM AOR.¹⁵ The advisory was in response to an increased general threat of HVE attacks from ISIL supporters, and was based on assessments of recent violent activity against military and LE personnel.

USNORTHCOM stated there was a lack of specificity about timing and targeting; no imminent credible threat against U.S. military personnel was identified.¹⁶

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 7, 2015, USNORTHCOM, and subsequently USFLTFORCOM and MARFORNORTH, directed an increase in FPCON to BRAVO. The USNORTHCOM directive was designed to complicate terrorist attack planning through unpredictability and to enhance security posture at installation perimeters and off-installation.¹⁷ The message repeated guidance from the May 5, 2015, FP Advisory, not in response to a specific threat stream, but rather to ensure RAMs were conducted at an unpredictable frequency.¹⁸

(U//~~FOUO~~) On May 8, 2015, CNRSE directed the FPCON increase with additional measures to include a robust RAM program and Region-specific RAMs focused on entry control points and perimeter defense.¹⁹

(U//~~FOUO~~) Navy and Marine Corps recruiting and reserve activities in Chattanooga acknowledged receipt of USNORTHCOM FPCON baseline change.²⁰

(U//~~FOUO~~) On July 16, 2015, the day of the shootings, there was no specific, credible threat against DoD personnel.²¹

Opinion 7.2: Communication of FP advisories and directives down the chain of command to the reserve and recruiting units was executed according to established policy and procedures. A consistent emphasis on vigilance and

awareness of potential threats, systematic increase of FPCON and escalation of RAMs were logical actions to reduce vulnerability.

Recommendation 7.2: Commanders remain alert and ensure constant vigilance and accountability, even in the absence of a specific threat.

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Finding 7.3 (Informational):** DON off-installation personnel and activities are vulnerable and face greater risks in the current threat environment.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Discussion: Off-installation recruiting and reserve activities lack the safety of an installation-hardened perimeter and security forces for protection. The missions of recruiting and reserves require our service members to live in and among urban and rural U.S. communities. They rely on baseline DoD physical security measures and local civilian, LE and emergency response agencies as their first line of protection.

(U//~~FOUO~~) There have been ten reported active shooter incidents since 2003 where a U.S. domestic military installation or activity was targeted. Of the ten events, three were disrupted before execution. In the seven events that were completed, two of the perpetrators were identified as Islamic extremists. Each of these seven attacks involved one perpetrator and was likely successful because the attacker was able to easily acquire weapons and equipment; did not require online or outside assistance or technical experience; and could execute the attack without significant planning. The seven attacks unfolded rapidly and it took several minutes to notify law enforcement in almost all cases. Victims seemed to be chosen randomly, making it difficult to detect prior to the event and respond accordingly.²²

(U//~~FOUO~~) Additionally, since 2003, U.S. LE agencies have disrupted eight plots targeting U.S. domestic military installations or activities, three of which included an active shooter component. Multiple perpetrators were involved in each of

these plots; LE disrupted these plots due to poor operational security. The perpetrators in each of the active shooter plots espoused a radical Islamic ideology.²³

(U/FOUO) Events including the attack on a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 2009, and the Chattanooga, Tennessee, shootings in 2015 demonstrate the vulnerabilities of “soft” military targets.²⁴

(U/FOUO) The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis assesses that LE and military targets remain a priority for HVEs.²⁵ Terrorist attacks and disrupted plots by lone actors in the U.S. over the past several years have demonstrated the ability of radicalized individuals to plan and execute violent behavior while remaining below the threshold of detection by law enforcement and intelligence communities.²⁶ MTAC assesses with HIGH confidence FTOs, including ISIL and al-Qa’ida, as well as HVEs and lone actors, continue to pose a significant threat to DON, especially against less hardened facilities such as recruiting centers, military entrance processing centers, military memorials, and off-base housing, restaurants and shopping centers where military members and families congregate.²⁷

(U/FOUO) FTOs continue to use online media forums, professional-grade, English language publications, and videos to encourage lone actors worldwide to carry out attacks against Western military and LE organizations.²⁸ In March 2015, six individuals were arrested in Ohio for the suspicion of plotting to abduct and kill service members associated with a military recruiting facility in the area.²⁹

The 14th issue of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s *Inspire* magazine highlighted the Chattanooga shootings as an example of successful, ‘high-impact’ operations.³⁰ According to a recent Department of Homeland Security bulletin, five of nine ISIL supporters arrested in the United States since June

2015 considered attacks against U.S. military or LE personnel as a direct result of ISIL propaganda calling for such attacks.³¹ MTAC assesses that terrorist propaganda calling for attacks against military personnel will continue to resonate with lone-actors.³² ISIL's online *Dabiq* magazine also directly encouraged targeting of DoD personnel.³³ MTAC assesses with HIGH confidence ISIL-related propaganda will continue to inspire HVEs to conduct attacks.³⁴

Opinion 7.3: ISIL, al-Qa'ida, and HVEs, using the active shooter tactic, have placed a priority on attacking off-installation targets, thereby increasing the threat to those personnel and facilities. It is impractical to resource all recruiting and reserve centers to the same level as installations. However, since the threat has increased, DON needs to either assume greater risk at these facilities, or increase the resources allocated to them, in order to maintain or reduce their risk.

Risk can be determined using the elements of threat, vulnerability, and criticality. Any change to these variables will be reflected by a corresponding change in risk. The Navy's Required Operational Capability (ROC) tiering strategy bins installations and facilities into categories according to their respective mission criticality (ROC Levels 1-5). ROC Level 1 (strategic weapons facilities and command and control) is the highest criticality, and Level 5 (all off-installation facilities) is the lowest criticality.

Assuming the threat remains relatively constant, AT resources (which directly affect the vulnerability) are allocated to maintain acceptable levels of risk to Navy installations and facilities according to their respective mission criticality. Any increase in the threat requires either a decrease in criticality (lower priority placed upon the mission accomplished by an installation or facility), or a decrease in vulnerability (through the allocation of additional resources used to reduce an installation or facility's vulnerability), in order to maintain the same level of risk.

During an active shooter event, priority should be survivability of personnel. Off-installation FP strategies must rapidly warn personnel, as well as deter and delay the active shooter until the arrival of LE. It is critical to prioritize capabilities that will **add time** throughout the active shooter detect-to-engage sequence.

Therefore, resourcing strategies should target points within an active shooter detect-to-engage sequence where improvements will add time to enhance survivability. Examples include next generation, near real time, hand held communication capabilities; adding additional impediments to a shooter's movement; and tight coordination with local agencies. All of these examples could provide precious minutes for personnel to execute IRPs (run, hide, fight) and enable LE to respond to the threat.

Recommendation 7.3: Analyze policies, procedures, training, and allocation of resources to reduce vulnerability in the current threat environment. Identify gaps, seams, and barriers to survivability during an active shooter attack.

Finding 7.4 (Non-compliance): NOSC and NRS Chattanooga were not fully compliant with FPCON measures.³⁵

Discussion: After receiving notice of the FPCON change from their respective higher headquarters, NOSC and NRS Chattanooga reported attainment of USNORTHCOM baseline FPCON increase.³⁶ Navy activities acknowledged directives to implement elevated RAMs directed by CNRSE, and the NOSC implemented a daily schedule as required.³⁷

Baseline FPCON measures are designed for installations and do not address the unique protection requirements for off-installation reserve centers.

USNORTHCOM has campus-based ROTC program and recruiting station baseline FPCON measures.³⁸

The CNRSE Preliminary Inquiry into the shootings found the NRS was not fully compliant with FPCON BRAVO measures.³⁹ This investigation confirmed NRS non-compliance with one Recruiting Station FPCON BRAVO measure (weekly contact with ATO), and one Recruiting Station FPCON Normal measure (personnel familiarize with emergency-action/incident-response plans).⁴⁰ The NOSC was not fully compliant with FPCON BRAVO because it was not testing mass notification systems or capable of reviewing intelligence.⁴¹

In June of 2014, Navy Region Midwest conducted an AT assessment of NOSC Chattanooga. The facility received a grade of "average." There were a total of 49 non-compliant AT, PS and LE requirements.⁴² Of the noted non-compliance discrepancies, five were directly related to FPCON implementation.⁴³ The Region assessed access control measures as "adequate"; however, it recommended that the NOSC submit waivers for "security and AT requirements that cannot be met."⁴⁴ NOSC Chattanooga did not request any waivers for specific FPCON measures.⁴⁵

Note: NRMW was disestablished on June 30, 2014, after which NOSC Chattanooga and NRS transitioned to CNRSE.⁴⁶

In April of 2015, RCC SE Jacksonville conducted a Command Assessment of NOSC Chattanooga.⁴⁷ The assessment reviewed all command programs, including FP. NOSC FP programs received a grade of "Satisfactory."⁴⁸ RCC SE Jacksonville evaluated 47 benchmarks of the NOSC FP program and noted six discrepancies, none of which were related to FPCON measures.⁴⁹ The RCC SE Jacksonville assessment neither used the same evaluation criteria nor specifically addressed previously noted discrepancies from the NRMW AT Assessment.⁵⁰

Opinion 7.4.1: Full implementation of FPCON measures would have increased FP readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.

Opinion 7.4.2: The NRMW AT and RCC SE Jacksonville command assessments of “average” and “satisfactory” did not accurately reflect the state of the NOSC AT program or FP posture. The RCC SE Jacksonville command assessment of the NOSC FP program was not effective because it was not informed by the results of the most recent region AT assessment.

Recommendation 7.4.1: Commanders must report all FPCON measures they cannot attain and request waivers to the first flag/general officer in the TACON for FP chain where necessary.

Recommendation 7.4.2: Region commanders ensure AT assessment discrepancies are corrected in a timely fashion. AT assessments should be informed by previous evaluations and conducted by qualified assessors to ensure accurate feedback and completion of corrective actions.

Recommendation 7.4.3: Expedite development and implementation of FPCON measures tailored to off-installation reserve activities.

Finding 7.5 (Non-compliance): NOSC Chattanooga, RTC Chattanooga, NRD Nashville, and RS Nashville did not have or participate in Threat Working Groups (TWG).⁵¹

Discussion: A TWG serves as a command’s focal point for integrating terrorist threat intelligence into an AT plan and program.⁵² TWG membership includes the commander (or designated representative); the ATO; staff members; tenant unit representatives; and representation from direct-hire, contractor, local, state, federal, and LE agencies and the intelligence community.⁵³ The ATO is

responsible for developing and maintaining terrorist threat information and requesting intelligence information through NCIS.⁵⁴ The TWG meets at least quarterly or more frequently, depending upon the level of threat activity, to develop and refine terrorist threat assessments and coordinate and disseminate threat warnings, reports, and summaries.⁵⁵

Opinion 7.5: Based on the absence of any specific credible threat against DON personnel on July 16, elevated FPCON, and increased RAMs, a TWG would not have recommended any specific actions to the Navy and Marine Corps Chattanooga activities. No previous suspicious activity had been reported and the sequence of events and brief period of time which elapsed between the shootings make it unlikely that a TWG review of known threat information would have had any effect on the events. However, a functioning TWG that analyzes current threat against known deficiencies will improve overall FP readiness.

Recommendation 7.5.1: NOSC establish a TWG; RTC participate in the NOSC TWG.

Recommendation 7.5.2: NRD and RS Nashville establish a TWG or participate in higher headquarters TWG.

Finding 7.6 (Non-compliance): NOSC and RTC Chattanooga, and NRD and RS Nashville, did not coordinate with NCIS and obtain all-source threat information.⁵⁶

Discussion: Commanders of off-installation activities are required to coordinate with NCIS to ensure the timely receipt of pertinent threat information from all available sources.⁵⁷ NAVOPSPTCHATINST 5530.1A requires annual threat assessments be requested.⁵⁸

Opinion 7.6: Coordination with NCIS would not have provided advance warning of the shootings. However, coordination will increase a commander's threat awareness.

Recommendation 7.6: Commanders coordinate with NCIS or next higher headquarters to obtain threat information.

Finding 7.7 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): NOSC, RTC, and RS and NRD Nashville did not have a capability to receive classified threat information.⁵⁹

Discussion: DoD and Service policy assigns commanders and ATOs responsibilities for threat mitigation, including access to classified threat data. NRD Nashville ATO, RCC SE Jacksonville ATO, NOSC Chattanooga CO, and RTC Chattanooga CO did not have access to classified networks for threat information.⁶⁰ NOSC Chattanooga ATO and CO were in the process of getting SIPRnet tokens to facilitate access to the classified network.⁶¹

Opinion 7.7.1: Commanders and ATOs require access to classified information in order to identify, analyze, validate, and mitigate threats. Although access to classified intelligence and threat information does not guarantee advance warnings of an attack, ATOs and commanders at off-installation activities should have priority for SIPRnet access.

Opinion 7.7.2: Where SIPRnet access is not available, a vertical and horizontal network of information sharing is vital to ensure timely dissemination of threat information. For example, establishing a TWG among local recruiting and reserve centers, and their higher headquarters.

Recommendation 7.7: Off-installation activity commanders and ATOs access classified threat information to inform AT planning and risk management. Off-

installation activities must be supported by their TACON for FP chain of command with threat information for proper risk mitigation.

Finding 7.8 (DOTMLPF Deficiency): Current active shooter training for DON personnel is not adequate in light of the known threat.

Discussion: The annual AT level I training includes a ten slide module (six are quiz questions) on the active shooter threat. This topic is embedded in the middle of the AT course and provides a minimum review of steps to take during an active shooter incident, emphasizing run, hide, fight.⁶²

USFLTFORCOM requires newly reported personnel (military and civilian) to all commands receive Security Education and Awareness Training (SEAT) encompassing 11 subjects, including HVE and active shooter, within 90 days of reporting for duty. Training must stress individual FP duties and responsibilities, to include immediately reporting detected conditions that present a threat or danger to the command. SEAT refresher training is also required annually, shall mirror the initial training, and provide personnel updates on new threat and tactics, techniques, and procedures.⁶³ CNIC has mandated a stand-alone computer based training active shooter course for all subordinate personnel; however, this requirement has not been implemented for all hands in the Navy or Marine Corps.⁶⁴

MCRC provides AT Level I and active shooter training at all hands training conducted annually by the District ATO.⁶⁵

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has developed an online video: "Run. Hide. Fight. Surviving an Active Shooter Event."⁶⁶ The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also has an active shooter course available through their Emergency Management Institute website.⁶⁷

Many states and local LE agencies have active shooter programs for their officers and will provide presentations to military units upon request.

Opinion 7.8: Navy and Marine Corps service members outside of law enforcement and security force personnel are not appropriately trained to respond to an active shooter scenario.

Recommendation 7.8.1: USFLTFORCOM and MARFORNORTH evaluate the efficacy of leveraging the existing CNIC Active Shooter Course (CNIC-TRTAS-1.1), or equivalent training, as an NKO/computer-based-training General Military Training annual requirement for all hands (military, civilian, contractor), to complement current AT Level I training and active shooter drills and exercises.

Recommendation 7.8.2: Commanders consider incorporation of readily available active shooter training into scheduled training (safety-standdowns, FP standdowns, etc.). Leverage FBI and/or FEMA training tools and local LE, where practical, to enhance active shooter training for personnel.

¹ OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Enclosure 9 § 1(a); MARFORNORTH MA OPORD 15-01, Annex B, ¶3(a)(3).

² SECNAVINST 5430.107, Mission and Functions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service § 7(b)(5).

³ OPNAVINST F3300.53C, Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 4.

⁴ www.ncis.navy.smil.mil; Example, NCIS Daily Threat Summary, 10 Jul 15, DTS-159-191-2015.

⁵ NCIS Threat Assessment, Millington, TN, 09JUL15-0025-6217-5GNA/C. Terrorist Threat Levels are set by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and used by Intelligence Community organizations including NCIS. There was no change to the DIA Terrorist Threat level after the 16 July shootings in Chattanooga. NCIS Threat Assessments are classified SECRET//NOFORN, though nothing contained in this report is classified.

⁶ NCIS Threat Assessment, Millington, TN, 09JUL15-0025-6217-5GNA/C. Terrorist Threat Levels are set by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and used by Intelligence Community organizations including NCIS. There was no change to the DIA Terrorist Threat level after the 16 July shootings in Chattanooga. NCIS Threat Assessments are classified SECRET//NOFORN, though nothing contained in this report is classified.

⁷ A 7 Sep 15 search of the NCIS threat assessment database performed by the investigation team revealed no threat assessments for Chattanooga, Tennessee.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ NCIS Daily Threat Summary, 10 Jul 15. NCIS DTS reports are classified SECRET//NOFORN; however this comment is U//FOUO.

¹⁰ NCIS Threat Assessment, Millington, TN, 09JUL15-0025-6217-5GNA/C.

¹¹ USNORTHCOM FP Directive 15-127, 072315Z May 15.

¹² FBI-DHS-NCTC JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, IA-0087-15/11 Jan 15.

- ¹³ HQ USNORTHCOM FORCE PROTECTION ADVISORY 15-068, 092230Z Mar 15.
- ¹⁴ USFLTFORCOM FORCE PROTECTION (FP) DIRECTIVE MSG 15-093, 031753Z Apr 15.
USFLTFORCOM FP Directive messages (in response to USNORTHCOM FP Directives) include the original message from USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM specifically references the FBI.
- ¹⁵ USNORTHCOM FP Advisory 15-125, 052225Z May 15.
- ¹⁶ *Id.*
- ¹⁷ USNORTHCOM FP Directive 15-127, 072315Z May 15.
- ¹⁸ *Id.*
- ¹⁹ COMNAVREG SE FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION (FPCON) DIRECTIVE 15-08, 082214Z May 15.
- ²⁰ Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 8 May 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 28 Aug 15. Navy/ Marine Corps C4I portal is monitored by a 24/7 Regional Operations Center (ROC) at Navy Region Southeast, MARFORRES and 6th MCD. FP Directive changes are also posted to the MARFORRES portal, which automatically forwards them via email to all subordinate commands. CNRSE directed that subordinate commands report attainment of FPCON BRAVO via C4I, phone or email to the ROC. No official message traffic was required to report compliance. Marine Corps activities reported compliance via the MARFORRES portal, and by phone (RSS). Personal interviews confirmed that reports from NRS and NOSC Chattanooga were made by phone and or email; NRD Nashville and RCC SE Jacksonville passed those reports to the ROC as required.
- ²¹ NCIS Daily Threat Summary, 10 Jul 15, DTS-159-191-2015.
- ²² (U//FOUO) San Diego – Law Enforcement Coordination Center. Active Shooter Attacks and Plots against U.S. Domestic Military Installations. Intelligence Bulletin 13-023, 3 Oct 13. (U//FOUO) USAF District of Washington. Intelligence Directorate. Force Protection Intelligence Assessment. Military Installation Active Shooter Events in the U.S. 1994-2014, Apr 14.
- ²³ *Id.*
- ²⁴ (U//FOUO) NCIS MTAC FPN-017-119-2015, 17 Jul 15.
- ²⁵ (U//FOUO) DHS Intelligence Assessment, IA-0272-15, 8 Sep 15.
- ²⁶ (U//FOUO) NCIS MTAC FPN-034-251-2015, 8 Sep 15.
- ²⁷ MTAC Americas Division Statement of 15 Sep 15; *Id.* Confidence level of HIGH indicates: Information for which [MTAC] have direct or high quality intelligence from multiple sources or from a single, highly reliable source. Characterized by well corroborated information from proven sources, minimal assumptions, and/or strong logical inferences. Confidence levels Low, Medium, and High, are based on three factors: strength of the knowledge base, to include the quality of the sources and [MTAC'S] depth of understanding about the issue; the number and importance of the assumptions used to fill information gaps; and the strength of logic underpinning the argument, which encompasses the number and strength of the analytical inferences as well as the rigor of the analytical methodology.
- ²⁸ (U//FOUO) NCIS MTAC FPN-034-251-2015, 8 Sep 15.
- ²⁹ MTAC Americas Division Statement of 15 Sep 15.
- ³⁰ (U//FOUO) NCIS MTAC FPN-035-253-2015, 10 Sep 15. The latest edition of *Inspire* magazine was likely released to coincide with the 14th anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks.
- ³¹ *Id.*
- ³² *Id.*
- ³³ (U//FOUO) NCIS MTAC FPN-023-180-2015, 29 Jun 15.
- ³⁴ *Id.*
- ³⁵ Marine Corps activities reported compliance via the MARFORRES portal, and by phone (RSS).
- ³⁶ *Id.*; Email from CDR Albert Seeman to (b)(6) of 8 May 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 28 Aug 15. Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 AUG 15. Personal interviews confirmed that reports from NRS and NOSC Chattanooga were made by phone and or email; NRD and RCC SE passed those reports to the ROC as required. Recruiting stations had been directed to maintain FPCON BRAVO as far back as 16 Jun 11, and have remained at this level since that time. USNORTHCOM FPCON CHANGE MESSAGE 11-166, 160255Z Jun 11. Note: USNORTHCOM directed recruiting stations to maintain FPCON BRAVO on 16 Jun 11. NRS and RSS Chattanooga were at that FPCON level on 16 Jul 15.

37 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 1 Sep 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 2; NOSC Chattanooga RAM BI-WKLY Report_v3; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 Aug 15.

38 USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222, FP Mission and AT Program, Table A-2.3 and 2.8.

39 CNRSE PI into the Chattanooga Shooting Incident of 24 Jul 15, Enclosure 7.

40 USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222, FP Mission and AT Program, Table A-2.3; SI with (b)(6) of 25 Aug 15, § 3; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, §§ 4-5.

41 USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222, FP Mission and AT Program, Table A-2.1; SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15.

NRMW AT Assessment of NOSC Chattanooga of 3 Jun 14. NOSC #10 Non-compliant Requirements table, provided by (b)(6), former NRMW AT Assessor.

43 *Id.* These five discrepancies were: (1) develop unique mission/location/situational measures or actions for each FPCON in addition to those already required; (2) include tenant units and commands in RAM planning and execution; (3) develop and implement site-specific CBRNE preparedness and emergency response measures that are synchronized with a corresponding FPCON measure; (4) develop and implement site-specific public health emergency response measures that are synchronized with FPCON levels; and (5) establish site-specific AT measures and PS actions linked to an FPCON which shall be classified, at a minimum, as CONFIDENTIAL.

44 NRMW AT Assessment of NOSC Chattanooga of 3 Jun 14.

45 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 11 Sep 15; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 11 Sep 15.

NRMW DISESTABLISHMENT MEMO_N3 TRANSFER OF NAVREG MIDWEST of 7 May 14.

47 RCC SE Jacksonville Command Assessment (CA) Results of Findings of 11 May 15.

48 *Id.*

49 *Id.* The CA noted the following discrepancies: 1) ATO had not attended required Level II training; 2) ATO was not providing Level I AT briefings to personnel 3) restricted area lighting system was not independent of activity primary power system; 4) restricted areas not designated in writing by the CO; 5) required security measures for designated restricted areas were not in effect; 6) no MOU for security support with local PD or nearest major military command.

50 *Id.*

51 SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15 § 6; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 14 Sep 15; SI of (b)(6) on 3 Sep 15, § 5; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 17 Sep 15.

CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14, Appendix 3 TO Annex A (A-3-1); MCO 3302.1E p.8-14(c); p.9-15(b); § 4(c)(13)(B).

53 DODI 2000.16, DOD Standard 11, § E3.11.

54 CNRSE AT OPORD 3300-14 Appendix 3, Annex A (A-3-2).

55 *Id.* at A-3-1.

56 SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 6; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 17 Sep 15; SI with (b)(6) of 25 Aug 15, § 8; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 18 Sep 15.

(U//FOUO) OPNAVINST F3300.53C Enclosure 8, CNO Standard 4; MCO 3302.1E ¶4(c)(1)(k) and ¶32 (p.1-5).

58 NAVOPSPTCHATINST 5530.1A Enclosure 4, § 3(a)(1)(a).

59 SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 11; Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 17 Sep 15; SI with (b)(6) of 25 Aug 15, § 18; SI with (b)(6) of 24 Aug 15, § 7.

60 SI with (b)(6) of 25 Aug 15, § 18; SI with (b)(6) of 25 Aug 15, § 9.

61 SI with (b)(6) of 20 Aug 15, § 11; SI with (b)(6) of 19 Aug 15, § 3.

62 Navy Knowledge Online, AT Awareness Level I annual training course.

63 USFLTFORCOM AT OPORD 3300-13, Appendix 2 to Annex C, § 3.d.(4).

64 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 27 Aug 15.

65 Email from (b)(6) to (b)(6) of 24 Sep 15.

⁶⁶ <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video>

⁶⁷ <https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-907>, Active Shooter: What You Can Do.

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Chapter 8 - Opinions and Recommendations

This chapter provides the investigation's primary opinions and recommendations. (Note: Appendix B provides a complete listing of Findings, Opinions, and Recommendations.)

Opinions

There are five opinions that inform this report's recommendations. The first three are the primary themes. First, commanders must own their operational environment, regardless of command. Second, commanders must emphasize FP readiness through deliberate planning, training and exercises. Last, FP strategies must add time throughout the active shooter detect-to-engage sequence in order to enhance personnel survivability until the arrival of LE.

Opinion 1: The DON requires a cultural shift in its approach to FP at off-installation activities. From day one of command, commanders must treat FP as an operational requirement vice an administrative program. Commanders at all levels must own the FP risks within their operational environment. The means in which commanders exercise FP for their Sailors, Marines, and civilians, regardless of what or where they command, must be oriented and adapted to unique mission requirements, emerging threats, and local FP vulnerabilities.

This cultural shift requires commanders to rigorously apply the RM process. Commanders must understand local threats and vulnerabilities and execute well-crafted RM strategies. In order to exercise necessary oversight, commanders must also continuously assess subordinates' FP readiness.

The cultural shift extends to every member of a command. As in combat, every individual must maintain the situational awareness, training, and mental toughness to act decisively toward a range of threats.

Opinion 2: This investigation found instances of non-compliance with policy related to FP for off-installation activities and deficiencies with DOTMLPF related to FP for off-installation activities. Deliberate compliance with existing FP requirements would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses. However, the deficiencies and non-compliance, individually or collectively, did not contribute to the tragic loss from the shootings.

Opinion 3: ISIL, al-Qa'ida, and HVEs, using the active shooter tactic, have placed a priority on attacking off-installation targets, thereby increasing the threat to those personnel and facilities. It is impractical to resource all recruiting and reserve centers to the same level as installations. However, since the threat has increased, DON needs to either assume greater risk at these facilities, or increase the resources allocated to them, in order to maintain or reduce their risk.

Risk can be determined using the elements of threat, vulnerability, and criticality. Any change to these variables will be reflected by a corresponding change in risk. The Navy's Required Operational Capability (ROC) tiering strategy bins installations and facilities into categories according to their respective mission criticality (ROC Levels 1-5). ROC Level 1 (strategic weapons facilities and command and control) is the highest criticality, and Level 5 (all off-installation facilities) is the lowest criticality.

Assuming the threat remains relatively constant, AT resources (which directly affect the vulnerability) are allocated to maintain acceptable levels of risk to Navy installations and facilities according to their respective mission criticality. Any

increase in the threat requires either a decrease in criticality (lower priority placed upon the mission accomplished by an installation or facility), or a decrease in vulnerability (through the allocation of additional resources used to reduce an installation or facility's vulnerability), in order to maintain the same level of risk.

During an active shooter event, priority should be survivability of personnel. Off-installation FP strategies must rapidly warn personnel, as well as deter and delay the active shooter until the arrival of LE. It is critical to prioritize capabilities that will **add time** throughout the active shooter detect-to-engage sequence.

Therefore, resourcing strategies should target points within an active shooter detect-to-engage sequence where improvements will add time to enhance survivability. Examples include next generation, near real time, hand held communication capabilities; adding additional impediments to a shooter's movement; and tight coordination with local agencies. All of these examples could provide precious minutes for personnel to execute IRPs (run, hide, fight) and enable LE to respond to the threat.

Opinion 4: There is a deficiency in DON EM Program policy for off-installation activities. Current policy does not cover all off-installation activities and does not clearly define EM requirements down to the AFRS and reserve center level, which leads to a lack of readiness. Notwithstanding this deficiency and instances of DON non-compliance, the EM response on the day of the shootings was exceptional. Hamilton County and City of Chattanooga EM agencies responded swiftly, effectively, and heroically.

Opinion 5: Post-incident care for victims, survivors, and their families was appropriate, timely, and responsive. There are some points of improvement that should be addressed through a routine after-action review, including CACO training curricula, continuity of counselling support, and management of crisis

response resources. These minor issues did not significantly affect post-incident care.

Recommendations

The investigation team acknowledges it is impractical to protect off-installation activities to the same level as installations. The unique missions of recruiting and reserve centers require our service members to be in and among communities across the nation, in urban and rural areas. A “one size fits all” approach is not viable across recruiting and reserve commands. Each command has unique local risks which must be addressed through risk-based decision-making with limited fiscal resources and small staffs.

In response to the Chattanooga shootings, SECDEF on July 29, 2015, directed the Services and combatant commanders to develop action plans to improve the security and FP of DoD personnel.¹ This task is being completed through the DoD Mission Assurance Control Board (MACB) co-chaired by OSD Policy and the Joint Staff. Navy and Marine Corps should synchronize the opinions and recommendations of this investigation with the MCAB.

To directly address the findings and opinions most relevant to strengthening the DON's FP posture against active shooter threats, Navy and Marine Corps must take the **immediate** actions below:

- Comply with SECDEF memorandum of July 29, 2015, on arming personnel, FP enhancements for off-installation leased facilities, and mass warning/notification systems.
- Reinforce commander ownership of FP and the risk management process through deliberate assessment.

- Direct unit level development and rehearsal of emergency action plans, to include active shooter scenarios, for the most likely local threats and coordinate those plans with local LE & EM response agencies.
- Mandate stand-alone active shooter training for individuals and units. Require active shooter response scenarios to be exercised uniformly across the Navy and Marine Corps.
- Require NRD, NOSC, and RS commanders to attend AT Level III training prior to assuming command. Ensure Level III curricula includes information relevant for off-installation commanders and provides requisite tools and knowledge for management of their AT programs.

Recommendation 1: Risk Management. A fundamental component of AT and mission assurance is the risk management process which is outlined in DoD and service policy. The risk management process is a commander's tool to inform all aspects of FP to include planning, operations, training, resourcing, and program review. To ensure risk management is incorporated into all aspects of commander programs, Navy and Marine Corps should:

1.1 Evaluate the effectiveness of FP and EM policy and procedures for risk management at off-installation activities. These policies, procedures, and processes should be reviewed from the tactical to strategic level; from off-installation activity OICs up through the chain of command. Policy processes, and procedures should be crafted to take into account small recruiting and reserve staffs.

Recommendation 2: To improve compliance with FP programs, Navy and Marine Corps should:

2.1 Conduct a FP program review to close off-installation FP-related policy gaps (e.g., AT, EM, MA); synchronize FP requirements between TACON for FP

and OPCON/ADCON chains of command; and review allocation of resources for the protection of personnel and off-installation facilities in the current threat environment, focusing resources on those materiel solutions that will give our personnel time to execute run, hide, and fight measures in order to survive an active shooter attack.

2.2 Implement a universal unclassified capability to provide rapid threat dissemination and near real-time threat sharing to off-installation activities. Leverage existing unclassified threat dissemination systems (e.g., AtHOC, C4I and Trapwire), local civilian mass warning systems, and mobile applications for hand-held devices.

2.3 Revise, through the DoD/JS MA Coordination Board (MACB), the process for applying additive physical security features to existing leases. The process should be streamlined and the decision-making authority should reside at the lowest level commander within the TACON for FP chain of command.

2.4 Direct commanders to review, exercise, and sign AT plans upon assuming command. Commanders should be required to identify unacceptable risk in writing to the first flag officer/general officer in the TACON for FP chain of command.

2.5 Require RTC I&Is and RSFPOs to attend AT Level II training. Review DON AT Level II ATO training and incorporate curricula for off-installation activity protection. Consider certifying RSFPO course to meet AT Level II training requirements.

2.6 Mandate stand-alone active shooter training for individuals and units. Require active shooter response scenarios to be exercised uniformly across the Navy and Marine Corps.

2.7 CNIC, MARFORRES, MCRC, and Manpower and Reserve Affairs capture lessons learned and recommendations from this investigation to improve unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care in future mass casualty post-incident responses.

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APPENDIX A - COMMAND INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE/AREA OF EXPERTISE</u>	<u>COMMAND</u>
(b)(6)	(b)(6)	NECC
(b)(6)	(b)(6)	HQMC

COMMAND INVESTIGATORS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE/AREA OF EXPERTISE</u>	<u>COMMAND</u>
(b)(6)	Chief of Staff	NECC
(b)(6)	Legal	RLSO SW
(b)(6)	Navy Anti-Terrorism	USFLTFORCOM
(b)(6)	Navy Force Protection	USFLTFORCOM
(b)(6)	USMC Mission Assurance	HQMC PPO (PS)
(b)(6)	USMC Anti-Terrorism	MARFORNORTH
(b)(6)	Inspector General	NECC
(b)(6)	Legal	OJAG
(b)(6)	Legal	MARFORCOM
(b)(6)	USMC Force Protection	MARFORNORTH

(b)(6)	PAO	USFLTFORCOM
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(b)(6)	Security	NECC
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SUPPORT STAFF

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE/AREA OF EXPERTISE</u>	<u>COMMAND</u>
(b)(6)	Deputy Chief of Staff	NECC
(b)(6)	ADMIN Support	NECC
(b)(6)	ADMIN Support	NECC
(b)(6)	IT Support	NECC
(b)(6)	Photographer	NECC

RED CELL (2-3 Sep 2015)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE/AREA OF EXPERTISE</u>	<u>COMMAND</u>
(b)(6)	CAG Director	NECC
(b)(6)	Force Legal	NECC
(b)(6)	Force Chaplain	NECC
(b)(6)	USN Force Protection	USFLTFORCOM
(b)(6)	USMC Force Protection	MARFORCOM
(b)(6)	Force Master Chief	NECC
(b)(6)	Sergeant Major	EWTGLANT
(b)(6)	Mission Assurance	HQMC

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Appendix B – Consolidated Table of Finding, Recommendations, and Opinions

Chapter 3		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 3.1 (Non-compliance)</u> : NRD Nashville, parent command of NRS Chattanooga, lacked an AT Plan.	<u>Opinion 3.1</u> : An AT Plan would have improved NRD Nashville's overall AT program and identified for correction possible FP deficiencies. An NRD Nashville AT Plan would have included NRS Chattanooga.	<u>Recommendation 3.1</u> : All NRD commanders establish an executable AT Plan within unique recruiting mission requirements and staff capabilities.
<u>Finding 3.2 (Non-compliance)</u> : NRD Nashville did not coordinate with NRS Chattanooga to establish site-specific Incident Response Plans (IRPs).	<u>Opinion 3.2</u> : IRPs would have strengthened NRD Nashville and NRS Chattanooga's preparedness.	<u>Recommendation 3.2.1</u> : Recruiting activities establish IRPs to address most likely local threat scenarios. <u>Recommendation 3.2.2</u> : NRDs coordinate with respective Navy Region CNRSE to establish recruiting station IRPs that can be tailored for NRSS. Navy Regions coordinate with NCIS to obtain tailored most likely/most dangerous threat scenarios to facilitate recruiting station IRP development. <u>Recommendation 3.2.3</u> : Require IRPs for active shooter scenarios for recruiting activities. <u>Recommendation 3.2.4</u> : Brief all new or temporarily-assigned personnel on IRPs.
<u>Finding 3.3 (Non-compliance)</u> : NRD Nashville did not coordinate with NRS Chattanooga to conduct AT exercises.	<u>Opinion 3.3</u> : Exercises are a critical part of an AT program, highlighting planning gaps and refining response plans. Exercises would have strengthened NRS Chattanooga's preparedness.	<u>Recommendation 3.3</u> : All NRDs ensure requisite AT training necessary to exercise their AT plan (to include active shooter scenarios) is incorporated into their annual training plan. Coordinate AT drills/exercises with local LE and EM response.
<u>Finding 3.4 (Non-compliance)</u> : NRD Nashville's ATO was not appointed in writing and lacked required training.	<u>Opinion 3.4</u> : The ATO is the key person responsible for managing a command's AT program. A trained ATO will improve AT program effectiveness.	<u>Recommendation 3.4</u> : NRD Commanders appoint ATOs in writing and ensure ATOs complete required AT Level II training.

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Chapter 3		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 3.5 (Non-compliance)</u> : RS Nashville, parent command of RSS Chattanooga, lacked an AT Plan.	<u>Opinion 3.5</u> : An AT Plan would have improved RS Nashville's overall AT program and identified for correction FP deficiencies.	<u>Recommendation 3.5.1</u> : RS commanders establish an executable AT Plan within unique recruiting mission requirements and staff capabilities. <u>Recommendation 3.5.2</u> : RS commanders include active shooter scenarios to exercise AT plans; coordinate exercises with local LE and EM response. <u>Recommendation 3.5.3</u> : Require Emergency Incident Response Plans for active shooter scenarios for recruiting activities.
<u>Finding 3.6 (Non-compliance)</u> : RS Nashville did not have a certified Level II ATO.	<u>Opinion 3.6.1</u> : The ATO is the key person responsible for managing the command's AT program. Having a trained ATO would have improved AT program effectiveness and identified for correction FP deficiencies. <u>Opinion 3.6.2</u> : MCRC is using the RSFPO course, which is not an AT Level II certified course, to fulfill the AT Level II requirement. This creates a disconnect between Service and MCRC policy.	<u>Recommendation 3.6.1</u> : RS commanders appoint ATOs in writing and ensure ATOs complete required AT Level II training. <u>Recommendation 3.6.2</u> : MCRC require RSFPO to attend AT Level II training. In coordination with Marine Corps Training and Education Command and Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, certify RSFPO Course to meet AT Level II requirements.
<u>Finding 3.7 (Non-compliance)</u> : RS Nashville did not participate in a required AT Working Group (ATWG).	<u>Opinion 3.7</u> : Participating in an ATWG would have improved RS Nashville's AT program effectiveness and identified for correction FP deficiencies.	<u>Recommendation 3.7.1</u> : 6th MCD establish an ATWG that includes RS Nashville; RS ATOs participate in district ATWGs. <u>Recommendation 3.7.2</u> : RS Nashville commander establish a local/regional ATWG to implement AT program requirements and coordinate with NCIS; federal, state, and local law enforcement; and other appropriate agencies.

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Chapter 3		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 3.8 (DOTMLPF Deficiency):</u> AT Level II and Level III training does not address the unique concerns of off-installation facilities.	<u>Opinion 3.8.1:</u> ATOs who complete the AT Level II training are not fully prepared to manage an AT plan at an off-installation facility. While the AT Level II training provides a foundation to execute ATO responsibilities, it does not fully address unique off-installation concerns. <u>Opinion 3.8.2:</u> NRD COs are responsible for protecting personnel and facilities, which includes the development, management, execution, and exercise of a command AT plan and program. They are additionally required to meet the recruiting station FPCON measures. A qualified and trained ATO to oversee and manage the AT program will facilitate the NRD CO's success. However, AT Level III program training for NRD COs would enhance AT program implementation. The Navy e-learning ATP Course is a valid delivery method for a prerequisite course, but does not address the unique concerns of off-installation activities. Online training is not a substitute for traditional in-person training provided by CENSECFOR subject matter experts. <u>Opinion 3.8.3:</u> AT Level III program training for RS commanders would enhance AT program implementation.	<u>Recommendation 3.8.1:</u> Expand AT Level II training to include one or more modules geared to the specific concerns of off-installation activities, to include instruction on AT Plans, barrier plans, site-specific FPCON measures, and IRPs or incident response measures. <u>Recommendation 3.8.2:</u> NRD and RS commanders attend AT Level III training prior to assuming command. Ensure Level III curricula includes information relevant for off-installation commanders and provides requisite tools and knowledge for management of their AT programs. <u>Recommendation 3.8.3:</u> Naval Education and Training Command/ CENSECFOR and MARFORRES, MCRC, TECOM, and PPO investigate viability of developing/implementing an AT Level II training course tailored for off-installation facilities and activities.

Chapter 3		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 3.9 (DOTMLPF Deficiency)</u> : There is a DON-wide policy and capability gap in the ability to conduct mass warning and notification, specifically for personnel assigned to recruiting activities.	<u>Opinion 3.9</u> : Active shooter incidents are dynamic and unfold quickly. Mass notification and warning systems need to be designed to enable rapid dissemination of information across a wide audience. Recruiting personnel must have mass warning capability in hand-held devices. This capability should be integrated into emergency action plans and rehearsed routinely. These capabilities need to be incorporated with local emergency response forces and leveraged with commercially available systems.	<u>Recommendation 3.9.1</u> : Close policy and capability gaps in mass warning and notification. <u>Recommendation 3.9.2</u> : Recruiting activities must incorporate mass warning and notification procedures into AT planning, coordinate with local LE and emergency responders, and exercise regularly. Leverage commercially available mass warning systems.
<u>Finding 3.10 (Non-compliance)</u> : Navy and Marine Corps AFRS offices were not compliant with The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) baseline leased facilities standards.	<u>Opinion 3.10</u> : Although the USACE standard for recruiting stations is focused on protection against theft and criminal activity, correcting these deficiencies will improve AFRS physical security.	<u>Recommendation 3.10</u> : USACE immediately correct these deficiencies.
<u>Finding 3.11 (DOTMLPF Deficiency)</u> : Current USACE standards place a higher priority on vision-blocking blinds over tinted/frost glass.	<u>Opinion 3.11</u> : Tinted glass should be prioritized over window blinds. Window tinting is more effective because it prevents observation from the outside while permitting occupants to see external threats.	<u>Recommendation 3.11.1</u> : USACE change the standard to prioritize tinted glass over window blinds. <u>Recommendation 3.11.2</u> : Modify Recruiting Station FPCON measure Charlie 12, to read "Recruiting Stations not equipped with tinted exterior glass, close blinds to reduce visibility of DoD presence and activities."
<u>Finding 3.12 (DOTMLPF Deficiency)</u> : Recruiting commanders lack the ability to quickly add nonstandard security enhancements for existing leased facilities.	<u>Opinion 3.12</u> : Special applications are one-size-fits-all security measures and are not responsive to commander's local, risk-based requirements. The current process for commanders to make physical security modifications to leased facilities degrades the ability to respond to emerging threats.	<u>Recommendation 3.12</u> : JRFC develop expedited process to identify commanders' nonstandard requirements and certify them to USACE for approval.

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Chapter 4		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 4.1 (Non-compliance):</u> NOSC Chattanooga's written AT Plan was not fully compliant with higher headquarters policy.	<u>Opinion 4.1:</u> A fully compliant and exercised AT Plan would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.	<u>Recommendation 4.1.1:</u> All NOSC commanders update written AT Plan to ensure compliance with all required elements/direction. <u>Recommendation 4.1.2:</u> All Navy Regions and RCCs assist NOSC's with reviewing and updating AT Plan.
<u>Finding 4.2 (Non-compliance):</u> NOSC Chattanooga did not have an ATWG.	<u>Opinion 4.2:</u> An ATWG would have formalized AT planning, supported RM, and increased dialogue with the RTC and local agencies. An ATWG would have also increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.	<u>Recommendation 4.2.1:</u> NOSC's with tenant commands establish an ATWG that includes the tenant. ATO should coordinate ATWG membership with NCIS; federal, state, and local law enforcement; and other appropriate agencies. <u>Recommendation 4.2.2:</u> NOSC's participate in higher headquarters ATWG's as directed. <u>Recommendation 4.2.3:</u> Off-installation reserve commands include local recruiting activities in ATWG's where practical.

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Chapter 4		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 4.3 (Non-compliance):</u> NOSC Chattanooga did not establish required IRPs to address AT scenarios.	<u>Opinion 4.3:</u> IRP planning and development would have increased readiness, resulted in site-specific guidance and training efficiencies, and mitigated FP weaknesses.	<u>Recommendation 4.3.1:</u> NOSC establish site-specific IRPs – and include tenant commands in those plans. Navy Regions coordinate with NCIS to obtain tailored most likely/most dangerous threat scenarios to facilitate NOSC IRP development. IRPs should be exercised routinely to account for personnel turnover and the NOSC's transient population. <u>Recommendation 4.3.2:</u> Require IRPs for active shooter scenarios at all off-installation activities. Navy Regions evaluate AT readiness during scheduled assessments, to include competency in execution of active shooter IRPs. <u>Recommendation 4.3.3:</u> Brief drilling reservists on IRPs and ensure they participate in exercises. <u>Recommendation 4.3.4:</u> Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) reinforce Navy Region AT training requirements to facilitate IRP development and execution.
<u>Finding 4.4 (Non-compliance):</u> NOSC Chattanooga did not conduct an annual AT exercise to evaluate the validity of the AT Plan.	<u>Opinion 4.4:</u> An annual exercise would have increased readiness, resulted in site-specific guidance and training efficiencies, and mitigated FP weaknesses. More frequent exercises are required to more fully sustain readiness and account for personnel turnover.	<u>Recommendation 4.4.1:</u> NOSC conduct an annual exercise to evaluate the validity of AT Plans. <u>Recommendation 4.4.2:</u> CNRFC evaluate the adequacy of NOSC AT training to sustain AT readiness.

Chapter 4		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 4.5 (Non-compliance)</u> : NOSC Chattanooga did not have a fully-compliant barrier plan.	<u>Opinion 4.5</u> : An effective barrier plan uses design basis threat to defeat moving vehicle threats and must be properly resourced.	<u>Recommendation 4.5</u> : NOSCs develop and exercise an effective barrier plan as part of a comprehensive AT Plan; identify resource limitations and seek engineering expertise from higher headquarters if required to develop an effective barrier plan.
<u>Finding 4.6 (Non-compliance)</u> : The RCC SE Jacksonville ATO had not completed required AT Level II training.	<u>Opinion 4.6</u> : The ATO is the key person responsible for managing a command's AT program. A trained ATO will improve AT program effectiveness.	<u>Recommendation 4.6</u> : RCCs ensure designated ATOs complete required AT Level II training.
<u>Finding 4.7 (Non-compliance)</u> : Commander, Navy Reserve Force (CNRF) had not issued required AT guidance or policy.	<u>Opinion 4.7</u> : CNRF AT policy should support TACON for FP efforts by disseminating terrorist threat information, and providing policy guidance concerning planning, programming, and budgeting of AT projects and programs.	<u>Recommendation 4.7</u> : CNRF issue required AT policy and procedures that complement and provide additional specificity to support TACON for FP authority. Ensure this policy is synchronized with the TACON for FP guidance.
<u>Finding 4.8 (Non-compliance)</u> : RTC Chattanooga did not have an AT Plan.	<u>Opinion 4.8</u> : A compliant AT Plan would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.	<u>Recommendation 4.8.1</u> : RTCs develop and promulgate a written AT Plan. RTCs that are tenants must ensure AT Plan is coordinated and integrated with host command. <u>Recommendation 4.8.2</u> : MARFORRES publish AT planning guidance and provide a template to guide development of AT planning and localized response measures. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve staffs.

Chapter 4		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 4.9 (Non-compliance)</u> : RTC Chattanooga did not conduct an annual AT exercise to validate the command AT Plan.	<u>Opinion 4.9</u> : An annual exercise would have increased readiness, resulted in site-specific guidance and training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses. Frequent exercises are required to sustain readiness and account for personnel turnover.	<u>Recommendation 4.9.1</u> : RTCs conduct an annual exercise to evaluate the validity of the AT Plan. Integrate RTC exercises with host command where applicable. <u>Recommendation 4.9.2</u> : Require emergency action plans (EAPs) for active shooter scenarios at all off-installation activities. EAPs should be exercised routinely to account for personnel turnover and drilling reservists. <u>Recommendation 4.9.3</u> : MARFORRES evaluate AT readiness during scheduled assessments, to include competency in execution of active shooter EAPs.
<u>Finding 4.10 (Non-compliance)</u> : RTC Chattanooga did not have an ATWG.	<u>Opinion 4.10</u> : An ATWG would have formalized AT planning and risk management processes, and increased dialogue with the NOSC and local agencies. An ATWG would have also increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.	<u>Recommendation 4.10.1</u> : RTC participate in NOSC and higher headquarters ATWG forums. <u>Recommendation 4.10.2</u> : RTCs include local recruiting station activities in ATWGs where practical.
<u>Finding 4.11 (Non-compliance)</u> : RTC Chattanooga did not complete its RM process. Specifically, RTC Chattanooga did not complete either its annual risk assessment or execute risk planning.	<u>Opinion 4.11</u> : The RM process would have increased readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses.	<u>Recommendation 4.11.1</u> : RTC Chattanooga institute the RM process, to include conducting annual risk assessments and risk planning. Coordinate risk strategies with NOSC. <u>Recommendation 4.11.2</u> : MARFORRES assist RTCs in executing the RM process. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve staffs.

Chapter 4		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 4.12 (DOTMLPF Deficiency):</u> AT Level II and Level III training does not address the unique concerns of off-installation facilities.	<u>Opinion 4.12.1:</u> ATOs who complete the AT Level II training are not fully prepared to manage an AT plan at an off-installation facility. While the AT Level II training provides a foundation to execute ATO responsibilities, it does not fully address unique off-installation concerns. <u>Opinion 4.12.2:</u> NOSC COs are responsible for protecting personnel and facilities, which includes the development, management, execution, and exercise of a command AT plan and program. They are additionally required to meet the baseline FPCON measures for installations, without having the manpower (Naval Security Forces) and resources of a naval installation. A qualified and trained ATO to supervise and manage the AT program will facilitate the NOSC CO's success; however, AT Level III training for NOSC COs would enhance AT program implementation. The Navy e-learning ATP Course is a valid delivery method for a prerequisite course, but does not address the unique concerns of off-installation activities. Online training is not a substitute for traditional in-person training provided by CENSECFOR subject matter experts. <u>Opinion 4.12.3:</u> AT Level II program training for RTC I&Is would enhance AT program implementation.	<u>Recommendation 4.12.1:</u> Expand AT Level II training to include one or more modules geared to the specific concerns of off-installation activities, to include instruction on AT Plans, barrier plans, site-specific FPCON measures, and IRPs or incident response measures. <u>Recommendation 4.12.2:</u> RTC I&Is should receive AT Level II training. <u>Recommendation 4.12.3:</u> NOSC commanders attend AT Level III training prior to assuming command. Ensure Level III curricula includes information relevant for off-installation commanders and provides requisite tools and knowledge for management of their AT programs. <u>Recommendation 4.12.4:</u> Naval Education and Training Command/CENSECFOR and MARFORRES, MCRC, TECOM, and PPO investigate viability of developing/implementing an AT Level II training course tailored for off-installation facilities and activities.

Chapter 4		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 4.13 (Informational)</u> : NOSC Chattanooga was not required to have a facility-wide mass notification system.	<u>Opinion 4.13</u> : Absent an installed mass notification system, commanders cannot effectively protect their personnel without an alternate process to quickly notify them of threats and instruct them how to respond to those threats.	<u>Recommendation 4.13.1</u> : Services develop mass notification systems for off-installation activities. Commands should conduct drills and exercises in conjunction with these systems. These systems should leverage emergency capabilities and be coordinated with other DON/DoD agencies in the local area as applicable. <u>Recommendation 4.13.2</u> : Clarify DoD and Service policy requirements for mass notification systems and processes at off-installation facilities.
<u>Finding 4.14 (DOTMLPF Deficiency)</u> : Naval Facilities Criteria (FC) did not require NOSC Chattanooga to have physical security features to protect against moving vehicle or active shooter threats.	<u>Opinion 4.14</u> : While it would be impractical to protect off-installation facilities to the same degree as installations, the current physical security requirements for off-installation facilities do not emphasize protection against moving vehicle and active shooter threats. Multi-disciplinary teams using DBT should broaden their focus beyond damage and theft to identify and mitigate FP weaknesses. For example, the NOSC Chattanooga gate was designed to prevent damage and theft – not protect against a moving vehicle threat.	<u>Recommendation 4.14.1</u> : Evaluate FC guidance for NOSCs to consider adding provisions on threats such as moving vehicles and active shooters. <u>Recommendation 4.14.2</u> : Align fiscal resources to match DBT decisions for NOSCs.
Chapter 5		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 5.1 (Informational)</u> : HCEMS agencies provided emergency response to both the AFRS and NOSC on July 16, 2015.	<u>Opinion 5.1</u> : The HCEMS response was swift, effective, and heroic.	<u>Recommendation 5.1</u> : DON off-installation activities develop EM MOAs/MOUs with local agencies (such as HCEMS) in order to establish expectations, ensure clear coordination, and enable effective response from local EM agencies.

Chapter 5		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 5.2 (DOTMLPF Deficiency)</u> : There is a deficiency in DON EM Program policy guidance for off-installation activities.	None.	<u>Recommendation 5.2</u> : Update DON EM policy to include off-installation activities. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve and recruiting staffs.
<u>Finding 5.3 (Non-compliance)</u> : CNRSE's regional security program does not include the development of EM plans for off-installation facilities.	None.	<u>Recommendation 5.3</u> : Navy Region Commanders update EM policy to include off-installation activities. Guidance should be flexible and scalable to enable implementation by small reserve and recruiting staffs.
<u>Finding 5.4 (Non-compliance)</u> : MARFORRES does not have a required EM policy.	None.	<u>Recommendation 5.4</u> : MARFORRES issue EM policy to include off-installation activities. Guidance should be tailored for implementation by small I&I staffs.
<u>Finding 5.5 (Non-compliance)</u> : Neither NOSC Chattanooga, NRD Nashville, nor RS Nashville had formal MOAs/MOUs with local emergency response agencies.	<u>Opinion 5.5</u> : MOAs/MOUs are valuable tools for pre-incident coordination and for increasing the effectiveness of EM when no organic assets are present. MOAs/MOUs are contingent upon agreement with agencies outside of DoD, and therefore may not be attainable for every reserve center and recruiting center. Where formal agreements are not attainable, coordination with local agencies should be documented.	<u>Recommendation 5.5</u> : Develop MOAs/MOUs with local emergency response agencies. When formal MOAs/MOUs are not attainable, document coordination with local agencies.
<u>Finding 5.6 (Non-compliance)</u> : Neither NOSC Chattanooga, NRD Nashville, nor RS Nashville established and exercised EM IRPs.	<u>Opinion 5.6</u> : IRP planning and exercises would have increased EM readiness.	<u>Recommendation 5.6</u> : NRDs, subordinate units, RSs, and NOSCs develop and exercise EM IRPs with local agencies.

Chapter 6		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 6.1 (Informational)</u>: CNRSE deployed a multi-disciplinary crisis action team (CAT) to Chattanooga to provide post-incident care to Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their families.	<u>Opinion 6.1</u>: CAT and administrative post-incident response was appropriate, timely, and effective.	<u>Recommendation 6.1.1</u>: Establish a single chain of command with a senior officer acting as the CAT POC to ensure unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care for the entire post-incident response. <u>Recommendation 6.1.2</u>: CATs should provide consistent staff support with minimal turnover. <u>Recommendation 6.1.3</u>: To the maximum extent possible, CATs supporting small activities should arrive on scene administratively self-reliant. CATs should not co-locate with supported personnel if doing so would strain resources. <u>Recommendation 6.1.4</u>: The CAT must have dedicated PA support, including a visual information specialist, to ensure consistent messaging. <u>Recommendation 6.1.5</u>: CNIC, MARFORRES, and Manpower and Reserve Affairs capture lessons learned and recommendations from this investigation to improve unity of command, unity of effort, and continuity of care in future mass casualty post-incident responses.
<u>Finding 6.2 (Informational)</u>: CACO services to victims' families, including Next-of-Kin (NOK) notifications, were timely and professional.	<u>Opinion 6.2</u>: CACO support, to include NOK notifications, was appropriate and effective.	<u>Recommendation 6.2</u>: Maximize opportunities for live training taught by experienced CACOs. Ensure CACO training includes instruction on handling inquiries by senior leaders.

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Chapter 7		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
(U/FOUO) <u>Finding 7.1 (Informational)</u> : Per NCIS, there were no indications of an imminent terrorist attack on DON personnel on July 16, 2015.	<u>Opinion 7.1</u> : The process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating threat information down to the tactical level was effective.	<u>Recommendation 7.1</u> : Ensure DON, NCIS, and USNORTHCOM continue coordination on the collection, assessment, and dissemination of threat information.
(U/FOUO) <u>Finding 7.2 (Informational)</u> : On May 7, 2015, USNORTHCOM directed an FPCON Increase to BRAVO.	<u>Opinion 7.2</u> : Communication of FP advisories and directives down the chain of command to the reserve and recruiting units was executed according to established policy and procedures. A consistent emphasis on vigilance and awareness of potential threats, systematic increase of FPCON and escalation of RAMs were logical actions to reduce vulnerability.	<u>Recommendation 7.2</u> : Commanders remain alert and ensure constant vigilance and accountability, even in the absence of a specific threat.

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Chapter 7		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
(U/FOUO) <u>Finding 7.3 (Informational)</u> : DON off-installation personnel and activities are vulnerable and face greater risks in the current threat environment.	<u>Opinion 7.3</u>: ISIL, al-Qa'ida, and HVEs, using the active shooter tactic, have placed a priority on attacking off-installation targets, thereby increasing the threat to those personnel and facilities. It is impractical to resource all recruiting and reserve centers to the same level as installations. However, since the threat has increased, DON needs to either assume greater risk at these facilities, or increase the resources allocated to them, in order to maintain or reduce their risk. Risk can be determined using the elements of threat, vulnerability, and criticality. Any change to these variables will be reflected by a corresponding change in risk. The Navy's Required Operational Capability (ROC) tiering strategy bins installations and facilities into categories according to their respective mission criticality (ROC Levels 1-5). ROC Level 1 (strategic weapons facilities and command and control) is the highest criticality, and Level 5 (all off-installation facilities) is the lowest criticality. Assuming the threat remains relatively constant, AT resources (which directly effect the vulnerability) are allocated to maintain acceptable levels of risk to Navy installations and facilities according to their respective mission criticality. Any increase in the threat requires either a decrease in criticality (lower priority placed upon the mission accomplished by an installation or facility), or a decrease in vulnerability (through the allocation of additional resources used to reduce an installation or facility's vulnerability), in order to maintain the same level of risk. During an active shooter event, priority should be survivability of personnel. Off-installation FP strategies must rapidly warn personnel, as well as deter and delay the active shooter until the arrival of LE. It is critical to prioritize capabilities that will add time throughout the active shooter detect-to-engage sequence. Therefore, resourcing strategies should target points within an active shooter detect-to-engage sequence where improvements will add time to enhance survivability. Examples include next generation, near real time, hand held communication capabilities; adding additional impediments to a shooter's movement; and tight coordination with local agencies. All of these examples could provide precious minutes for personnel to execute IRPs (run, hide, fight) and enable LE to respond to the threat.	<u>Recommendation 7.3</u> : Analyze policies, procedures, training, and allocation of resources to reduce vulnerability in the current threat environment. Identify gaps, seams, and barriers to survivability during an active shooter attack.

Chapter 7		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 7.4 (Non-compliance)</u> : NOSC and NRS Chattanooga were not fully compliant with FPCON measures.	<u>Opinion 7.4.1</u>: Full implementation of FPCON measures would have increased FP readiness, resulted in training efficiencies, and identified for correction FP weaknesses. <u>Opinion 7.4.2</u>: The NRMW AT and RCC SE Jacksonville command assessments of "average" and "satisfactory" did not accurately reflect the state of the NOSC AT program or FP posture. The RCC SE Jacksonville command assessment of the NOSC FP program was not effective because it was not informed by the results of the most recent region AT assessment.	<u>Recommendation 7.4.1</u>: Commanders must report all FPCON measures they cannot attain and request waivers to the first flag/general officer in the TACON for FP chain where necessary. <u>Recommendation 7.4.2</u>: Region commanders ensure AT assessment discrepancies are corrected in a timely fashion. AT assessments should be informed by previous evaluations and conducted by qualified assessors to ensure accurate feedback and completion of corrective actions. <u>Recommendation 7.4.3</u>: Expedite development and implementation of FPCON measures tailored to off-installation reserve activities.
<u>Finding 7.5 (Non-compliance)</u> : NOSC Chattanooga, RTC Chattanooga, NRD Nashville, and RS Nashville did not have or participate in Threat Working Groups (TWG).	<u>Opinion 7.5</u> : Based on the absence of any specific credible threat against DON personnel on July 16, elevated FPCON, and increased RAMs, a TWG would not have recommended any specific actions to the Navy and Marine Corps Chattanooga activities. No previous suspicious activity had been reported and the sequence of events and brief period of time which elapsed between the shootings make it unlikely that a TWG review of known threat information would have had any effect on the events. However, a functioning TWG that analyzes current threat against known deficiencies will improve overall FP readiness.	<u>Recommendation 7.5.1</u>: NOSC establish a TWG; RTC participate in the NOSC TWG. <u>Recommendation 7.5.2</u>: NRD and RS Nashville establish a TWG or participate in higher headquarters TWG.
<u>Finding 7.6 (Non-compliance)</u> : NOSC and RTC Chattanooga, and NRD and RS Nashville, did not coordinate with NCIS and obtain all-source threat information.	<u>Opinion 7.6</u> : Coordination with NCIS would not have provided advance warning of the shootings. However, coordination will increase a commander's threat awareness.	<u>Recommendation 7.6</u> : Commanders coordinate with NCIS or next higher headquarters to obtain threat information.

Chapter 7		
Finding	Opinion	Recommendation
<u>Finding 7.7 (DOTMLPF Deficiency):</u> NOSC, RTC, and RS and NRD Nashville did not have a capability to receive classified threat information.	<u>Opinion 7.7.1:</u> Commanders and ATOs require access to classified information in order to identify, analyze, validate, and mitigate threats. Although access to classified intelligence and threat information does not guarantee advance warnings of an attack, ATOs and Commanders at off-installation activities should have priority for SIPRnet access. <u>Opinion 7.7.2:</u> Where SIPRnet access is not available, a vertical and horizontal network of information sharing is vital to ensure timely dissemination of threat information. For example, establishing a TWG among local recruiting and reserve centers, and their higher headquarters.	<u>Recommendation 7.7:</u> Off-installation activity commanders and ATOs access classified threat information to inform AT planning and risk management. Off-installation activities must be supported by their TACON for FP chain of command with threat information for proper risk mitigation.
<u>Finding 7.8 (DOTMLPF Deficiency):</u> Current active shooter training for DON personnel is not adequate in light of the known threat.	<u>Opinion 7.8:</u> Navy and Marine Corps service members outside of law enforcement and security force personnel are not appropriately trained to respond to an active shooter scenario.	<u>Recommendation 7.8.1:</u> USFLTFORCOM and MARFORNORTH evaluate the efficacy of leveraging the existing CNIC Active Shooter Course (CNIC CNIC-TRTAS-1.1), or equivalent training, as an NKO/computer-based-training General Military Training annual requirement for all hands (military, civilian, contractor), to complement current AT Level I training and active shooter drills and exercises. <u>Recommendation 7.8.2:</u> Commanders consider incorporation of readily available active shooter training into scheduled training (safety-standdowns, FP standdowns, etc.). Leverage FBI and/or FEMA training tools and local LE, where practical, to enhance active shooter training for personnel.

Appendix C – Marine Corps Mission Assurance Assessment

The Mission Assurance Assessment Team, Headquarters Marine Corps conducted a Mission Assurance Assessment 17-21 August 2015 on the Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), Reserve Training Center (RTC), and Navy/Marine Corps Recruiting Sub-Stations.

The report is provided as Appendix C of this report.

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Appendix D – Marine Corps All Hazards Threat Assessment


The Mission Assurance Assessment Team, Headquarters Marine Corps conducted an All Hazards Threat Assessment 17-21 August 2015 on the Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), Reserve Training Center (RTC), and Navy/Marine Corps Recruiting Sub-Stations.

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Appendix E – Compilation of Photos

Navy Operational Support Center
&
Armed Forces Recruiting Station
Chattanooga, TN



Source: Google Maps

AFRS Chattanooga Layout

Source: Google Maps



AFRS Chattanooga



Open source news photos show small arms fire to the exterior doors and windows at AFRS Chattanooga, July, 16, 2015.

Source: AP/John Bazenmore

AFRS Chattanooga



Photos taken by investigation team on August 19, 2015 showing damage from small arms fire inside RSS Chattanooga.

U.S. Navy photos



AFRS Chattanooga



Photos taken by investigation team on August 19, 2015 showing damage from small arms fire inside RSS Chattanooga.

U.S. Navy photos




AFRS Chattanooga



Photo taken by investigation team on August 19, 2015. Repaired exterior windows and doors at RSS Chattanooga. U.S. Navy photo

NOSC Chattanooga Layout

Source: Google Maps



NOSC Chattanooga

Source: Google Maps



Google Maps "Street View" shows barriers, gate and passcode box in place at NOSC Chattanooga prior to July 16, 2015.

NOSC Chattanooga

Open source news photos show vehicle driven by ^{(b)(6)} af-
ter crashing the main gate and stopping in the parking lot.



Source: AP



Source: Chattanooga Free Times Press/Doug Strickland



NOSC Chattanooga

Photos taken by investigation team on August 19, 2015 detail external security systems. U.S. Navy photos.

Call box outside main gate.

Building main entrance with security camera.



Building main entrance passcode lock and call box.

NOSC Chattanooga

Front of building, main entrance. U.S. Navy photo





NOSC Chattanooga
Entrance to motor pool. U.S. Navy photo



Photos taken by investigation team on August 19, 2015 showing perimeter fence line at NOSC Chattanooga.

U.S. Navy photos





Photos taken by investigation team on August 19, 2015 showing repaired main gate and front entrance barriers at NOSC Chattanooga.

U.S. Navy photos



NOSC Chattanooga



Photos taken by Expeditionary Combat Camera on July 25, 2015 detailing damage from small arms fire inside NOSC Chattanooga.

U.S. Navy photos

Main entrance

Exterior window.



NOSC Chattanooga

Photos taken by Expeditionary Combat Camera on July 25, 2015 detailing damage from small arms fire inside NOSC Chattanooga.


U.S. Navy photos

Door frame




Fire extinguisher box

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Photos taken by Expeditionary Combat Camera on July 25, 2015 detailing damage from small arms fire inside NO SC Chattanooga. Commanding Officer (b)(6) office. U.S. Navy photos (b)(6)



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Appendix F – Compilation of Interview & Supporting Citations

See enclosed CD-ROM to view this Appendix

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