ONE CHINA TO RULE THEM ALL: THE P.R.C.'S DISTORTION OF THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE

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I. INTRODUCTION

What does the concept of "One China" entail? Does it convey a sense of Chinese pride and national rejuvenation? Is it political gamesmanship for expansionist pursuits? Or both? What does "One China" mean to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.)[2] and what does it mean *now* for the people of Taiwan?[3]

Since its origination, the term "One China" has held different meanings for different countries and political factions. For the past 75 years, the concept of "One China" has been a fascinating diplomatic tussle between the P.R.C. and Taiwan. The United States is caught in this century-long quagmire under its decades-old, complicated, and ambiguous *One China Policy* designed to ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The P.R.C. concept of "One China" is rooted in the *One China Principle*, which is distinctly different from the One China Policy, and is now used as a diplomatic tool to engage in institutional lawfare.

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[1] "Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." SUN TZŬ ON THE ART OF WAR 8 (Lionel Giles trans., Allandale Online Publishing 2000), https://bit.ly/3XQVdnD.

[2] "China," "the People's Republic of China," and "the P.R.C." are used interchangeably in this Article depending on the context.

[3] "Taiwan," "the Republic of China," and "the R.O.C." are used interchangeably in this Article depending on the context.

For this paper, I define the One China concept as the belief that Taiwan is a part of China and the two should be unified. The One China Principle is the belief that the P.R.C. is the sole legitimate government of China *and* that Taiwan is a part of China. The One China Policy is the United States' policy towards the P.R.C. and Taiwan.

This Article aims to offer key distinctions between the One China Principle and the One China Policy, examine other countries' positions on the One China Principle, and identify significant trends in how countries interpret the concept of "One China." The survey results in the Appendix demonstrate that the P.R.C. government has successfully manipulated the One China Principle to garner international support for its authoritarian vision of a unified China under P.R.C. control.

This paper includes six parts. Part I describes the rich and complicated history of cross-strait relations between Taiwan, China, and the United States. Part II provides an overview of the One China Principle and how the P.R.C. uses the principle to leverage its international power. Part III discusses the diplomatic complexities and nuances of the One China Policy. Parts IV and V outline the One China Principle survey of United Nations (U.N.) member countries' "One China" policies and identify significant trends among the U.N. countries. Part VI offers ideas for future research and further analysis of these trends.

II. THE UNIQUE HISTORY INVOLVING TAIWAN, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES

Throughout history, many states have claimed Taiwan, the island approximately 100 miles off the east coast of mainland China, as their territory. The original Austronesian peoples, the Dutch, the Spanish, the Chinese, and the Japanese have each claimed or administered parts of Taiwan.[4] In 1662, the Kingdom of Tungning drove out the Dutch traders and remained in power until 1683.[5] Over the next 200 years, Taiwan was loosely administered by China's Qing dynasty.[6] After more and more Chinese settlers moved to Taiwan, the island received the Qing dynasty's designation as a formal province, but only for about ten years until the Japanese invaded.[7] Following the Sino-Japanese War in 1895,

[4] SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF12503, TAIWAN: THE ORIGINS OF THE U.S. ONE-CHINA POLICY (2023), https://bit.ly/3UlFMTB.
[5] Gerrit van der Wees, *Has Taiwan Always Been Part of China?*, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/4dGuBvb.
[6] Gerrit van der Wees, *When the CCP Though Taiwan Should be Independent*, DIPLOMAT (May 3, 2022), https://bit.ly/47UXu5D (Taiwan was administered as part of the Fukien province, but the inhabitants there did not see themselves as "part of China.").
[7] SHIRLEY A. KAN & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41952, U.S.–TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP: OVERVIEW OF POLICY (2014), https://bit.ly/4eUarij. *But see* Gerrit van der Wees,

and for the next 50 years, Taiwan became a colony of the Japanese empire.[8] After the Xinhai Revolution on mainland China in 1911, the Republic of China (R.O.C.) formed, led by Sun Yat-sen.[9] The Chinese civil war, which was paused during World War II, resumed in 1945 despite General George Marshall's attempt to mediate the differences between the nationalist Kuomintang Party (K.M.T.) and the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.).[10] In 1949, Mao Zedong's communist forces defeated the Chiang Kai-shek-led nationalist forces, who retreated to Taiwan.[11] The victorious C.C.P. established the P.R.C. government and effectively ruled mainland China, whereas the nationalist K.M.T. party ruled Taiwan by martial law.[12]

As part of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations in 1943 and 1945, respectively, the victorious Allied forces generally agreed to return Taiwan to the R.O.C. at the war's conclusion.[13] Accordingly, the R.O.C. became a member of the newly formed U.N. representing the entirety of China and holding a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council (U.N.S.C.).[14] In 1952, the Treaty of San Francisco determined that Taiwan would return to China, but did not clarify whether Taiwan would be part of the R.O.C. or the P.R.C.[15]

Originally, President Harry Truman took the position that Taiwan was a part of China. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, U.S. officials feared communist expansion in greater Asia and further conflict between the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., so President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to deter both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. from attacking each other.[16] President Truman then shifted his position on Taiwan, saying that its status was undetermined, in order to recognize the R.O.C. as the government of China while reserving judgment about whether Chinese sovereignty included

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supra note 6 (claiming that Taiwan was only a Chinese province under the Qing dynasty for eight years, not ten).

[8] KAN & MORRISON, *supra* note 7 (describing a Taiwanese resistance, culture, and identity during its time as a Japanese colony).

[9] *Id*.

[10] RICHARD C. BUSH, A ONE-CHINA POLICY PRIMER, CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 7 (Mar. 2017), https://bit.ly/3BCeceg.

[11] *The Great Obfuscation of One-China*, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 11, 2017), https://econ.st/3BxMm2F. For the discussion of "mainlanders" as the families that retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and the "Taiwanese" as the ethnic Chinese that were already living on Taiwan, *see* SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44996, TAIWAN: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2–3 (2017), https://bit.ly/4gTRHBl.

[12] KAN & MORRISON, *supra* note 7.

[13] Ryan M. Fisher, *Defending Taiwan: Collective Self-Defense of a Contested State*, 32 FL. L. REV. 107, 126 (2020).

[14] U.N. Charter art. 23 ¶ 1, https://bit.ly/3XXilRe (see page 31 signed, "For China").

[15] Treaty of Peace with Japan, art. 2 ¶ (b), Sept 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 48 ("Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores [islands].").

[16] Bush, *supra* note 10, at 10.

Taiwan.[17] During this period, both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the entirety of China, further complicating matters of respective sovereignty, autonomy, and international recognition.[18]

In 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower explicitly supported Taiwan and established a mutual defense treaty with the R.O.C., later supported by subsequent U.S. administrations encouraging Taiwan to enhance its defense.[19] During the 1960s, pressure intensified to recognize the P.R.C. at the U.N.[20] Seeking to take advantage of Sino-Soviet tensions, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, took steps to normalize diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. government.[21] In 1971, U.N. General Assembly Resolution (U.N.G.A.R.) 2758 recognized the P.R.C. over the R.O.C. as the official government of China. Later, in 1979, President Jimmy Carter established formal diplomatic relations with the P.R.C., severing official ties with the R.O.C. as detailed in Part III.[22]

In the 1990s, Taiwan underwent a political transformation from an authoritarian state to a fully realized democracy, holding its first Presidential election in 1996.[23] Currently, the R.O.C. maintains a sovereign status, with an independent military, vibrant economy, efficient immigration system, and official diplomatic relationships with 11 countries and the Vatican.[24] Taiwan also maintains unofficial relationships with almost 60 countries.[25] Despite Taiwan's governing system and relative autonomy, the P.R.C. claims Taiwan as a renegade province that is actually a part of China—stating claims from the Cairo Conference, historical ties, diplomatic acquiescence, and the result of U.N.G.A.R.

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[17] *Id*.; *see also* Presidential Statement on Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 119 (Jun. 27, 1950).
[18] Tzu-wen Lee, *The International Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan*, 1 UCLA INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 354 (1996).
[19] Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, https://bit.ly/3XSRS7A; CAITLIN CAMPBELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF12481, TAIWAN: DEFENSE AND MILITARY ISSUES 1 (2024), https://bit.ly/3Dxl8Kl.
[20] Bush, *supra* note 10, at 11–12.
[21] *Id*.
[22] CAMPBELL, *supra* note 19, at 1.
[23] LAWRENCE, *supra* note 11, at 5.
[24] Fisher, *supra* note 13, at 102; for discussions of how Taiwan practically meets the sovereign standards under the Montevideo Convention: (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government, and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states, *see* Jacques deLisle, *Taiwan: Sovereignty and Participation in International Organizations*, FOREIGN POL'Y RSCH. INST. (Jul. 1, 2011), https://bit.ly/3zYQ3hf; Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, T.S. No. 881, O.A.S.T.S. N0. 37 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1934).
[25] *East Asia and Pacific*, EMBASSIES & MISSIONS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (May 6, 2024), https://bit.ly/3NgeutS.

2758.[26] The P.R.C. government which came into power in 1949, has never ruled Taiwan.[27]

Since that time, the P.R.C. has executed a slow, methodical, and meticulous campaign to ensure countries adopt its version of "One China," further isolating Taiwan and squeezing it of its quasi-sovereignty. Since Chinese President Xi Jinping's election in 2013, the P.R.C. has formally named unification with Taiwan as crucial to the rejuvenation of the Chinese motherland.[28] Understanding the complicated history between China and Taiwan is critical to grasping the aggressive Chinese narrative surrounding the One China Principle.

III. THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE

A. Background

Though seemingly contradictory, the broader concept of "One China" appeared in both the nationalist R.O.C. Constitution in 1947 and the preamble to the P.R.C. Constitution in 1949.[29] The P.R.C.'s assertion was partially in response to the U.S. containment strategy and the possibility that Taiwan would be independent of China.[30] At the time, the concept of "One China" asserted that Taiwan was part of China's sovereign territory and would eventually be unified with the mainland.[31] This view was held by both the R.O.C. and P.R.C.

[26] TAIWAN AFF. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL & STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND CHINA'S REUNIFICATION IN THE NEW ERA (2022), https://bit.ly/4eUrMbg.
[27] van der Wees, *supra* note 6 (van der Wees offers a compelling view that the C.C.P. actually advocated for Taiwan's independence, similar to Vietnam or Korea, and considered Taiwanese a distinct nationality).
[28] Susan M. Gordon et al., *U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China*, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 21, 30, 37 (2023), https://bit.ly/4fBH9oU (identifying 2049 as a target date for (re)unification of Taiwan).
[29] Jessica Drun, *One China, Multiple Interpretations*, CENTER FOR ADVANCED CHINA RSCH. (Dec. 28, 2017), https://bit.ly/4euZzYI; *see* Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area (Jun. 8, 2022) (codified as amended), https://bit.ly/4gWeg8u; *see also* THE STATE COUNCIL, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC CHINA (Nov. 20, 2019), https://bit.ly/4ewjLJx.
[30] Both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., under the K.M.T., opposed the concept of "two Chinas" where Taiwan would be recognized as a second China, or "one China, one Taiwan." Adam P. Liff & Dalton Lin, *The "One China" Framework at 50 (1972-2022): The Myth of "Consensus" and Its Evolving Policy Significance*, 252 CHINA Q. 977, 981 (2022).
[31] The "One China Principle" term was not mentioned until 1992. Both sides of the strait support the One China Principle and seek national unification. However, negotiations on routine matters across the strait do not involve the political meaning of 'one China.'" *See* SHIRLEY A. KAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 30341, CHINA/TAIWAN: EVOLUTION OF THE "ONE CHINA" POLICY – KEY STATEMENTS FROM WASHINGTON, BEJING, AND TAIPEI 51 (2014); The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (N.P.C.) in December 1982, stipulates: "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China." EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA, YE JIANYING'S NINE PRINCIPLES FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN (2006), https://bit.ly/4eMIFVH.

governments. The P.R.C. claimed that since they won the Chinese civil war, the R.O.C. ceased to exist, and therefore, Taiwan should be a province of China.[32]

From 1949 to 1971, Soviet-bloc countries and a few others recognized the P.R.C. as the government of China. In 1971, U.N.G.A.R. 2758 recognized the P.R.C. as the only legitimate representative of China to the U.N.—further de-legitimizing the R.O.C. while solidifying international P.R.C. credibility.[33] Soon thereafter, official relations with the P.R.C. rapidly increased, although many countries opted to recognize the P.R.C. government while not accepting that Taiwan was part of China. These countries generally ensured diplomatic communiqués maintained vague or ambiguous language around the Taiwan issue—thereby not explicitly recognizing P.R.C. sovereignty over Taiwan.[34]

In 1992, at the start of a democratic Taiwan, the C.C.P. and the K.M.T. agreed to the principle that there is "One China," but both disagreed on its practicality.[35] Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (D.P.P.) rejected this debated consensus and currently does not support the One China Principle, whereas Taiwan's K.M.T. adheres to its conceptual roots. However, neither approach by Taiwan's major political parties has effectively countered the P.R.C.'s One China Principle.[36]

In 1993, the P.R.C. issued a white paper titled, *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China*, that primarily focused on Taiwan's sovereignty and the P.R.C.'s assertion that those countries with whom it had already established diplomatic relations agree with their version of the One China Principle.[37] This concerted effort to "box-in" countries to the One China Principle symbolized a shift in the P.R.C.'s rhetoric around the "One China" concept. The lexicon change elevated the One China Principle to a higher level of policy prioritization and culminated in another P.R.C. white paper in 2000 called *The "One China" Principle and the Taiwan Issue*.[38] Here, the P.R.C. Taiwan Affairs Office formally

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[32] KAN & MORRISON, *supra* note 7.

[33] G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), at 2 (Oct. 25, 1971).

[34] Lee, *supra* note 18, at 366.

[35] *The Great Obfuscation of One-China*, *supra* note 11.

[36] IVAN KANAPATHY, THE COLLAPSE OF ONE CHINA, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 2 (Jun. 2022), https://bit.ly/3PAW0FD.

[37] *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China*, TAIWAN AFF. OFFICE & INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Aug. 1993), https://on.china.cn/4exhBJR. In September 1996, 158 countries recognized the P.R.C. and 30 countries recognized the R.O.C. Lee, *supra* note 18.

[38] Taiwan Affairs Office & the Information Office of the State Council, *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2000) [hereinafter *The One-China Principle*], https://nyti.ms/4dz9j2Q; *see* JESSICA DRUN & BONNIE GLASER, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE U.S., THE DISTORTION OF UN RESOLUTION 2758 TO LIMIT TAIWAN'S ACCESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS 16 (2022), https://bit.ly/4eREGXh.

defined the One China Principle as follows: "There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the P.R.C. is the sole legal government representing the whole of China."[39] This white paper sought to shape the narrative around the One China Principle and claim ownership of the terminology that conceptually originated with the R.O.C. government. Additionally, the P.R.C. stated that countries who establish diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. must recognize the P.R.C. as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China and sever or refrain from establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[40]

As part of Taiwan's rapid democratization in the 1990s, the Taiwan government formally renounced its claim of authority over mainland China.[41] Nevertheless, the P.R.C. continued to press forward with the One China Principle by passing the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which stated that there is only one China in the world and that both the mainland of China and Taiwan belong to one China.[42] The law provides a formal mechanism for the P.R.C. to unify the country through peaceful means and clarifies that, if Taiwan secedes from China, or if other peaceful means are completely exhausted, then China "shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."[43]

On August 2, 2022, the P.R.C. released a statement in strong opposition to a diplomatic visit to Taiwan by the then-Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi. The P.R.C. claimed that U.S. actions violated the integrity of the One China Principle and the U.S. One China Policy. The statement again reaffirmed P.R.C. allegiance to the One China Principle: "There is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory, and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China."[44]

Shortly thereafter, the P.R.C. released another white paper titled, *The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era*.[45] Like in 2000, the P.R.C. sought to further control the information narrative at the outset, stating in the preamble: "Taiwan is part of China—this is an indisputable fact."[46] The white

[39] *The One-China Principle*, *supra* note 38 (noting P.R.C.'s ownership and advocacy of the "One China" concept).
[40] *Id*.
[41] Lee, *supra* note 18, at 374.
[42] Anti-Secession Law (反分裂国家法), art. 2, Mar. 14, 2005 (China), *translated in* CSIS Interpret: China, https://bit.ly/3U0KmX8.
[43] *Id*. arts. 5–8.
[44] STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Aug. 2, 2022), https://bit.ly/3OMDk54.
[45] THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND CHINA'S REUNIFICATION IN THE NEW ERA (2022), *supra* note 26.
[46] *Id*.

paper sought to reiterate that Taiwan is part of China, explain the P.R.C.'s commitment to unifying Taiwan with mainland China, and attack the current Taiwanese political party in power, the D.P.P.[47] The key difference with this particular white paper was that the P.R.C. implied that U.N.G.A.R. 2758 forms the basis of the One China Principle.[48] The P.R.C. explained that national rejuvenation is essential for China to return to its glorious past and restore China to a position of world leadership.[49]

Today, the P.R.C.'s interpretation of the One China Principle includes two parts: (1) that the P.R.C. is the sole legal government of China and (2) that Taiwan is a part of China. The first part is a government's official position on who is the government of China, typically formalized through a joint political communiqué after normalizing diplomatic relations with the P.R.C.[50] The second part is more complicated. Here, governments have instituted creative flexibility to craft their diplomatic intentions with the P.R.C. government, generally adopting affirmative, ambiguous, or silent positions on whether Taiwan is a part of China.

B. U.N.G.A.R. 2758 Exploitation

Since 1971, the P.R.C. has attempted to shape the international narrative about Taiwan's legitimacy at the U.N. and among international organizations. P.R.C. efforts include eliminating Taiwan from all international bodies, inserting language into international entities that identify Taiwan as a "Province of China," and subtly re-enforcing that the international community has agreed to the One China Principle by reference to U.N.G.A.R. 2758.[51]

U.N.G.A.R. 2758 concluded that the P.R.C. government would be represented at the U.N. as "the only lawful representative of China" and "one of the five permanent members of the [U.N. Security Council].[52] The resolution did not mention Taiwan, the Republic of China, or whether Taiwan was a province of the P.R.C.[53] Nevertheless, the PRC has pushed the view that Taiwan is a province of China and that the One China Principle was "confirmed" or "affirmed" by the resolution.[54] While many countries do not adhere to the P.R.C. version of the One

[47] *Id*. ("The historic goal of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized.").
[48] *Id*. ("[U.N.G.A.R] 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide.").
[49] Mark Metcalf, *The National Humiliation Narrative: Dealing with the Present by Fixating on the Past*, 25 EDUC. ABOUT ASIA 44 (2020), https://bit.ly/4dAhHyT.
[50] Liff & Lin, *supra* note 30, at 988.
[51] DRUN & GLASER, *supra* note 38, at 23.
[52] G.A. Res. 2758, *supra* note 33.
[53] DRUN & GLASER, *supra* note 38, at 29.
[54] THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND CHINA'S REUNIFICATION IN THE NEW ERA, *supra* note 26 (The P.R.C. refers to the official legal opinion from the UN Secretariat Office of Legal Affairs that "the United Nations considers 'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status."); *see* Madoka

China Principle, the P.R.C. artfully mischaracterizes U.N.G.A.R. 2758 as international justification to establish the link that Taiwan is a part of China.

C. Gross Misrepresentation

The P.R.C. actively seeks to control the global narrative by influencing domestic and foreign populations and leaders about the One China concept.[55] The One China Principle is now a coercive, diplomatic tool used to escalate lawfare against Taiwan and its international legitimacy.[56] The P.R.C. uses information to stress adherence to the One China concept and to ensure the One China Principle becomes a universally accepted international norm.[57] Many countries have adopted joint communiqués with the P.R.C., but they are often more indicative of Taiwan's status rather than China's.[58] Despite this, the P.R.C. uses these joint communiqués as a way to bolster support for the One China Principle. While many of the communiqués have certain characteristics of the One China Principle, many do not adopt the P.R.C.'s interpretation.

In 2022, the P.R.C.'s foreign ministry issued the inflated claim that 181 countries established diplomatic relations with China on the basis of the One China Principle, and that the One China Principle was a universal consensus of the international community and a basic norm in international relations.[59] This rhetoric is an example of the P.R.C.'s strategic, legal warfare in their attempt to reframe international sentiment and suggest implicit adoption of the One China Principle.[60] Although there is almost universal recognition of the P.R.C. government, there is no international consensus on, or global acceptance of the Taiwan portion of the One China Principle.[61] These tactics are similar to the P.R.C.'s lawfare efforts in the South China Sea, where China has been advancing

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Fukuda, *China is Using a UN Resolution to Further Its Claim Over Taiwan*, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 26, 2022) (explaining that the Secretariat language goes beyond the original implication of Resolution 2758), https://bit.ly/4808KOb; *see also* DRUN & GLASER, *supra* note 38, at 14.

[55] Dean Cheng, *Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare*, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 21, 2012), https://herit.ag/4ewA3SQ (describing how the P.R.C. uses political warfare to establish international political norms, raise doubts, and diminish political will).

[56] Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., *Lawfare 101: A Primer*, 97 MIL. REV. 8, 9 (2017) (Lawfare is the use of law as a means of accomplishing what might otherwise require the application of traditional military force.). For a greater discussion on lawfare, *see* Jill I. Goldenziel, *Law as a Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Global Escalation of Lawfare*, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 1100 (2021).

[57] Chien-Huei Wu, Ching-Fu Lin, & Yun-Sheng Lin, *China's Word Game: A New Narrative of the "One China Principle,"* DIPLOMAT (Aug. 16, 2023), https://bit.ly/4gTwKGQ.

[58] Fisher, *supra* note 13.

[59] STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, *supra* note 44.

[60] Liff & Lin, *supra* note 30, at 997.

[61] Chong Ja Ian, *The Many "One Chinas": Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China*, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT'L PEACE (Feb. 9, 2023), https://bit.ly/3zNO13t.

spurious territorial claims for decades.[62] By allowing such rhetoric to go unchecked, the international community allows the P.R.C. to ignore established legal norms, gain strategic advantage, and control the narrative about Taiwan.

The P.R.C. has long sought to isolate Taiwan with its long game diplomacy. This brand of institutional lawfare seeks to exploit the international community and coerce states to adopt the P.R.C. version of the One China Principle.[63] Coopting international institutions, influencing weak states with economic dependency, and seeking to control the power of information have enabled the P.R.C. to create new international legal norms as a pretext for possible action.[64] The One China Principle has successfully sowed confusion around the world and used its ambiguous status to China's advantage. Even while the P.R.C. falsely claims the U.S. has accepted the One China Principle, the U.S. One China Policy is, in fact, distinctly different.

IV. THE U.S. ONE CHINA POLICY

The One China Policy is not the One China Principle. The One China Policy is a comprehensive framework of diplomatic agreements and government statements. The simple explanation of the One China Policy is that the United States maintains an official, diplomatic relationship with the P.R.C. government and an unofficial relationship with Taiwan. This does not necessarily mean that the U.S. acquiesces to the P.R.C.'s worldview; it is simply a recognition of the diplomatic reality and necessity of a bilateral relationship with China. However, the policy has come under recent scrutiny. Statements from President Donald Trump and President Joseph Biden, P.R.C. military escalation around Taiwan, and the linguistic similarities with the One China Principle all create uncertainty and confusion.[65] In a U.S. State Department hearing the topic was nicely summarized by the future Secretary of State Rex Tillerson:

> The Three Communiqués, Taiwan Relations Act, and Six Assurances provide the foundation for U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. The United States should continue to uphold the One China policy and support a peaceful and mutually

[62] Wu et al., *supra* note 57.
[63] Goldenziel, *supra* note 56, at 1100 (identifying institutional lawfare as either using or creating new domestic or international law to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives).
[64] *See id*.; *see also* Dean Cheng, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institution for Peace, Speech at Duke University School of Law 29th Annual National Security Law Conference: Update on China: Lawfare Technology and More (Feb. 23, 2024), https://bit.ly/3Yf0ZRr.
[65] *See* Peter Nicholas, Paul Beckett, & Gerald F. Seib, *Trump Open to Shift on Russia Sanctions, "One China" Policy*, WALL ST. J. (Jan.13, 2017), https://on.wsj.com/3BJlBYX; *see also The Great Obfuscation of One-China*, *supra* note 11 (Former President Trump stated: "I don't know why we have to be bound by a one-China policy," only to later walk back his comments.).

> agreeable cross Strait outcome. Under this policy, the United States recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China. As required by the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States continues to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and maintains the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan. The United States also upholds the Six Assurances on U.S. policy toward Taiwan.[66]

A. The Three Communiqués

The three communiqués between the United States and P.R.C. are doctrinal statements of U.S. policy signed in 1972, 1978, and 1982 under three different U.S. Presidents.[67] These statements serve as nonbinding political commitments to express diplomatic intentions and are not legally binding agreements under domestic or international law.[68] The P.R.C. has sought to manipulate the U.S. communiqués to suit their version of the One China Principle, whereas the United States views them as diplomatic notes and statements of future policy.

The *1972 Shanghai communiqué* became the first and pivotal step toward normalization between the United States and the P.R.C., and ensured the P.R.C. government would be the primary sovereign entity in international organizations.[69] In President Nixon's historic trip to China, the communiqué summarized the dialogue between the two countries. The P.R.C. clarified its position that it "is the sole legal government of China [and that] Taiwan is a province of China."[70] The U.S. position "acknowledge[d] that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan

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[66] *Nomination of Rex Tillerson to be Secretary of State: Hearing on Nomination of Rex Tillerson Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations*, 2017 S. Hrg. 115-4, 1st Sess. (Secretary-Designate Tillerson's Answers to Questions from Senator Cardin, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations). https://bit.ly/4itmc1O.

[67] SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10275, TAIWAN: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 2 (2024), https://bit.ly/4etpTlO.

[68] Julian Ku, *President Trump Can Legally End the One China Policy and Station U.S. Troops in Taiwan*, LAWFARE (Jan. 17, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://bit.ly/4ex4FDI (describing how China implies these communiqués are binding international agreements and offers that the United States adheres to their One China Principle).

[69] *See* BUSH, *supra* note 10, at 11–12.

[70] JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ), China-U.S., Feb. 27, 1972, WILSON CENTER DIGIT. ARCHIVE, https://bit.ly/3Ya1ig6.

is part of China [and] the [United States] does not challenge that position," and that the United States "reaffirm[ed] its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."[71] In other words, the United States acknowledged and did not challenge the P.R.C.'s position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.[72]

The *1978 normalization communiqué* provided not only an official recognition of diplomatic relations between the United States and the P.R.C., but also confirmation that the U.S. would "maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with Taiwan."[73] In this communiqué, the United States "recognize[d] the Government of the [P.R.C.] as the sole legal Government of China," which formalized their official relations.[74] Secondly, the United States removed the "does not challenge" language from the *1972 Shanghai communiqué* and simply "acknowledge[d] the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."[75] By merely acknowledging the Chinese position, rather than not challenging the position, the United States held no position on the matter.[76] However, during the negotiations, U.S. diplomats allowed the P.R.C. to use the stronger verb "recognize" in the Chinese text of the communiqué, which caused tensions later.[77] Shortly thereafter, President Carter announced the termination of the U.S.-R.O.C. mutual defense treaty.[78]

The *1982 arms communiqué* allowed the United States and the P.R.C. to reaffirm the 1972 and 1978 communiqués under President Ronald Reagan. Additionally, the Taiwan Relations Act put a major strain on initial U.S.-P.R.C. relations, so this communiqué sought to address some of those issues.[79] President

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[71] *Id*.
[72] *See* Liff & Lin, *supra* note 30, at 984 (discussing that the United States did not support the "one China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas" framework).
[73] President James Earl Carter, Address to the Nation, *in* 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980 (Dec. 15, 29178), https://bit.ly/4dvzqHX (quoting the final text of the joint communiqué), JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (NORMALIZATION COMMUNIQUÉ), China-U.S., Dec. 15, 1979, AMERICAN INSTITUTE TAIWAN, https://bit.ly/4ja9w0v.
[74] *Id*.
[75] *Id*.
[76] Michael J. Green & Bonnie S. Glaser, *What Is the U.S. "One China" Policy, and Why Does it Matter?*, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://bit.ly/3zNgIO0 (Then-Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher stating that, "[W]e regard the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word 'acknowledge' as being the word that is determinative for the U.S."); Victor H. Li, *The Law of Non-Recognition: The Case of Taiwan*, 1 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 134, 137 n.12 (1979) (Professor Victor Li testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about the linguistic discrepancy of the Chinese versions of the word "acknowledge." *Ch'eng-jen* carries a strong connotation of acceptance or agreement whereas *jen-shih* is more similar to the English version of acknowledge, or take note of.).
[77] BUSH, *supra* note 10, at 13.
[78] LAWRENCE, *supra* note 4, at 1.
[79] *See id*.; *See infra* Part III.C.

Reagan reiterated the English version of the *1978 normalization communiqué* (using "acknowledge" rather than "recognize") and stated to Congress that the United States took no position on Taiwan's sovereignty.[80] The United States noted its intention to gradually reduce the sale of arms to Taiwan on the condition that the P.R.C. settle the Taiwan matter via peaceful means.[81] Lastly, the United States declared no intention of pursuing a policy of two Chinas (one China, one Taiwan).[82]

B. The Six Assurances

President Reagan provided six assurances to Taiwan before the release of the *1982 arms communiqué*, which sought to clarify communiqué negotiations.[83] The assurances were as follows:

1. The United States had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the R.O.C;
2. The United States had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the P.R.C. regarding arms sales to the R.O.C;
3. The United States would not play a mediation role between the P.R.C. and the R.O.C;
4. The United States would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
5. The United States had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan;
6. The United States would not exert pressure on the R.O.C. to enter negotiations with the P.R.C.[84]

C. The Taiwan Relations Act

On April 10, 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (T.R.A.), intending to respond to P.R.C. recognition with a commitment of an "unofficial relationship" with the "people of Taiwan."[85] The T.R.A. allows the United States to continue its relationship with Taiwan via the American Institute of Taiwan,

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[80] *See* BUSH, *supra* note 10, at 13.
[81] *The August 17, 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan*, U.S. DEP'T. STATE: OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://bit.ly/4exRnGT [hereinafter *The August 17, 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué*]; *see also Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arm Sales & Six Assurances (1982)*, AM. INST. IN TAIWAN (Mar. 30, 2022), https://bit.ly/3BzkAmk.
[82] *The August 17, 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué*, *supra* note 81; *see also* LAWRENCE, *supra* note 4.
[83] *See generally* SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11665, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SIX ASSURANCES TO TAIWAN (2024).
[84] *Id*. at 1; *see also* Green & Glaser, *supra* note 76.
[85] Steven M. Goldstein, *Understanding the One China Policy*, BROOKINGS (Aug. 31, 2023), https://bit.ly/47SKpdf; Taiwan Relations Act, H.R.2479, 96th Cong. (1979), https://bit.ly/3PhXhRu.

while also providing significant U.S. security and commercial guarantees.[86] The T.R.A. states that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability," and it is U.S. policy "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."[87] In sum, the T.R.A. outlines that the United States will continue to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and conveys an ambiguous political commitment to come to Taiwan's defense if the P.R.C. were to attack the island by force.[88]

The T.R.A. created *strategic ambiguity* by not specifying whether the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a P.R.C. attack. Additionally, the T.R.A. provided a robust defense relationship between the United States and Taiwan, thus making the P.R.C. unsure about what would happen if it were to attack Taiwan militarily.[89] Since 2021, President Biden has stated on multiple occasions that the United States would defend Taiwan, appearing to abandon strategic ambiguity, although White House officials later said U.S. policy remains unchanged.[90]

D. Additional Factors

In addition to the above, the One China Policy shifts slightly with each presidential administration. Under certain circumstances, U.S. presidents have reiterated portions of the One China Policy depending on the current geopolitical relationship with China and Taiwan. For example, President Bill Clinton reiterated "three Nos" in that the United States did not support: (1) two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan); (2) Taiwan independence; and (3) Taiwan membership in international organizations when statehood was required.[91]

In 2023, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, reiterated the U.S. One China Policy at a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing: "We remain committed to our long standing One China Policy and oppose any

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[86] SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10275, TAIWAN: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 1–2 (2024), https://bit.ly/4etpTlO.
[87] Taiwan Relations Act, *supra* note 85.
[88] BUSH, *supra* note 10, at 18; *see also* Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Policy on Taiwan Before the S. For. Rel. Comm., Sub. Comm. on East Asia and the Pacific, 104th Cong. (Feb. 7, 1996), https://bit.ly/3ZZNsy6 (statement of Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Aff.) (The T.R.A. forms the basis of U.S. policy regarding the security of Taiwan.).
[89] CAMPBELL, *supra* note 19, at 2.
[90] LAWRENCE, *supra* note 83, at 2.
[91] BUSH, *supra* note 10, at 12 (allowing the United States to still advocate for Taiwan internationally).

unilateral changes to the cross-strait status quo. Our policy has not changed. What has changed is Beijing's growing coercion. So we will keep assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability."[92] The United States does not recognize the P.R.C.'s One China Principle nor does it support Taiwan's independence, which is a common misconception about the One China Policy.

U.S. officials regularly state that the United States takes no position on the status of Taiwan, but that is incorrect, as the United States has never deviated from Taiwan's *undetermined* status set forth by President Truman.[93] Positing an undetermined status is distinct from taking no position on the matter. So, across the past two U.S. presidential administrations, the policy is on fragile grounds, with officials regularly misstating the policy, Western media misconstruing the policy, and Presidents Trump and Biden publicly displaying a lack of understanding, perhaps unintentionally.[94]

V. THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE SURVEY FACTORS (SEE APPENDIX)

Since 1949, the P.R.C. has aggressively demanded adoption of the One China Principle. From 1970 to 1996, 123 countries established diplomatic ties with the P.R.C., but those countries have varied in their approach to whether China was recognized as the sole legitimate government of China and whether Taiwan was a part of China.[95] In 1996, Tzu-wen Lee categorized these diplomatic relationships into nine categories, and more recently, Chong Ja Ian of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, did the same but added another category for states that recognized the R.O.C.[96] The survey in the Appendix seeks to expand their efforts, identify any significant trends among various geopolitical factors, and offer ideas for further analysis.

In 2017, the former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou identified three categories of countries regarding the One China Principle in his attempt to

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[92] Evaluating U.S.-China Policy in the Era of Strategic Competition Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong. 118 (Feb. 9, 2023), https://bit.ly/4gWnqlq (reiterating the One China Policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances).
[93] James Lee, *The One-China Policy in Transition*, SFS: GEO. J. INT'L AFF. (Nov. 7, 2022), https://bit.ly/3Ngyi0a.
[94] One idea is to change the name of the U.S. One China Policy as the term "One China" feeds into the P.R.C.'s narrative of tacit support of the One China Principle. The U.S. Policy on Cross-Strait Relations, U.S. Policy in the Taiwan Strait, or U.S. Cross-Strait Policy are possible examples. *See, e.g.*, Michael E. O'Hanlon et al., *Should the United States Change Its Policies Toward Taiwan?*, BROOKINGS (Apr. 16, 2024), https://bit.ly/3YdAV9k (Kanapathy supports this idea); DRUN & GLASER, *supra* note 38, at 31; *The U.S.'s One-China Policy Explained*, ABC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017, 5:26 AM), https://bit.ly/3ZTbIC5 (describing how the U.S. media mischaracterizes the U.S. One China Policy as "recognizing" China's claims over Taiwan).
[95] Lee, *supra* note 18, at 357.
[96] *Id*. at 357–59; Chong, *supra* note 61.

overcome P.R.C. rhetoric that all states adhere to the stricter P.R.C. version of the One China Principle.[97] According to Ying-jeou, the categories of countries are classified as follows: (1) Countries that recognize P.R.C. claims that Taiwan is a province or part of China; (2) Countries that provide vague or ambiguous language about recognizing P.R.C. claims that Taiwan is a province or part of China; and (3) Countries that neglect to mention Taiwan whatsoever.[98] This classification of states is simpler than the Lee and Chong versions, but should be expanded to include countries that recognize the R.O.C.[99]

A. Country

In his study, Lee reviewed 123 countries. This article expands the survey to include all 181 U.N. member states plus the Vatican, which officially recognizes Taiwan but only holds U.N. observer status.[100]

B. One China Principle Scale

The One China Principle has two parts: (1) the position as to whether the P.R.C. is the sole legitimate government of China; and (2) the position as to whether Taiwan is a part of China. The scale here represents four Categories across a continuum of diplomatic preference between the P.R.C. and Taiwan. Lee addresses part (2), but I expanded his efforts here by including part (1), increasing the number of countries, and identifying other survey factors for consideration. Across the continuum, Category 1 countries are pro-P.R.C. and Category 4 countries are pro-R.O.C.

- Category 1 countries (light red color):
    - Recognize the P.R.C. as the sole legitimate government of China; and
    - Recognize Taiwan as part of China.
- Category 2 countries (light orange color):
    - Recognize the P.R.C. as the sole legitimate government of China; and
    - Express some type of vagueness (acknowledge, take note of, understand and respect) or remain silent as to whether Taiwan is a part of China.

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[97] Ma Ying-jeou, Former President of Taiwan, Speech to Brookings Institution: Views from a Former President: Taiwan's Past, Present and Future (Mar. 7, 2017), https://bit.ly/3ZTbUkN.
[98] Drun, *supra* note 29.
[99] Lee, *supra* note 18, at 357–59.
[100] *Member States*, UNITED NATIONS, https://bit.ly/3BCgPNa. The Vatican, also known as the Holy See, is the government of the Roman Catholic Church led by the Pope. Along with Palestine, The Vatican is a non-member state of the U.N. and can observe the sessions and work of the United Nations. *See Non-Member-States*, UNITED NATIONS, https://bit.ly/3TWfw1E.

- Category 3 countries (light yellow color):
  - Remain silent as to whether the P.R.C. is the sole legitimate government of China; and
  - Remain silent as to whether Taiwan is a part of China.
- Category 4 countries (light green color):
  - Recognize Taiwan; and
  - Do not adhere to the One China Principle.

C. One China Principle Position on China

This column identifies part (1) of the One China Principle as to whether the P.R.C. is the sole legitimate government of China. Here, I used Chong's language: "Recognize PRC as sole legitimate government of China (or representing all Chinese people)."[101] Those countries that recognize the P.R.C. government are listed as Category 1 and Category 2 countries as explained above. Category 3 countries contain no mention of the P.R.C. as the sole legitimate government of China, but often those countries established official relations before 1970 or are simply indifferent. Category 4 countries explicitly recognize Taiwan and maintain no official relations with the P.R.C. government.

D. One China Principle Position on Taiwan

This column identifies part (2) of the One China Principle as to whether Taiwan is a part of China. Again, I modified the language from Chong among the four categories.[102] Category 1 countries recognize Taiwan as part of China, an explicit, pro-P.R.C. position. Category 2 countries are broad in their approach to part (2) of the One China Principle but offer a level of ambiguity as to whether Taiwan is a part of China. These Category 2 countries express varying levels of diplomatic parlance: acknowledge, take note of, understand and respect, or remain silent with no explicit mention of Taiwan's status. I combined this vague language into one category to explain that this large cohort of countries has been able to maintain official relations with the P.R.C. while still holding unofficial relations with Taiwan. Category 3 countries do not include any mention of Taiwan's status and Category 4 countries do not adhere to the One China Principle.

E. Type of Government

Each country's type of government listed is identified by the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.[103]

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[101] Chong, *supra* note 61.
[102] *See id*.
[103] *The World Factbook – Explore All Countries*, CENTRAL INTEL. AGENCY, https://bit.ly/4gXyrmP.

F. Region

Each country listed is identified as part of one of the six geographical regions from the U.S. Department of State.[104] Of particular note, 75 percent of Category 1 countries (pro-P.R.C.) are located in South and Central Asia.

G. Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.)

A nation's G.D.P. at purchasing power parity exchange rates is the sum value of all goods and services produced in the country valued at prices prevailing in the United States dependent on the year. This is the measure most economists prefer when looking at per-capita welfare and when comparing use of resources across countries. The estimates here range from 2014 to 2023 based on current and available data.[105]

H. G.D.P. Per Capita

This measurement, meant to identify a citizen's purchasing power, is calculated by dividing the G.D.P. of a country by its population. The dates of the estimates here range from 2015 to 2023 with a mean of $17,500 in 2017 U.S. Dollars.[106]

I. China Foreign Investment

This column identifies P.R.C. global investments through two databases: (1) the American Enterprise Institute (A.E.I.) China Global Investment Tracker and (2) the College of William & Mary's Global Chinese Development Finance dataset (AidData). In the event that a country's data was not captured from the A.E.I. China Global Investment Tracker which collected data from 2005 to 2023, I alternatively used AidData which spanned from 2000 to 2021. The data shows that the P.R.C. is the largest official source of international development financing.[107]

J. Belt and Road Initiative (B.R.I.)

In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed the B.R.I. in a speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. Invoking Chinese ties to Central Asia, he sought to build economic development ties, regional cooperation, and strategic

[104] *Countries and Areas*, U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://bit.ly/4eIYhce.
[105] *The World Factbook – Real GDP (purchasing power parity),* CENTRAL INTEL. AGENCY, https://bit.ly/4gMk70a.
[106] *The World Factbook – Real GDP per capita,* CENTRAL INTEL. AGENCY, https://bit.ly/4gQROxN.
[107] *China Global Investment Tracker*, AM. ENTER. INST., https://bit.ly/3XTCwj5; *Global Chinese Development Finance*, AIDDATA, https://bit.ly/4gTUxpZ.

partnerships.[108] Now, over a decade later the B.R.I. has expanded the P.R.C.'s international influence across the developing world by supporting an international network of infrastructure projects that have boosted trade and connectivity, transformed geopolitical environments, and increased China's political reach.[109] In 2023, China had more than 200 B.R.I. cooperation agreements with approximately 150 countries across five continents, yielding large infrastructure projects, small initiatives, and green B.R.I. ventures.[110] Of the 181 countries listed in the Appendix, almost 90 percent of Category 1 countries are B.R.I. members, while 75 percent of Category 2 countries, 87 percent of Category 3 countries, and none of Category 4 countries are B.R.I members.[111]

K. Power Index

This column identifies a country's power status via numerical ranking. The power index includes the top 89 countries and was developed by the BAV Group and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and published by U.S. News & World Report.[112] A country's power calculation is based on leadership, economic influence, political influence, diplomatic alliances, and a strong military. Of the 11 Category 4 countries (plus the Vatican), only Guatemala is listed in the Power Index at number 64.[113]

L. Human Development Index (H.D.I.)

This column identifies a country's human development status from the U.N. Development Program. H.D.I. is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic areas of human development: (1) a long and healthy life, (2) knowledge, and (3) a decent standard of living.[114] H.D.I. is a more comprehensive approach than the power index model because the U.N. provides identification criteria and methodology of determining "developed" nations.[115]

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[108] *President Xi Proposes Silk Road Economic Belt*, CHINADAILY.COM (Sep. 7, 2013), https://bit.ly/3NffsGt.
[109] Joseph Leahy, James Kygne, & Benjaming Parkin, *Ten Years of China's Belt and Road: What Has $1tn Achieved?*, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2023), https://on.ft.com/3XS8rjP.
[110] *Key Takeaways from BRI White Paper*, XINHUANET (Oct. 11, 2023), https://bit.ly/4eyqgeS (noting major B.R.I. projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor); *see also* Spencer Feingold, *China's Belt and Road Initiative Turns 10*, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 20, 2023), https://bit.ly/4exRUZp (cleaner forms of infrastructure investment align with China's climate goals).
[111] *See Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*, GREEN BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE CENTER, https://bit.ly/3BD4Zml.
[112] *Power*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://bit.ly/4eSg2pk.
[113] *See id*.
[114] *Human Development Index (H.D.I.)*, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME (last visited Aug. 24, 2024), https://bit.ly/4eyzOXj.
[115] *LDC Identification Criteria & Indication*, UNITED NATIONS DEP. OF ECON. AND SOCIAL AFF. (last visited Nov. 26, 2024), https://bit.ly/3BXifC7.

VI. THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE SURVEY RESULTS (SEE APPENDIX)

A. World Powers Maintain Ties to Taiwan

The most powerful countries fall in Category 2 (P.R.C. recognition and Taiwan ambiguity) and generally have strong, unofficial ties with Taiwan.[116] These countries have higher G.D.P., G.D.P. per capita, power rankings, and H.D.I. scores than any of the other three categories. Most of these world powers maintain official relations with the P.R.C. and unofficial relations with Taiwan, and have not changed their positions on whether Taiwan is a part of China.[117] While these countries recognize the P.R.C. as the sole legitimate government of China, many world powers do not accept the P.R.C.'s claim that Taiwan is a part of China and are able to maintain an ambiguous position on the Taiwan issue.[118]

B. Countries That Recently Switched Official Relations to the P.R.C. Affirm That Taiwan is a Part of China

For the past two decades, when a country switches official relations from the R.O.C. to the P.R.C., it immediately adopts the P.R.C. version of the One China Principle and affirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.[119] For example, in 2021 Nicaragua switched official relations from the R.O.C. to the P.R.C. government.[120] The joint communiqué stated that Nicaragua: "recognize[d] that there is only one China in the world, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate Government representing all of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory."[121] Therefore, it is likely that any countries that switch relations from the R.O.C. to the P.R.C. going forward will resemble a Category 1 (pro-P.R.C.) country and affirm that Taiwan is a part of China.

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[116] Fisher, *supra* note 13, at 126.
[117] For example, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Iran, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States, India, among others.
[118] Liff & Lin, *supra* note 30, at 987–88.
[119] This includes Nauru, Honduras, Nicaragua, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, El Salvador.
[120] MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, COMUNICADO CONJUNTO ENTRE LA REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA Y LA REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA SOBRE EL RESTABLECIMIENTO DE RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS [JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA ON THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS], ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE (Dec. 10, 2021, 12:46 PM) (Esp.), https://bit.ly/4gV8qEp (translated to English).
[121] *Id*.

C. Countries That Recently Switched Official Relations to the P.R.C. Receive Economic Benefits

Since 2016, eight of the ten countries to switch official relations from the R.O.C. to the P.R.C. have immediately entered into a B.R.I. agreement with the P.R.C. government.[122] Most recently, Honduras switched relations in 2023 and secured a B.R.I. agreement later that year.[123] The same is true for Panama in 2017, El Salvador in 2018, the Solomon Islands in 2019, and so on.[124] Nauru is the latest country to switch diplomatic relations and has not yet established membership in the B.R.I., but one would expect that to occur very soon.[125]

D. Countries with Official Relations with the P.R.C. are Now Confirming That Taiwan is a Part of China

Countries with long-standing, official relations with the P.R.C. are now confirming that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. For example, Tanzania recognized the P.R.C. in 1961, but only recently reaffirmed its relationship, stating in the joint communiqué: "The Tanzanian side reaffirmed its firm commitment to the one-China principle [and] regards Taiwan as an inalienable part of China."[126] The same language that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China" holds true for Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, and Laos, among others. Accordingly, the P.R.C. is now focusing solely on a country's position on whether Taiwan is a part of China because most countries in the world already recognize the P.R.C. as the government of China. Therefore, many countries that already have official relations with the P.R.C. may reaffirm their relationship by endorsing that Taiwan is a part of China.

E. Category 1 Countries are Firmly Pro-P.R.C.

Clearly, countries that adhere to both parts of the One China Principle are strong diplomatic partners of the P.R.C. government. The survey identified almost all Category 1 countries as official members of the B.R.I., receiving over $300 billion in Chinese foreign investment since 2000. Additionally, Category 1

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[122] This includes Nauru, Honduras, Nicaragua, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Burkina Faso, Republic of Panama, and Gambia. See *infra* Appendix. Of the 10 countries, Nauru and the Burkina Faso are the only two nations that have not joined the B.R.I. *See Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*, GREEN BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE CENTER, https://bit.ly/3BD4Zml.

[123] *See infra* Appendix.

[124] *Id*.

[125] Ryan Woo, *Former Taiwan Ally Nauru Re-established Diplomatic Ties with China*, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2024: 11:09 PM), https://reut.rs/3TWW5WH.

[126] *See infra* Appendix; *see* MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFS. CHINA, JOINT STATEMENT ON ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (Nov. 3, 2022, 9:49 PM), https://bit.ly/4eo0z0B.

countries coalesce around common issues in international organizations and have demonstrated significant international political influence.[127]

F. Category 4 Countries are Geopolitically Weak and Concentrated in Latin America

Countries that recognize Taiwan and do not adhere to the One China Principle have lower G.D.P., below average G.D.P. per capita, lower power rankings, and lower H.D.I. scores. Seven out of eleven Category 4 countries are located in Latin America, which may explain China's recent push to expand the B.R.I. there and foster new economic agreements in the Americas region.[128] Two of the eleven Category 4 countries (Marshall Islands and Palau) maintain a special defense relationship with the United States called the Compact of Free Association.

VII. FUTURE ANALYSIS

The diplomatic relationships of Taiwan and China are complex, economically interdependent, and ever-changing. Given the associated trends with the One China Principle, it is likely that all countries that currently recognize the R.O.C. will eventually switch their official relations to the P.R.C. government. Those countries will likely become B.R.I. members, which will provide access to large amounts of Chinese foreign investment, economic, financial, and digital infrastructure, and even political power.

This One China Principle survey focuses on the language of the One China Principle in two parts, type of government, region, G.D.P., G.D.P. per capita, foreign investment, B.R.I. membership, power, and H.D.I. factors. Additional factors worth considering include defense spending, population trends, corruption propensity, or other diplomatic and socioeconomic characteristics. A more focused review into the complexities and financing of the B.R.I. would be helpful, especially given the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Given that China has strengthened its diplomatic ties significantly with the Global South, including Latin America, extensive examination into the specific economic and financial relationships there could be analyzed further.

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[127] *See* John Feng, *China Backed by 65 Nations on Human Rights Despite Xinjiang Concerns*, NEWSWEEK (Jun. 23, 2021, 08:25 AM), https://bit.ly/4eVsdSB.

[128] *See What does China want from Latin America and the Caribbean?* ECONOMIST (Jun. 17, 2023), https://econ.st/3TWgdYO (describing how the P.R.C. became Latin America's top trading partners from $12 billion to $445 billion over two decades); *see* Didi Kirsten Tatlow, *China Building New Outpost on U.S. Doorstep, Leaked Documents Reveal*, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2024), https://bit.ly/3XXvMAy.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The history and meaning of "One China" can be difficult to grasp. Today, the P.R.C. uses the concept of "One China" via its One China Principle to advance its authoritarian and expansionist vision. Even though the R.O.C. has generally abandoned the term, "One China" remains embedded linguistically in the U.S. One China Policy and is a critical link to maintaining peace, stability, and economic prosperity in the Taiwan Strait.

While many foreign policy observers disagree on the current practicality of the One China Policy, it remains clear that other countries' One China policies show significant trends in favor of the P.R.C. government.[129] The remaining eleven countries that recognize the R.O.C. are likely to switch to the P.R.C. in the near future, secure economic benefits, and reinforce the P.R.C. rhetoric of the One China Principle that Taiwan is a part of China. Other countries are expected to reinforce their diplomatic relationship with Beijing and adhere more strongly to the One China Principle – further isolating Taiwan. Despite these trends, some of the most powerful countries still hold strong ties to Taiwan, while maintaining a politically ambiguous status.

The P.R.C. is notorious for playing long game diplomacy to reclaim its former dynastic glory. The One China Principle is a form of institutional lawfare designed to convince states to ultimately accept that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States, in particular, given its outsized role in Taiwan-China relations, cannot allow the P.R.C. to dictate how the world views Taiwan. A whole-of-government effort could coalesce neatly under a counter-lawfare concept to confront and challenge the P.R.C.'s manipulation of the One China Principle.[130] Disciplined and diplomatic resiliency, supported by continued ambiguity with other like-minded countries, will serve to counter the P.R.C.'s incremental encroachment in the Indo-Pacific region and sustain a peaceful status quo.

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[129] *See* Richard Haass and David Sacks, *American Support for Taiwan Must be Unambiguous*, FOREIGN AFFS. (Sep. 2, 2020), https://fam.ag/3XT3pne; *see also* Thomas J. Christensen et al., *How to Avoid a War Over Taiwan*, FOREIGN AFFS. (Oct. 13, 2022), https://fam.ag/4gQjIdd; *Why the Absurd One-China Policy Must be Upheld*, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://econ.st/4gV8Med; Gordon, *supra* note 28, at 71.

[130] Bill Gertz, *Pacific Command Legal Office Prepares Military Forces For Future Fight With China*, WASHINGTON TIMES (Feb. 6, 2024), https://bit.ly/4gVsG9e (identifies military lawyers conducting counter legal warfare and information operations designed to prevent China from achieving its military objectives); *see J06 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate*, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND, https://bit.ly/4gT1qIa (Counter-lawfare is a cross-functional concept that encompasses a range of functions centered on the law and enhancing legitimacy of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's activities while exposing flawed legal narratives and illuminating activities of those who challenge the rules-based international order and a free and open Indo-Pacific.).

APPENDIX THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE SURVEY

Country	One China Principle Scale	Date of Official Relations with the P.R.C.[i]	One China Principle Position on China's Govt.[ii]	One China Principle Position on Taiwan[iii]	Type of Govt.	Region	GDP	GDP per capita	P.R.C. Foreign Investment	BRI	Power Index	HDI	Comments
Albania	1	1949	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$43 Billion	$15,500	$7.8 million	Yes		74	
Andorra	1	1994	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Democracy	Europe and Eurasia	$3 Billion	$49,900	No data	No		35	
Angola	1	1983	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$210 Billion	$5,900	$3.79 billion	Yes		150	
Antigua and Barbuda	1	1983	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$2 Billion	$22,300	$23.97 million	Yes		54	
Armenia	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Democracy	Europe and Eurasia	$45 Billion	$16,100	$44.7 million	Yes		76	
Azerbaijan	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$153 Billion	$15,100	$312.2 million	Yes	57	89	
Bahamas	1	1997	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$14 Billion	$34,700	$2.4 million	No		57	
Belarus	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic In Name, Although In Fact A Dictatorship	Europe and Eurasia	$176 Billion	$19,100	$400 million	Yes	30	69	
Bolivia	1	1985	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$101 Billion	$8,200	$2 billion	Yes		120	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1995	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$54 Billion	$16,700	$1 billion	Yes		80	

Botswana	1	1975	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$41 Billion	$15,500	$2 billion	Yes		114	
Costa Rica	1	2007	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$114 Billion	$22,100	$1.1 billion	Yes	74	64	
Croatia	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$132 Billion	$34,300	$<1 billion or $220 million	Yes	79	39	
Czechia (also known as the Czech Republic)	1	1949	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$438 Billion	$41,100	$1 billion	Yes	66	32	
Dominica	1	2004	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Western Hemisphere	$1 Billion	$11,500	$310 million	Yes		97	
Dominican Republic	1	2018	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$217 Billion	$19,300	$194 million	Yes	75	82	Switched to P.R.C. in 2018[i]
El Salvador	1	2018	Recognize P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China (province inalienable part) [hereinafter "Recognize P.R.C. government"]	Recognize Taiwan as part of China or [hereinafter "Recognize Taiwan as part of China"]	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$60 Billion	$9,400	$310 million	Yes	60	127	Switched to P.R.C. in 2018[ii] BRI in 2018 BRI in 2019
Eritrea	1	1993	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$10 Billion	$1,600	$950 million	Yes		175	

Estonia	1	1991	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$51 Billion	$37,700	No data	Yes	87	31			
France	1	1964	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$3,120 Billion	$45,900	$35 billion	No	7	28			
Gambia	1	1974	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$6 Billion	$2,100	$214 million	Yes		174	Switched back to P.R.C. in 2016[i] BRI in 2018		
Georgia	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$63 Billion	$17,100	$370 million	Yes		60			
Guinea Bissau	1	1974	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$4 Billion	$1,900	$170 million	Yes		179			
Honduras	1	2023	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$60 Billion	$5,700	$450 million	Yes	72	138	Switched to P.R.C. in 2023[ii] BRI in 2023		
Israel	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Democracy	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$424 Billion	$44,400	$5.7 billion	No	11	25			
Jordan	1	1977	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$107 Billion	$9,500	$2 billion	Yes	61	99			

Kazakhstan	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	South and Central Asia	$512 Billion	$26,100		$20 billion	Yes	50	67		
Kyrgyzstan	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	South and Central Asia	$35 Billion	$5,100	$860 million		Yes		117		
Latvia	1	1991	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$62 Billion	$33,000	No data	Yes	Yes	86	37		
Lesotho	1	1983[j]	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Sub-Saharan Africa	$5 Billion	$2,200	$513 million	Yes			168		
Lithuania	1	1991[l]	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$113 Billion	$40,000	No data	Yes	Yes	84	37		
Malawi	1	2007[m]	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$30 Billion	$1,500	$100 million	Yes			172		
Maldives	1	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	South and Central Asia	$11 Billion	$21,300	$100 million	Yes			87		
Moldova (Republic of)	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$34 Billion	$13,300	$82 million	Yes			86		
Montenegro	1	2006	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$14 Billion	$22,100	$100 million	Yes			50		

Namibia	1	1990	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$25 Billion	$9,800	$4 billion	Yes		142		
Nauru	1	2024	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	<$1 Billion	$11,000	$5 million	No		122	Switched to P.R.C. in 2024[i]	
													BRI TBD	
Nicaragua	1	1985	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$40 Billion	$5,800	$300 million	Yes		130	Switched back to P.R.C. in 2021[ii]	
													BRI in 2022	
Niger	1	1974	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$33 Billion	$1,300	$6 billion	Yes		189		
North Macedonia	1	2001	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$35 Billion	$17,100	$1.4 billion	Yes		83	Switched to P.R.C. in 2002[iii]	
													BRI in 2013	
Panama	1	2017	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$147 Billion	$33,300	$310 million	Yes	65	57	Switched to P.R.C. in 2017[iv]	
													BRI in 2017	
Poland	1	1949	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$1,388 Billion	$37,700	$1 billion	Yes	37	36		
Portugal	1	1979	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$372 Billion	$35,800	$9 billion	Yes	39	42		

Romania	1	1949	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$619 Billion	$32,500	$808 million	Yes	78	53		
Serbia	1	1949	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$139 Billion	$20,900	$5 billion	Yes	71	65		
Slovakia (also known as the Slovak Republic)	1	1949[i]	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$180 Billion	$33,200	$130 million	Yes	85	45		
Slovenia	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$87 Billion	$41,000	$1 billion	Yes	83	22		
Solomon Islands	1	2019	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	East Asia and the Pacific	$2 Billion	$2,200	$200 million	Yes		156	Switched to P.R.C. in 2019[ii] BRI in 2019	
South Africa	1	1998	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Parliamentary Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$807 Billion	$13,500	$11 billion	Yes	29	110		
South Sudan	1	2011	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$20 Billion	$1,600	$6 billion	Yes		192		
Sudan	1	1959	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$167 Billion	$3,600	$260 million	Yes		170		
Switzerland	1	1950	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Federal Republic (Formally A Confederation)	Europe and Eurasia	$634 Billion	$72,300	$62 billion	No	21	1		

Tajikistan	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	South and Central Asia	$41 Billion	$4,100							
Timor-Leste	1	2002	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Semi-Presidential Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$5 Billion	$3,900	$113 million	Yes			155		
Tonga	1	1998	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Constitutional Monarchy	East Asia and the Pacific	$1 Billion	$6,100	$427 million	Yes			98		
Turkmenistan	1	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic; Authoritarian	South and Central Asia	$95 Billion	$14,700	$2 billion	Yes			94		
Uganda	1	1962	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$108 Billion	$2,300	$3 billion	Yes			159		
Viet Nam	1	1950	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Communist State	East Asia and the Pacific	$1,119 billion	$11,400	$10 billion	Yes	27		107		
Burkina Faso	1	2018	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$49 Billion	$2,200	$447 million	No			185	Switched to P.R.C. in 2018[i]	
Kiribati	1	1980	Recognize P.R.C. government	Recognize Taiwan as part of China	Presidential Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	<$1 Billion	$2,000	$161 million	Yes			137	Switched back to P.R.C. in 2019[ii]	BRI TBD
														BRI in 2020	

Russian Federation	1	1949	Respects and supports the position of the P.R.C. over Taiwan	Respects and supports the position of the P.R.C. over Taiwan	Semi-Presidential Federation	Europe and Eurasia	$4,027 Billion	$27,500	$34 billion	Yes	3	56	While "respects and supports" are similar to "understands and respects," Russia has made clear that it is a support of the One China Principle
Bulgaria	1	1949[iii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[iii]	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$174 Billion	$27,000	$120 million	Yes	82	70	
Cambodia	1	1958	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[iv]	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	East Asia and the Pacific	$76 Billion	$4,500	$13 Billion	Yes	62	148	
Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos)	1	1961[v]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[vi]	Communist State	East Asia and the Pacific	$60 Billion	$7,900	$16 Billion	Yes		139	Countries who recognized the P.R.C. decades ago are now coming out with statements that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China
Nepal	1	1955[vii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[viii]	Federal Parliamentary Republic	South and Central Asia	$122 Billion	$4,000	$1 billion	Yes		146	Countries who recognized the P.R.C. decades ago are now coming out with statements that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China

North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)	1	1949[i]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Unknown	Dictatorship, Single-Party State	East Asia and the Pacific	$40 Billion	$1,700	$2 billion	No		164	China is North Korea's closest ally, so they are listed here in Category I	
Pakistan	1	1951[ii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[iii]	Federal Parliamentary Republic	South and Central Asia	$1,268 Billion	$5,400	$16 billion	Yes			Countries who recognized the P.R.C. decades ago are now coming out with statements that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China	
Sri Lanka	1	1957	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[iv]	Presidential Republic	South and Central Asia	$271 Billion	$12,200	$4 billion	Yes	53	78	Countries who recognized the P.R.C. decades ago are now coming out with statements that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China	
Tanzania, United Republic of	1	1961[v]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[vi]	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$167 Billion	$2,600	$1 billion	Yes		167	Countries who recognized the P.R.C. decades ago are now coming out with statements that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China	
Zambia	1	1964[vii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Recognize Taiwan as part of China[viii]	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$67 billion	$3,400	$4 billion	Yes		153	Countries who recognized the P.R.C. decades ago are now coming out with statements that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China	

Argentina	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C. claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$1,039 Billion	$22,500	$1.7 billion	Yes	47	48	
Australia	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	East Asia and the Pacific	$1,329 Billion	$51,100	$106 Billion	No	17	10	
Austria	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$505 Billion	$55,900	$1 Billion	Yes	38	22	
Barbados	2	1977	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$4 Billion	$15,400	$243 million	Yes		62	
Belgium	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Federal Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$623 Billion	$53,300	$5 billion	No	28	12	
Benin	2	1964	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$46 Billion	$3,400	$3 billion	Yes		173	
Brazil	2	1974	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Federal Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$3,250 Billion	$15,100	$71 billion	No	19	89	
Cameroon	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$104 Billion	$3,700	$9 billion	Yes		151	
Canada	2	1970	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$1,907 Billion	$49,000	$58 billion	No	13	18	
Chad	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$25 Billion	$1,400	$2 billion	Yes		189	

Chile	2	1970	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$507 Billion	$25,900	$18 billion	Yes	55	44			
Colombia	2	1980	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$810 Billion	$15,600	$7 billion	No	44	91			
Comoros	2	1975	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$3 Billion	$3,200	$302 million	Yes		152			
Cote d'Ivoire	2	1983	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$156 Billion	$5,500	$7 billion	Yes		166			
Cyprus	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$41 Billion	$45,000	No data	Yes	81	29			
Denmark	2	1950	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Understands and respects" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$354 Billion	$59,900	$730 million	No	32	5			
Djibouti	2	1979	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$6 Billion	$5,000	$700 million	Yes		171			
Ecuador	2	1980	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$195 Billion	$10,900	$6 billion	Yes	68	83			
Equatorial Guinea	2	1970	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$25 Billion	$14,900	$9 billion	Yes		133			

Ethiopia	2	1970	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Parliamentary Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$294 Billion	$2,400	$2 billion	Yes		176	
Fiji	2	1975	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$12 Billion	$12,400	No data	Yes		104	
Gabon	2	1974	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$33 Billion	$13,900	$400 million	Yes		123	
Greece	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$331 Billion	$31,700	$9 billion	Yes	43	33	
Grenada	2	1985	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$2 Billion	$14,500	$490 million	Yes		73	
Guyana	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	Western Hemisphere	$29 Billion	$35,600	$5 billion	Yes		95	
Hungary	2	1949	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Understands and respects" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$341 Billion	$35,400	$8 billion	Yes	67	47	
Iceland	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Unitary Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$21 Billion	$55,600	No data	No		3	
Indonesia	2	1950	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$3,419 Billion	$12,400	$44 billion	Yes	36	112	

Iran	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Theocratic Republic	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$1,369 Billion	$15,500	$5 billion	Yes	18	78	
Ireland	2	1979	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$577 Billion	$12,400	$8 billion	No	48	7	
Italy	2	1970	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$2,611 Billion	$44,300	$24 billion	No'	16	30	
Jamaica	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Democracy (Parliament) Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$29 Billion	$10,100	$1 billion	Yes		115	
Japan	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Understands and respects" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	East Asia and the Pacific	$5,210 Billion	$41,600	$13 billion	No	8	24	
Kuwait	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Constitutional Monarchy (Emirate)	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$211 Billion	$49,400	$650 million	Yes		49	
Lebanon	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Republic	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$73 Billion	$13,000	$490 million	Yes	49	109	
Liberia	2	1977	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$8 Billion	$1,500	$520 million	Yes		177	
Luxembourg	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$77 Billion	$117,700	$5 billion	Yes	45	20	

Madagascar	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Semi-Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$44 Billion	$1,500	$140 million	Yes		178	
Malaysia	2	1974	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Federal Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	East Asia and the Pacific	$963 Billion	$28,400	$24 billion	Yes	42	63	
Malta	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$26 Billion	$48,600	$440 million	Yes		25	
Mauritius	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$29 Billion	$22,800	$740 million	Yes		72	
Micronesia (Federated States of)	2	1989	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Republic In Free Association With The US	East Asia and the Pacific	<$1 Billion	$3,300	$204 million	Yes		135	
Netherlands (Kingdom of the)	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Respects" P.R.C.'s claim *that Taiwan is a province of the P.R.C.*	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy; Part Of The Kingdom Of The Netherlands	Europe and Eurasia	$1,049 Billion	$59,200	$22 billion	No	25	10	
New Zealand	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	East Asia and the Pacific	$232 Billion	$45,200	$4 billion	Yes	31	16	
Nigeria	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$1,085 Billion	$5,000	$7 billion	Yes		160	
Norway	2	1954	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$368 Billion	$67,500	$8 billion	No	35	2	

Oman	2	1978	Recognize P.R.C. government	No mention explicit of Taiwan's sovereignty	Absolute Monarchy	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$162 Billion	$35,300	$2 billion	Yes	56	59	
Peru	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$434 Billion	$12,700	$28 billion	Yes	70	87	
Philippines	2	1975	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Understands and respects" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$992 Billion	$8,600	$7 billion	Yes	46	113	
Rwanda	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No mention explicit of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$33 Billion	$2,400	$120 million	Yes		161	
Samoa	2	1975	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$1 Billion	$5,200	$110 million	Yes		116	
San Marino	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$2 Billion	$61,600	No data	No		43	
Sao Tome and Principe	2	2016	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Semi-Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$1 Billion	$3,400	$270 million	No		141	Switched to P.R.C. in 2016
Saudi Arabia	2	1990	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Absolute Monarchy	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$1,827 Billion	$50,200	$14 billion	Yes	9	40	BRI TBD
Senegal	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$62 Billion	$3,600	$4 billion	Yes		169	

Seychelles	2	1976	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$3 Billion	$25,200	$163 million	Yes		67		
Sierra Leone	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$14 Billion	$1,600	$5 billion	Yes		184		
South Korea (Republic of Korea)	2	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Respects" P.R.C.'s claim that *Taiwan is a province of the P.R.C.*	Presidential Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$2,352 Billion	$45,600	$13 billion	Yes	6			
Spain	2	1973	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$1,922 Billion	$40,200	$11 billion	No	20	27		
Surname	2	1976	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$9 Billion	$15,000	$360 million	Yes		124		
Thailand	2	1975	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Constitutional Monarchy	East Asia and the Pacific	$1,255 Billion	$17,500	$7 billion	Yes	33	66		
Togo	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$19 Billion	$2,200	$190 million	Yes		163		
Turkiye (Turkey)	2	1971	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$2,817 Billion	$33,100	$6 billion	Yes	15	45		
Ukraine	2	1949	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Semi-Presidential Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$380 Billion	$10,700	$180 million	Yes	14	100		
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2	1972	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Acknowledge" P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Europe and Eurasia	$3,187 Billion	$47,600	$101 billion	No	5	15		

United States of America	2	1979	Recognize P.R.C. government	*"Acknowledge" P.R.C. position that Taiwan is part of China*	Federal Republic	Western Hemisphere	$21,538 Billion	$64,600	$195 billion	No	1	20	The United States "acknowledges" the P.R.C. position, not the P.R.C. claim.
Uruguay	2	1988	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of"[v] P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$84 Billion	$24,400	$323 million	Yes	80	52		
Uzbekistan	2	1992	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic; Highly Authoritarian	South and Central Asia	$288 Billion	$8,100	$3 billion	Yes	51	106		
Vanuatu	2	1982	Recognize P.R.C. government	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$1 Billion	$2,800	$594 million	Yes		140		
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	2	1974	Recognize P.R.C. government	"Take note of"[vi] P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan	Federal Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$269 billion	$7,704	$5 billion	Yes		119		
Algeria	2	1958[i]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty[ii]	Presidential Republic	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$503 Billion	$11,200	$28 Billion	Yes	52	93		
Egypt	2	1956[iii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty[iv]	Presidential Republic	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$1,419 Billion	$12,800	$25 billion	Yes	34	105		
Finland	2	1950[v]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	Does not take a position on Taiwan's international status[vi]	Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$275 Billion	$49,400	$17 billion	No	41	12		
Guinea	2	1959[vii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty[viii]	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$37 billion	$2,700	$8 billion	Yes		181		

India	2	1950[i]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No mention of explicit Taiwan's sovereignty[ii]	Federal Parliamentary Republic	South and Central Asia	$10,079 Billion	$7,100	$17 billion	No	12	134			
Iraq	2	1958[iii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty[iv]	Federal Parliamentary Republic	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$409 Billion	$9,200	$14 billion	Yes		128			
Kenya	2	1963[v]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$264 Billion	$4,900	$1 billion	Yes	73	146			
Liechtenstein	2	1950[vi]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty[vii]	Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$5 Billion	$139,100	No data	No		12			
Mauritania	2	1965[viii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$25 Billion	$5,300	$2 billion	Yes		164			
Monaco	2	1995[ix]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$8 Billion	$115,700	No Data	No					
Mongolia	2	1949[x]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty[xi]	Semi-Presidential Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$41 Billion	$12,100	$5 billion	Yes		96			
Myanmar (formerly known as Burma)	2	1950[xii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	"Understands and supports" China's stance on the Taiwan issue[xiii]	Military Regime	East Asia and the Pacific	$230 Billion	$4,200	$7 billion	Yes	58	144			
Somalia	2	1960[xiv]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Parliamentary Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$25 Billion	$1,400	$77 million	Yes		193			

Syrian Arab Republic	2	1956[i]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No mention explicit of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic; Highly Authoritarian Regime	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$50 Billion	$2,900	$4 billion	Yes		157		
Tunisia	2	1964[ii]	Recognizes the P.R.C.	No explicit mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$131 Billion	$10,600	$349 million	Yes	77	101		
Afghanistan	3	1955	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Theocratic / Provisional Government	South and Central Asia	$61 Billion	$1,500	$3.28 Billion	Yes	N/A	182		
Bahrain	3	1989	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Constitutional Monarchy	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$76 Billion	$51,900	No data	Yes	59	34		
Bangladesh	3	1975	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	South and Central Asia	$1,072 Billion	$6,300	$7 billion	Yes	40	129		
Brunei Darussalam	3	1991	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Absolute Monarchy Or Sultanate	East Asia and the Pacific	$26 Billion	$58,700	$3 billion	Yes		55		
Burundi	3	1963	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$9 Billion	$700	$507 million	Yes		187		
Cabo Verde	3	1976	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$4 Billion	$7,400	$498 million	Yes		131		

Central African Republic	3	1964	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$5 Billion	$800	$724 million	Yes		191		
Congo, Republic of the	3	1964	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$22 Billion	$3,700	$1 billion	Yes		149		
Cuba	3	1960	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	Communist State	Western Hemisphere	$137 Billion	$12,300	$500 million	Yes		85		
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire)	3	1972	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	Semi-Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$112 Billion	$1,100	$18 billion	Yes		180		
Germany	3	1972[1]	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Parliamentary Republic	Europe and Eurasia	$4,523 Billion	$54,000	$52 billion	No	4	7		
Ghana	3	1960	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$183 Billion	$5,500	$3 billion	Yes	63	145		
Libya	3	1978	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	In Transition	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$135 Billion	$19,800	$465 million	Yes		92		
Mali	3	1960	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate	No mention Taiwan's sovereignty	Semi-Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$48 Billion	$2,100	$260 million	Yes		188		

Mexico	3		No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Federal Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$2,583 Billion	$20,300	$5 billion	No	26	77		
Morocco	3	1958	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$307 Billion	$8,100	$970 million	Yes	54	120		
Mozambique	3	1975	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$41 Billion	$1,300	$5 billion	Yes		183		
Papua New Guinea	3	1976	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	East Asia and the Pacific	$38 Billion	$3,800	$2 billion	Yes		154		
Qatar	3	1988	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Absolute Monarchy	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$260 Billion	$96,600	$1 billion	Yes	22	40		
Singapore	3	1990	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	East Asia and the Pacific	$609 Billion	$108,000	$44 billion	Yes		9		
Sweden	3	1950	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Europe and Eurasia	$580 Billion	$55,300	$17 billion	No	23	5		
Trinidad and Tobago	3	1974	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Parliamentary Republic	Western Hemisphere	$36 Billion	$23,300	$1 billion	Yes		60		

United Arab Emirates	3	1984	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	In Transition	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$707 Billion	$74,900	$8 billion	Yes	10	17		
Yemen	3	1956	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	In Transition	Near East (Middle East and Northern Africa)	$74 billion	$2,500	$470 million	Yes		186		
Zimbabwe	3	1980	No mention of P.R.C. as sole legitimate government of China	No mention of Taiwan's sovereignty	Presidential Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	$36 billion	$2,200	$4 billion	Yes	69	159		
Belize	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$4 Billion	$9,500	No data	No		118		
Eswatini	4	None	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Absolute Monarchy	Sub-Saharan Africa	$11 Billion	$9,100	No data	No		142		
Guatemala	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$159 Billion	$9,200	No data	No	64	136		
Haiti	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Semi-Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$32 Billion	$2,800	No data	No		158		
Marshall Islands	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Mixed Presidential-Parliamentary System In Free Association With The US	East Asia and the Pacific	<$1 Billion	$6,000	$5 billion	No		102	Compact of Free Association with the United States since 1986.[1]	

Palau	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Presidential Republic In Free Association With The US	East Asia and the Pacific	<$1 Billion	$14,100	No data	No	71	Compact of Free Association with the United States since 1994.[i]	
Paraguay	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Presidential Republic	Western Hemisphere	$92 Billion	$13,500	$76 million	No	102	Recognized the ROC since 1957[iii]	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Federal Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$1 Billion	$28,800	No data	No	51	Recognized the ROC since 1983 (established independence in 1983)[iii]	
Saint Lucia	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$3 Billion	$15,100	$56 million	No	108	Recognized the ROC since 2007[iv]	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	4	N/A	Recognize Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	Western Hemisphere	$2 Billion	$14,600	No data	No	81	Recognized the ROC since 1981[v]	
Tuvalu	4	N/A	Recognizes Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Parliamentary Democracy Under A Constitutional Monarchy; A Commonwealth Realm	East Asia and the Pacific	<$1 Billion	$4,600	No data	No		132	Recognized the ROC since 1979[vi]
Vatican (also known as Holy See)[vii]	4	N/A	Recognizes Taiwan	Does not adhere to the One China Principle	Ecclesiastical Elective Monarchy; Self-Described As An "Absolute Monarchy"	Europe and Eurasia	N/A	N/A	No data	No			Recognized the ROC since 1942[viii]
Bhutan	N/A	None	No relations	No relations	Constitutional Monarchy	South and Central Asia	$9 Billion	$11,600	No data	No	125	Bhutan shares a southwest border with the P.R.C. but maintains no official	

[i] Compiled via miscellaneous news reports and government websites. If the date was questionable, I included a citation for clarification.

[ii] Chong, *supra* note 59. Some countries have additional citations for clarification.

[iii] *Id.*

[iv] MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE DOMENICAN REPUBLIC (May 1, 2018, 08:24 AM), https://bit.ly/3ZSMgwB.

[v] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 118; *see* Chris Horton, *El Salvador Recognizes China in Blow to Taiwan,* N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2018), https://nyti.ms/4etrb08.

[vi] *New Gambia Government Says Committed To "One-China" Policy*, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2017, 03:03 AM), https://reut.rs/40bX4Gv.

[vii] Amy Chang Chien & Emiliano Rodriguez Mega, *In Blow to Taiwan, Honduras Switches Relations to China*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2023), https://nyti.ms/4dzi5Oe.

[viii] Some countries recognized then severed official ties with the P.R.C., only to re-establish them later. See *Lesotho, China Celebrate 30 Years of Friendship*, THE REPORTER (Jan. 15, 2024), https://bit.ly/4gMVsc5.

[ix] Augustas Stankevičius, *Vilnius and Beijing are in talks on normalizing relations – Lithuanian FM*, LITH. NAT'L RADIO & TELEVISION (Nov. 10, 2023, 12:33 PM), https://bit.ly/3ByBf9G (P.R.C.-Lithuanian relations are in transition).

[x] *Malawi Confirms Establishment of Diplomatic Relations With China*, CHINADAILY.COM (Jan. 14, 2008, 10:53 PM), https://bit.ly/3Bsy5UM.

[xi] Woo, *supra* note 117.

[xii] JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA ON THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, *supra* note 116.

[xiii] MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (Apr. 18, 2002, 00:00 AM), https://bit.ly/4eV9cjd.

[xiv] *Panama Cuts Ties With Taiwan In Favour Of China*, BBC (Jun. 13, 2017), https://bbc.in/3XXCdnz.

[xv] Under the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which later became Serbia.

[xvi] Under the Czechoslovak Republic, which later became Slovakia.

[xvii] *Solomon Islands forms ties with China after Taiwan break,* THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sep. 21, 2019), https://yhoo.it/3zNQhHZ.

[xviii] EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND BURKINA FASO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (May 26, 2018, 09:20 AM), https://bit.ly/3YaDdpz.

[xix] MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI (Sep. 28, 2019, 02:40 AM), https://bit.ly/3NedFBz.

[xx] Under the Soviet Socialist Republics until December 25, 1991.

[xxi] Vladimir Shopov, *Thousands Of Contacts To Flourish: How China Competes For Influence In Bulgaria – A Comprehensive Analysis Of The Chinese Presence In Bulgaria,* EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sep. 2021), https://bit.ly/3YcCkwN.

[xxii] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also* Ambassador Yu, Speech The Relationship Between China and Bulgaria: Present and Future (Apr. 25, 2017), https://bit.ly/47XCUBH.
(confirming adherence to the PRC version of the One China Principle).

[xxiii] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see* also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ BETWEEN THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sep. 16, 2023), https://bit.ly/47WZTBF. In the Comminque, it states:

> The Cambodian side reaffirms resolute adherence to the One-China Policy, that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole lawful government representing the whole of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory and China's internal affairs, brooking no foreign interference. Cambodia opposes any attempt to interfere in China's internal affairs or to block or contain China under the subterfuge of Taiwan, or any form of separatist activities seeking "Taiwan independence." Cambodia resolutely supports China's every effort to achieve national reunification and will not develop any form of official relations with Taiwan."

Id.

[xxiv] *List of States which LAO PDR has Established Diplomatic Relations Since 1950*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF LAOS, https://bit.ly/3BCiClm.

[xxv] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao PDR*, LAO NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 8, 2022), https://bit.ly/3TVvaKA (Lao PDR "reaffirms its consistent policy of supporting "One China Policy" and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and opposes any intention aiming at creating a situation for 'two China' or 'one China, one Taiwan.'").

[xxvi] *Nepal-China Relations*, GOV'T OF NEPAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. (Feb. 2019), https://bit.ly/47TU43e.

[xxvii] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also* MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND NEPAL (Oct. 13, 2019, 6:56 PM), https://bit.ly/4eQewUX ("The Nepali side reiterated its firm commitment to One China policy, acknowledging that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory and Tibet Affairs are China's internal affairs, and the determination on not allowing any anti-China activities on its soil.").

[xxviii] Daniel Wertz, JJ Oh & Kim Insung, *DPRK Diplomatic Relations, Issue Brief*, NAT'L COMMITTEE ON NORTH KOREA (Aug. 2016), https://bit.ly/3XXL9Jk.

[xxix] Jamal Afridi & Jayshree Bajoria, *China-Pakistan Relations*, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jul. 6, 2010, 08:00 AM), https://on.cfr.org/3Nfmtak.

[xxx] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also* USC US-CHINA INSTITUTE, CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT DECLARATION, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 (Nov. 4, 2003), https://bit.ly/3XXLfAG. In That Joint Declaration it states:

> The Pakistani side reaffirms that it will continue to consistently adhere to the one-China policy, and recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China and Taiwan an inalienable and indivisible part of Chinese territory, and fully support China's cause of peaceful reunification.

Id.

[xxxi] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also* MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, JOINT PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA (Mar. 4, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3NcQKqn. In that Joint Comminique, it states:

> The Sri Lankan side reiterated its consistent position that there is only one China in the world, that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory. Sri Lanka remains firmly committed to the one China policy, opposes any form of "Taiwan independence" including "de jure independence" and opposes participation of Taiwan in any international and regional organizations which are composed of sovereign states. Respecting each other's major concerns, Sri Lanka will not develop any official link with Taiwan and supports all efforts by the Chinese Government to achieve national reunification. The Chinese side highly appreciates the above position of Sri Lanka.

Id.

[xxxiii] *Tanzania*, CHINA.ORG (Oct. 10, 2006), https://on.china.cn/3NbOwaR.

[xxxiv] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also* MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, JOINT STATEMENT ON ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (Nov. 3, 2022, 9:49 PM), https://bit.ly/3Ya8mJN ("The Tanzanian side reaffirmed its firm commitment to the one-China principle, regards Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, and opposes any actions or remarks that undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.").

[xxxv] *China and Zambia Celebrated the 55th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations*, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA (Nov. 1, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://bit.ly/3zDhRI5.

[xxxvi] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also* MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA (Feb. 4, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3ZS5L8s. In that Joint Comminique, it states:

> The Zambian side reaffirmed its commitment to the one China policy and its opposition to "Taiwan independence" in any form, including "de jure Taiwan independence," and Taiwan's attempt to join any international or regional organisation consisting only of sovereign states. The Zambian side will not enter into any official relations or have any official contacts with Taiwan and supports the efforts made by the Chinese side to realise national reunification. The Chinese side highly appreciated this principled position of the Zambian side.

Id.

[xxxvii] Italy official pulled out of the B.R.I. on December 6, 2023. Mazzocco & Palazzi, *Italy Withdraws from China's Belt and Road Initiative*, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Dec. 14, 2023), https://bit.ly/3zPXTtE.

[xxxviii] J.R. Wu & Ben Blanchard, *Taiwan Loses Another Ally, Says Won't Help China Ties*, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2016, 12:40 AM), https://reut.rs/3ZOB4RJ.

[xxxix] *Algeria, China: Exceptional Achievements in 60 Years of Diplomatic Relations*, ALGERIE PRESSE SERV. (Dec. 20, 2018, 12:22 AM), https://bit.ly/3XOUQd8.

[xl] *See Xi Jinping Meets with Algerian Prime Minister Ayman Benabderrahmane*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA (Dec. 10, 2022, 9:39 PM), https://bit.ly/4ewGDsw.

[xli] *China-Egypt Relations*, CHINA.ORG (Jan. 18, 2004), https://on.china.cn/47TWG0O.

[xlii] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi of Egypt Meets with Qin Gang*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF CHINA (Jan. 16, 2023), https://bit.ly/3zNmr6s (the leaders of the three countries reaffirmed that they will adhere to the One China principle position).

[xliii] Andreas B. Forsby, *The Precarious State of the Nordic Countries' One China Policy*, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 27, 2024), https://bit.ly/3YbyJir.

[xliv] MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF FINLAND, FINLAND'S CHINA ACTION PLAN 12 (Jun. 2010), https://bit.ly/3NgDT6G ("Finland considers stability in the Taiwan Strait important. Finland welcomes the improvement in cross strait relations; this may open up new perspectives for both Finland and the EU.").

[xlv] *Guinea*, CHINA.ORG (Oct. 10, 2006), https://bit.ly/3YdSp5t.

[xlvi] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also China, Guinea Vow To Further Parliamentary Exchange*, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA (Jul. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3ZO9rYY (reaffirming Guinea would adhere to the one-China policy).

[xlvii] *Joint Communiqué On The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between The People's Republic Of China and The Republic Of India* EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA (Jan. 16, 2002, 10:18 AM), https://bit.ly/4ezAsUw.

[xlviii] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India*, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFS. GOV'T INDIA (Jan. 14, 2008), https://bit.ly/47XZYjD. The statement reads:

> The Indian side recalls that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and that its one China policy has remained unaltered. The Indian side states that it would continue to abide by its one China policy, and oppose any activity that is against the one China principle. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position.

Id.

[xlix] *Bilateral Relations between China and Iraq*, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ (Apr. 11, 2013, 8:57 PM), https://bit.ly/4eONOfi.

[l] ONE CHINA POLICIES DATABASE, *supra* note 117; *see also Xi Says China to Expand Cooperation with Iraq*, XINHUANET (Aug. 18, 2021, 10:55 PM), https://bit.ly/3BCn7MM ("[Iraq] firmly adheres to the one-China policy.").

[li] Adekunle Agbetiloye, *Kenya Reaffirms Support For One-China Policy Amidst Diplomatic Engagement*, BUSINESS INSIDER AFRICA (Jan. 26, 2024), https://bit.ly/3YcH5GF; *see also* Chinese Foreign Ministry, *Kenya*, CHINA.ORG (Oct. 10, 2006), https://on.china.cn/3TYWzvc.

[lii] Chen Junxia and Martina Fuchs, *Interview: Liechtenstein aims to strengthen ties with China – PM*, XINHUANET (Jun. 6, 2021, 2:59 PM), https://bit.ly/3ZSR9pr.

[liii] *Id.*

[liv] *Mauritania*, CHINA.ORG (Oct. 10, 2006), https://on.china.cn/3YdBxLW.

[lv] *China and Monaco*, PRINCIPALITY OF MONACO (2024), https://bit.ly/3YfQdt1.

[lvi] MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF MONGOLIA, MONGOLIA-CHINA RELATIONS (Jan. 17, 2021), https://bit.ly/47Yh4xR.

[lvii] *See* Zhao Jia, *Mongolia Says It Firmly Supports the One-China Principle*, CHINADAILY.COM (Aug. 8, 2022, 3:17 PM), https://bit.ly/3zZrCQK.

[lviii] *List of Countries Having Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of the Union of Myanmar*, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYAN. IN BRAZ., https://bit.ly/3ZZVfMm.

[lviii] Sebastian Strangio, *Myanmar's Shadow Government Issues 10-Point China Policy*, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 3, 2024), https://bit.ly/3YdIxsq ("Myanmar reiterated that it sticks to the One-China policy, understands and supports China's stance on the Taiwan issue, Tibet-related issues and Xinjiang-related issues.").
[lix] *Our [Somalia] Diplomatic Relations*, SOMALI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. (Jul 24, 2011), https://bit.ly/3YcU4Ii.
[lx] *67 Years Passed And The Syrian Chinese Ties Towards Greater Hardness And Strength*, Syrian Arab News Agency (Sep. 22, 2023), https://bit.ly/4eSn9Oy.
[lxi] *Tunisia*, CHINA.ORG (Oct. 10, 2006), https://on.china.cn/3zNo0Bm.
[lxii] Bernd Schafer, Senior Research Scholar, Woodrow Wilson In't Ctr., Speech to the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Shangai Foundation: Relations between the People's Republic of China and the two German States, 1949–1990 (Jun. 2, 2011), https://bit.ly/47VSMEK.
[lxiii] THOMAS LUM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF12194, THE COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION 2 (2024), https://bit.ly/3TTEEWX.
[lxiv] *Id*.
[lxv] *Paraguay President-Elect Invited to Visit Taiwan*, TAIPEI TIMES (May 19, 2023), https://bit.ly/3TYCjdr.
[lxvi] *Saint Kitts and Nevis Celebrates 40 Years of Friendship with Taiwan*, ST KITTS NEVIS OBSERVER (Oct. 12, 2023), https://bit.ly/4gWtcna.
[lxvii] *St. Lucia Dumps PRC for Taiwan*, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 26, 2007), https://bit.ly/3zZsqVM.
[lxviii] *Bilateral Relations*, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) IN ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES (June 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/3XSgNYJ.
[lxix] Helen Davidson, *'Not About The Highest Bidder': The Countries Defying China to Stick with Taiwan*, GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2023, 7:01 PM), https://bit.ly/3NeJ86J.
[lxx] Holy See (Vatican) is a permanent observer. *Non-Member-States*, *supra* note 97.
[lxxi] Channing Lee, *What the Holy Don't See: A Catholic Defense of Vatican-Taiwan Relations*, GEO. U. BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS. (Apr. 28, 2022), https://bit.ly/4ex8fgW.
[lxxii] Shi Jiangtao, *Why Bhutan's Tilt Towards China May 'Significantly Change' Regional Dynamics*, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct 29, 2023), https://bit.ly/3BzESMF.